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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**WHAT IS GOING TO MOVE THE NEEDLE ON CITIZEN
PREPAREDNESS? CAN AMERICA CREATE A CULTURE
OF PREPAREDNESS?**

by

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March 2008

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CAN AMERICA CREATE A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS?**

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ABSTRACT

The federal government has called for the creation of a Culture of Preparedness. A literature review confirms a variety of studies have found that citizens are woefully unprepared for disasters. Citizens are no more prepared now than prior to Hurricane Katrina. The thesis identifies two major hurdles for a Culture of Preparedness: (1) changing government itself to embrace citizen preparedness as a forward deployment of assets and to provide the necessary leadership and funding for preparedness efforts, and (2) changing the behavior of the American people to embrace and act upon the message of preparedness.

The thesis reviews numerous federal documents highlighting the importance of citizen preparedness and juxtaposes stated policy to actual federal budget numbers. Lack of formal policy by state and local government is identified as a concern.

Defining and measuring citizen preparedness have yet to be accomplished. A persuasive campaign to change human behavior has yet to be created that incorporates social marketing, cause marketing, psychology and sociology. Case studies including seatbelt usage and breast cancer awareness are identified as models. Israel is discussed as a Culture of Preparedness.

Several recommendations and suggestions for developing a Culture of Preparedness are provided. Areas of further study are identified.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11, 2001, changed America in many ways. As our country accepted and embraced a new era, filled with uncertainty and fear of terrorism in major urban areas, surprisingly few citizens took personal responsibility for making sure they and their families have the skills, education, and supplies to survive on their own for a minimum of three days following a catastrophic event. Citizen preparedness and education is vital to our nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism, catastrophic events, or natural disasters. An engaged and educated citizenry understands instructions, follows orders, and is less prone to panic. An educated and prepared citizenry has managed expectations following a major event. A prepared citizenry can take care of itself for the first seventy-two hours post-disaster, allowing local government and first responders to focus on the most acute rescue needs, addressing mass casualties, keeping order, and restoring lifelines prior to the arrival of significant outside assistance.

Efforts to increase public preparedness and education have not penetrated deep into the American psyche, although national efforts have been made by organizations such as the American Red Cross, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others. Despite 9/11, the constant reminders of the instability of the world we live in and recognition of the devastation Mother Nature can cause, post-Katrina studies show Americans are no more prepared now than they were prior to this cataclysmic event. In comparing pre-Katrina and post-Katrina surveys, Professor Paul Light of New York University (NYU) found that Americans remain woefully unprepared for a catastrophic event and government is doing little effective work in preparing and educating the citizenry.¹ Studies conducted by the Council for Excellence in Government and

¹ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable: A Report on the State of Citizen Preparedness*, (New York: New York University Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, undated). Reports results of national survey conducted July 2005.

American Red Cross have found that Katrina has had little influence in changing the American citizenry's lack of active commitment to preparedness.²

Citizen preparedness has been referred to as "a national imperative."³ In 2004, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge stated: "We cannot secure America from inside the Beltway. Neither can we prepare citizens from an office or a boardroom. Homeland security must be a priority in every home, every city and every neighborhood across America."⁴ More recently, White House Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, in *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned* (herein referred to as the Townsend Report), clearly recognized the need to reassess the country's efforts with regard to citizen education, involvement, and preparedness. The Townsend Report calls for the creation of a "Culture of Preparedness," transforming homeland security in a "profound and enduring" manner.⁵ The report recognizes and underscores the fact that this transformation depends upon significant involvement of citizens in the overall preparedness efforts of the country.

Numerous studies show that Americans understand the threat of terrorism. They pay attention to government information regarding terrorism and disasters, and they were definitely impacted by Katrina.

Americans were clearly paying attention to the event. According to the Pew Research Center's News Interest Index, Katrina was one of the most watched events of the past quarter century. Seventy percent of Americans were paying very or fairly close attention to the hurricane and its aftermath, placing it only behind the Challenger accident, the September 11th attacks, and the 1989 San Francisco earthquake, and tying it with the Los Angeles riots that followed the acquittal of the officers in the Rodney King case...The question is what Americans learned in watching the

² Peter D. Hart and Public Opinion Strategies, *The AfterShock of Katrina and Rita: Public Not Moved to Prepare* (Washington, D.C.: Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, December 2005).

³ Staff, "Secretary Ridge to Encourage 'Public Readiness Index' for Communities, More Than 100 Homeland Security Leaders Voice Support," *U.S. Newswire*, January 27, 2005, www.nexis.com (accessed October 22, 2005).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁵ U.S. White House, "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," foreword by Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 23, 2006), 79.

Katrina catastrophe unfold...Indeed, pre- and post-Katrina surveys conducted by New York University suggest that Americans are no more prepared after Katrina than they had been before.⁶

The NYU studies made another significant finding: two-thirds of respondents stated that they pay a great deal, or fair amount, of attention to news stories or information distributed by the organizations in their local community, or the federal government, on how to prepare for a terrorist attack.⁷ This raises the obvious question: If two-thirds of Americans are “paying attention” to messages and information, then why are the preparedness numbers so abysmal? Given the Pew Center’s finding that 70% of Americans were paying attention to Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, nagging questions remain. What gets people to act in their own best interest to prepare for survival after a disaster? What motivates people to act for their own safety? Efforts at the national level to urge citizens to prepare are admirable but lacking in effectiveness, as the majority of Americans are not taking action and changing their behavior.

The Townsend Report was issued February 23, 2006. At the end of 2007, much still remains to be done in preparing Americans for disaster and creating a culture of preparedness. This effort requires a major shift in the behavior of the American people; even more important is changing the attitude of government – at all levels – toward the issue of citizen preparedness.

No longer can government view citizen preparedness as a “feel good” issue, relegated to an aside for funding, focused on only sporadically or once a year during a “preparedness month” press conference. Bold statements in speeches, reports, and national strategies can no longer refer to the priority and importance of citizen preparedness without serious augmentation of funding and a dramatic new approach to programs. Citizen preparedness has been woefully neglected and under-funded as part of the federal budget. Citizen preparedness – where urban areas are filled with persons skilled in surviving disaster and homes and communities prepared with a minimum of

⁶ Paul C. Light, *The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness: A Report on the Lessons Americans Learned in Watching the Katrina Catastrophe Unfold* (New York: New York University Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, undated). Results of national survey conducted October 2005, 1.

⁷ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 4.

seventy-two hours of supplies – must be viewed by homeland security officials and the traditional first responder community as a force multiplier and a forward deployment of assets. A serious, well-crafted, well-funded, and sustained effort can create a culture of preparedness which will be an essential life and death component to response and recovery efforts in the critical first seventy-two hours following the onset of a disaster.

Government needs to alter its view of citizen preparedness and make a long-term commitment to this vital asset – the prepared citizen and resilient community. Government must act in its own best interest in re-assessing its attitude toward citizen preparedness. Even in the post-Katrina environment, with FEMA on the mend, the federal government has stated its position clearly: localities are on their own for a minimum of seventy-two hours. Thus, the forward deployment of relief assets in homes and communities, and training and educating citizens to augment the first responder community as a force multiplier, should take on substantial importance. Sadly, budgets and programs do not reflect this most urgent mission for government – at any level.

A. THE RESEARCH QUESTION, DEFINING THE PROBLEM, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

Studies have shown that Americans are unprepared for disaster and unprepared for the psychological impact of terrorism. Funding remains woefully deficient for a serious and sustained preparedness effort in our country. Preparedness and education efforts have not resonated with the American public in urban areas. Urban areas must revolutionize the way in which they approach preparedness in order to create a social contagion leading to a culture of preparedness. Major urban areas cannot use a one-size-fits-all approach, given the complexities of socio-economic factors, large immigrant populations, and various cultural sensitivities.

There are several efforts afoot to address the issue of citizen preparedness. The country needs to realistically evaluate whether America can indeed create a culture of preparedness and what it will take to accomplish “profound and enduring” change. Given the ravages of Katrina, the possibility of further terrorist attacks upon the United States, and the certainty of other natural disasters occurring, what new methods and

strategies need to be implemented beyond what has already been tried? What successful models for issue awareness and education, leading to proactive measures and changing human behavior, have applicability to citizen preparedness efforts? What is the key that will finally unlock the puzzle of how to get the American public to actively embrace preparedness? How can concepts in the fields of marketing, sociology, and psychology be employed to create a social contagion of preparedness and effectuate a cultural change in the American public? Will government take citizen preparedness seriously and change its view of preparedness programs as “feel good” measures to recognizing the importance of the forward deployment of assets and creation of force multipliers in response and recovery efforts?

This thesis looks at many studies and polls that have taken place since 9/11 involving the issue of citizen preparedness – or lack thereof. There are many silos of research in the country that are looking at this phenomenon, all performing great work, but not necessarily working in concert to create a unified effort. The first issue to address with these disparate groups and authors of studies and articles is what constitutes *preparedness*. What are the goals of preparedness efforts and what is a culture of preparedness in that context? To some, preparedness is the storage of food and water, flashlight, radio, and batteries; to others it is these items plus an emergency plan. Many of the surveys use this as the sign of preparedness. What is lacking is the educational component – knowing what to do when disaster strikes – which is equally important. Some measurement tools to determine preparedness have been or are in the process of being developed. The research suggests that a common definition of preparedness should be established for consistency and for measurement, but recognizes there is no current agreement on the definition of preparedness and, further, that it is not an easy task to establish consensus on this issue.

A true culture of preparedness exists in Israel. If America desires to create a “profound and enduring” change to a culture of preparedness, is Israel the model? Israelis believe in talking about terrorism with children and accepting terrorism as a part of life. Israeli citizens are considered “psychologically” prepared for terrorism and the Israeli government stresses the concept of resiliency in all preparedness efforts. Is

America willing to go that far? In looking to create a culture of preparedness and resilient communities throughout the United States, should preparedness include psychologically preparing for terrorism?

This research seeks to identify the factors that motivate citizens to get prepared and evaluates several factors that seem to motivate individuals to take action (such as fear, sense of civic pride or civic duty) and whether sustained efforts centered on specific motivating factors will create a transformation in preparedness. Barriers to action are also addressed. Central to this research is an evaluation of several concepts from sociology, psychology, and marketing which can be used to effectively motivate Americans to action. In constructing a national effort, a “one-size-fits-all campaign” will not work in the urban areas of America. For example, using fear based messages have been shown to work with some groups, while other groups may react poorly to these types of messages. The use of fear in messaging requires a delicate balance and a full understanding of the impact of fear as a motivator. The concept of mortality salience is important, as human beings tend to avoid upsetting issues.

Given the high number of immigrants, socio-economic factors, and educational differences in a large urban population, finding a single motivating factor is difficult. The research identifies effective means of reaching/influencing large segments of a major American city, and reveals that significant further research is needed in this area. This thesis also evaluates methods by which the country can create a culture of preparedness by assessing other effective cultural changes implemented in the past twenty years and leading to behavior modification or other pro-active conduct on the part of citizens. This includes case studies in the area of social marketing and cause marketing, including those aimed at increasing seat belt usage and breast cancer awareness, which resulted in measurable changes in human behavior and a marked cultural shift. In seeking to identify the elements of a model program, the research looks at the applicability of social marketing and cause marketing to the issue of citizen preparedness. Citizen Corps has

recently released a new study which develops a new “Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness.”⁸ This is also discussed in the context of successful campaigns to change human behavior.

The types of messages and the need to identify appropriate and effective messengers are also studied. Faith in government is a critical component of the overall citizen preparedness effort. Understanding the audience and who is best equipped to address that audience is the key to success. The research suggests that government may not be the right messenger. The research also recognizes that a preparedness gap exists, based on socio-economic differences, which presents a particular challenge to preparedness efforts.

This research reviews what needs to be done in creating a model for urban areas in structuring effective, robust and multi-layered public education and preparedness efforts. The research concludes that creating a culture of preparedness faces two immense obstacles: (1) finding an effective message to reach the citizenry (to motivate citizens and to overcome barriers to preparedness) and developing programs that change human behavior in a sustainable way; and (2) changing the attitude of government, at all levels, toward citizen preparedness from that of an under-funded aside to a vital link in the forward deployment of assets to provide assistance in the seventy-two hour gap before meaningful outside assistance arrives, and viewing prepared citizens as partners and a force multiplier in response and recovery efforts. Despite myriad government reports and strategies calling for a focus on citizen preparedness, budgets, staffing, and funding do not reflect a serious commitment to this most important issue.

B. METHODOLOGY AND PRESENTATION

The research presented here consisted of a variety of sources, including the personal experience of the author as an emergency manager in a large urban area, participation on national committees involving citizen preparedness issues, interviews

⁸ ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, Office of Community Preparedness, Office of Grants and Training, Department of Homeland Security, “Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness,” *Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research*, Issue 4 (Fall 2006).

and discussions with subject matter experts, substantial literature review, and analysis of textbooks, studies, polls, preparedness campaigns, budgets and policy documents, as well as case studies of past successful persuasion campaigns to change human behavior.

In approaching the question of whether America can create a culture of preparedness, a variety of issues were encountered. The research revealed that before any program can have any success, two substantial issues need to be addressed. First, government (at all levels) must take the issue of citizen preparedness seriously. Second, substantial research will need to be conducted on the best way to reach the American people, looking to social marketing, cause marketing, sociology and psychology (among other fields and areas of study) as well as finding the right messages and messengers. Current efforts are not working to create profound and enduring change.

The thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter I introduces and establishes the importance of the research question and the need for dramatic change in current efforts with regard to policy priorities, funding, and the vision needed to create a culture of preparedness. If the public remains unprepared for disaster, the images of thousands of desperate citizens stranded after Hurricane Katrina will likely be repeated with the next major event, as an overloaded first responder community struggles during the acute seventy-two hour phase of response and recovery, prior to the arrival of outside assistance.

Chapter II addresses the question of whether government at all levels takes citizen preparedness seriously. It begins with the stated importance of citizen preparedness at the federal level in national strategies, directives, and the Townsend Report, speeches and presentations by senior DHS officials over the last several years and the narratives that accompany each fiscal year budget, the *Budget-in-Brief*, appearing to set citizen preparedness as an important goal. A comparison of funding for citizen preparedness programs versus funding for other homeland security priority programs offers clear evidence that the rhetoric of speeches, strategies, and reports emphasizing the importance of citizen preparedness does not match with the abysmal funding provided to citizen preparedness programs each year. The research also demonstrates that official organizations representing local, state, and county governments (National Governors

Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and National Association of Counties) do not have official policy statements prioritizing citizen preparedness, or endorsing the creation of a culture of preparedness.

Myriad studies conducted over the past several years all arrive at the same general conclusion: Americans are woefully unprepared for disaster. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita did little to change things. Chapter III analyses a variety of studies and reports (a modified literature review) and examines the reasons Americans cite in not preparing for disasters. The research in this chapter supports the thesis by providing overwhelming evidence demonstrating the problem: current efforts to increase citizen preparedness are largely ineffective. Effectively engaging the public on preparedness issues is a complex and challenging endeavor, requiring significant further research and substantial investment.

Chapter IV explores the need for clarity in defining and measuring preparedness. Research shows there is no consistent or generally accepted tool for measuring preparedness and no consistent definition of preparedness. Three entities have suggested measuring tools and definitions; each is at a different stage of development and each is explored and discussed in this chapter. This research also raises an important concern: is the country preparing for the psychological impact of terrorism through preparedness programs (largely absent from “all hazards” preparedness discussions), and is there a need for programs to embrace this issue to create a resilient population, placing psychological preparedness within the definition of what it means to be prepared.

Chapter V provides insight on one model for a culture of preparedness: Israel. A variety of sources are utilized, including some powerful statements by Israeli citizens which exemplify the internalization of a culture of preparedness, with a sense of resiliency and the psychological preparedness for terrorism. This chapter provides some applicable “lessons learned” and policy considerations for developing a culture of preparedness in America.

Chapter VI addresses what it will take to reach the American public. As a result of this research, there are several issues discussed in developing general ideas for

effective campaigns. First and foremost is the need for consistency of message and a fusing of information and disciplines and industries – from academia to marketing to behavioral sciences – to arrive at a comprehensive program. There are pockets of success and excellent work occurring throughout the country, but not as a unified whole, backed by strong vision, strong funding, and strong academic and scientific assistance. This has led to the inevitable situation where dedicated persons and groups are working in stovepipes and silos to solve an extremely complex issue. A variety of successful behavior change programs are examined through case studies and the applicability of social marketing and cause marketing concepts to citizen preparedness programs (including the successful efforts to improve seatbelt usage and the pink ribbon campaign to promote breast cancer awareness) is evaluated.

Chapter VII applies the concepts presented in the book *Blue Ocean Strategy* to the issue of citizen preparedness. This best selling book suggests a strategy for looking at challenges in an entirely new way, one that can be applied to both sides of the research question. First, the concept of retooling and overhauling how we reach the American people, in creating new customers of the preparedness message, is informative. Second, *Blue Ocean Strategy* is instructive in how to effect a change in government mindset (at all levels) to embrace citizen preparedness as a critically important component of response and recovery efforts and to see citizen preparedness as a forward deployment of assets. The research examined in this chapter also underscores the absence of defined roles for federal, state and local government in preparing citizens for disaster.

In conclusion, Chapter VIII provides several areas for further study. Based on the findings of the thesis research, the conclusion provides important steps in creating a foundation upon which to build a culture of preparedness and summarizes major changes that must occur before the creation of a culture of preparedness is possible.

II. GOVERNMENT VIEWS CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS AS ESSENTIAL BUT DOES IT TAKE IT SERIOUSLY?

A. CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS: RECOGNIZED IN NATIONAL REPORTS, NATIONAL STRATEGIES, DIRECTIVES, AND KATRINA'S LESSONS LEARNED AS ESSENTIAL

Citizen education and citizen preparedness is a significant issue and a part of the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*.⁹ The central question is whether this area of homeland security has been truly embraced as a national effort, even though it has been identified time and time again as a critical part of the nation's ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism or other catastrophic events. *The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (the 9/11 Report) recognized that individual citizens need to take responsibility for their survival should a disaster strike.¹⁰ *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8* calls for citizen preparedness.¹¹ The *Target Capabilities List* identifies Citizen Participation and Citizen Preparedness as an essential capability.¹²

The Townsend Report represents the first time a federal report has positioned citizen preparedness and education as a true focal point and full partner in creating a "national state of preparedness."¹³ This report identifies "two immediate priorities for this transformation: (1) Define and implement a comprehensive National Preparedness System; and (2) Foster a new, robust culture of preparedness. "¹⁴

⁹ United States Department of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 2002).

¹⁰ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 318.

¹¹ United States, White House, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD 8: National Preparedness* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 17, 2003).

¹² United States Department of Homeland Security, *Target Capabilities List* (version 2.0), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005).

¹³ Townsend Report, 66.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

The Townsend Report identifies citizen preparedness as a key to the transformation of homeland security.

Leadership at all levels will be essential in helping transform citizen preparedness. First, responsible public officials at the Federal, State, and local levels as well as prominent national figures should begin a public dialogue that emphasizes common themes regarding the importance of citizen preparedness. DHS should continue to build upon those programs and institutions that already work...But more needs to be done...¹⁵

A robust, multi-faceted citizen preparedness effort was a “lesson learned” in this report.

The Federal government, working with State, local, NGO, and private sector partners, should combine the various disparate citizen preparedness programs into a single national campaign to promote and strengthen citizen and community preparedness. This campaign should be developed in a manner that appeals to the American people, incorporates the endorsement and support of prominent national figures, focuses on the importance of individual and community responsibility for all-hazard disaster preparedness, provides meaningful and comprehensive education, training and exercise opportunities applicable to all facets of the American population, and establishes specialized preparedness programs for those less able to provide for themselves during disasters such as children, the ill, the disabled, and the elderly.¹⁶

In recognizing that “more needs to be done” a clear understanding of who is and who is not prepared – AND WHY – is essential to any further national efforts. The “lessons learned” in Katrina with regard to citizen preparedness and education generated seven recommendations.¹⁷ The national effort to improve citizen preparedness must look carefully at the sociology, psychology, marketing, and messaging that went into the successful or model campaigns cited in the Townsend report as examples to follow, identifying the key factors of success. Pinpointing the “tipping point” for the successful campaigns leading to societal change (Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, seat belt usage, etc.) is a critical factor in effectively using these models for citizen preparedness efforts.

¹⁵ Townsend Report, 80.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 121 (Recommendation numbers 119-125).

B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE PRIORITIZING CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS

In the wake of 9/11 President Bush made citizen preparedness a priority, as evidenced by an executive order issued November 9, 2001.¹⁸ In a variety of contexts, Secretary Ridge referred to citizen preparedness as a priority:

That's why, when we laid down our key priorities for the department, they were public priorities, they were goals, aspirations and we wanted the world to know what we were seeking to achieve. Those priorities included more prepared and better prepared communities...we've nurtured a culture of citizen preparedness.¹⁹

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff has addressed the importance of citizen preparedness as well. In June of 2006, while addressing the Brookings Institution, he concluded his remarks by emphasizing citizen preparedness.

A last plea on a personal level, preparedness at the end of the day, no matter how well it's done at the government level, or at the community level, or at the business level requires individual contribution. It is an article of faith among people in emergency management that people ought to be prepared to sustain themselves for 48 to 72 hours until help comes. It's an article of faith that you ought to have a plan so if a family is separated when an event happens you know where to go. It's an article of faith that when people tell you to evacuate, local officials, you should take that instruction and act upon it.

If able-bodied people don't take care of themselves, then what they're going to do is distract the responders who would otherwise be out in the field helping those who couldn't help themselves either because they were too poor, or they were too sick, or they were too infirm. And therefore, I've kind of made a plea that it is a civic responsibility for the able-bodied to make sure that they have done what they need to do to prepare so that

¹⁸ President George W. Bush, *Citizen Preparedness in War on Terrorism Executive Order* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, November 9, 2001).

¹⁹ United States Department of Homeland Security, "Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at the Council for Excellence in Government," Press Release, January 28, 2005, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 15, 2007).

we can turn in the first instance to those who can't help themselves and who have therefore a right to expect government will step in to assist them.²⁰

DHS views the country's preparedness as requiring individual contribution from the citizenry. It is viewed as an article of faith that able-bodied persons should be prepared and to know that it is their civic duty and responsibility.

In September of 2006, Under Secretary for Preparedness George Foresman addressed the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations. In his statement he describes citizen preparedness efforts at DHS.

We have made considerable progress as a Department in strengthening and uniting the pieces that collectively encompass what must become a "culture of preparedness." To many, preparedness is simply a name on an organizational chart, or a step in the cycle of emergency management. It must be more. Secretary Chertoff said in announcing the Second Stage Review that in the broadest sense, preparedness is the full range of capabilities in the Department of Homeland Security. This guides our efforts working every day to internally connect the full capabilities of the Department better, including with our external partners. But there is more to be done. For starters, individual responsibility is a big piece to this big picture.

The Department approaches individual responsibility from the ground up and the top down. The Citizen Corps program, established under the USA Freedom Corps initiative shortly after 9/11, operates in every state and all 6 U.S. territories at the community level to empower every American to take responsibility for his or her safety and security—as well as that of their neighbors. This is important. A better prepared America will be achieved when government, the private sector, and the American people each do their part.

In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security and the Advertising Council launched *Ready*, a national public service advertising campaign designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to emergencies including natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks. The goal of the campaign is to get the public involved and ultimately to

²⁰ United States Department of Homeland Security, "Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff at the Brookings Institution," Press Release, June 1, 2006, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 10, 2007).

increase the level of basic preparedness across the nation. We understand that government is expected to act decisively in the face of adversity. The American people must as well.²¹

The concept of citizen preparedness as an individual's responsibility is reinforced and the importance of citizen preparedness is emphasized as a large part of the whole picture of preparedness. The *Ready* campaign is viewed as a way to help Americans "act decisively" in the face of adversity.

In addressing the issue of citizen preparedness, DHS has looked at the great progress of Citizen Corps in establishing thousands of councils across the United States and a substantial number of partnerships with other organizations to reach the American public. In addressing the Subcommittee, testimony was provided to show the progress of citizen preparedness efforts, measured by the department as of June of 2006.

This past June, a study conducted by the Ad Council on behalf of the Department's *Ready* Campaign recorded significant positive increases in preparedness behaviors by individual Americans. It found:

- From 2005 to 2006, the proportion of Americans who said they have taken any steps to prepare for an emergency rose 10 points, from 45% to 55%
- 91% of respondents said it is "very" or "somewhat" important for all Americans to be prepared for emergencies

There were also several notable increases in key preparedness behaviors from 2004 to 2006:

- Put together an emergency kit: 44% in 2004 to 54% in 2006
- Created a family emergency plan: 32% in 2004 to 39% in 2006
- Searched for info (sic) about preparedness: 28% in 2004 to 40% in 2006.

While there is still a long way to go to ensure that all Americans have taken steps to prepare, there are strong indications of progress. Mr.

²¹ United States Department of Homeland Security, "Statement of George W. Foresman Under Secretary for Preparedness before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations," (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, September 7, 2006) www.dhs.gov (accessed March 5, 2007).

Chairman, as buoyed as we are with the progress we have made among the American people, we recognize that our nation's preparedness is a shared national responsibility.²²

Citizen preparedness surveys throughout 2004, 2005, and 2006 are not consistent with these findings, particularly in the area of Americans placing "importance" on the issue of preparedness. Numerous surveys indicate something less than "a strong indication of progress," as do statements by FEMA Director Paulison in November of 2006 and March of 2007, *infra*. While *Ready*, Citizen Corps and the Ad Council are engaging in laudable and worthwhile efforts, study after study reveals that Americans are not preparing. As discussed in Chapter III, a variety of other studies indicate that levels of preparedness fall far short of these numbers. In addition, as discussed in Chapter IV, there is no defined or agreed upon definition of preparedness by which to measure success.

In speaking at the National Grants and Training Conference, Secretary Chertoff again reiterated the importance of citizen preparedness in his closing remarks.

Let me conclude by saying something which I know you all know: Preparedness is not at the end of the day just a government responsibility. The government does not own most of the assets in the country. We don't operate a business, and we don't employ most of the people. That's why it's a civic duty and a personal responsibility for individuals and private businesses all across the country to do their part in personal preparedness. We have to continue to promote a culture of preparedness through Citizen Corps, which has at this point close to 2,100 councils in every state and which is training hundreds of thousands of people in communities all over the country in preparedness...

We also have to continue to promote preparedness through a robust media campaign known as our *Ready* Campaign. I want to tell you that the *Ready* Campaign has generated almost \$600 million in donated media, and the website has received more than 1.9 billion hits and 24.3 million are

²² United States Department of Homeland Security, "Statement of George W. Foresman Under Secretary for Preparedness before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations," (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, September 7, 2006) www.dhs.gov (accessed March 5, 2007).

unique visitors. That is getting the message out so people can do what they have to do to put themselves in a position to deal with emergencies.²³

As stated in the introduction, the Pew Research Center's *News Interest Index* found that Americans were paying great attention to Katrina; other surveys show they also pay attention to information provided by government. But while surveys and studies show Americans may be listening and paying attention, most are not taking action to prepare. Much has been accomplished and many efforts are afoot in the area of citizen preparedness. However, actual budgets – as opposed to valuation of donated media and late night public service announcements – are a better indication of what the federal government is spending on the issue of citizen preparedness. This is discussed more thoroughly in this Chapter, Section C, *infra*.

In November of 2006, FEMA Director Paulison²⁴ appeared before the National Press Club to discuss improvements to FEMA and a new vision for the organization. In his remarks, he highlighted citizen preparedness as an “urgent need” and also highlighted the importance of creating a culture of preparedness.

I believe many Americans have little awareness of citizens' personal roles and responsibilities, along with state and local jurisdictions, in the emergency management process.

Now, part of this is our fault. **We in FEMA simply haven't done as good a job as we should explaining our roles and responsibilities, managing expectations and communicating the urgent need for personal preparedness.** Although FEMA can—and will do a better job of framing our respective roles and responsibilities within an emergency management context, I want to make it crystal clear that **every American has a part to play in achieving national preparedness.** [Emphasis added.]

...The extent to which any one of us is victimized by disaster is determined, at least in part, by how well—or how poorly—we personally prepare ourselves and our loved ones for disaster...So, what does personal

²³ Michael Chertoff, “Keynote Address by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff to the 2006 Grants and Training National Conference,” Washington, D.C., November 28, 2006, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 2, 2007).

²⁴ This was prior to the restructuring of the Department of Homeland Security and the change in position of the Director of FEMA to Administrator status.

preparation mean? This means having a plan, understanding that plan, and exercising that plan; and, It (sic) also means having adequate homeowners and flood insurance to recover after disasters strike. **America must continue to develop a culture of preparedness.**²⁵ [Emphasis added.]

DHS senior officials again stress the importance of personal preparedness, framing the issue as one of civic duty and responsibility.

In February of 2007, Secretary Chertoff addressed the issue of citizen preparedness before the National Emergency Managers Association. In concluding his speech he reiterated the importance of citizen preparedness. “Finally, as you all know, we’re going to have to still bang the drum for preparedness in all of our communities – at the family level, at the business level, and at the individual level. Everybody understands, everybody in this room sure understands, that help is not going to be there in the first hour. ... So this is what I call civic responsibility, and I think it’s one which we want to continue to emphasize.” During the question and answer phase, Secretary Chertoff responded to a question about citizen preparedness and offered his thoughts on what emergency managers should be telling citizens on the issue of individual preparedness:

This is actually a very complicated question, because it’s a balance between giving them information that is important, and not so overloading them that they throw their hands up in despair and therefore don’t do anything...

A second really important part is the planning piece, getting people to understand they’ve got to make their own plans, like where to meet if we’re separated; where do we go if our house is somehow inaccessible to us...

You know the basic things you need to have, in terms of radios and whatnot. The hardest piece, I think, is going to be this – and it’s particularly true if we get something unusual like a pandemic flu – we’re

²⁵ United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Director Paulison Lays Out Vision for a ‘New FEMA’,” speech given at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 30, 2006, www.fema.gov (accessed March 5, 2007).

going to have to get people conditioned, but also work with the media to get a responsible chain of public communication about what steps to take in the case of an emergency...²⁶

The statement “we’re going to have to get people conditioned” may be the first glimpse of moving from citizen preparedness as a “civic duty” to citizen preparedness as “resiliency” and “psychological preparation” for widespread disaster (pandemic flu) and terrorism.

One of the more recent statements from senior DHS officials regarding the importance of citizen preparedness was made on March 9, 2007, by FEMA Director David Paulison, Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management, before the House Appropriations Committee on Homeland Security. In discussing the mission of FEMA, citizen preparedness was framed as an integral part of disaster preparedness and response. FEMA’s mission, Director to Paulison stated, “is to help protect the nation from disasters. We help America mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all-hazards disasters. [But] FEMA cannot and does not do this alone.” Director Paulison went on to point out that the National Response Plan (NRP) is a map, directing federal, tribal, state, and local activities before, during and after and disaster. The NRP “is built on the assumption that incidents should be managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level possible.” For this reason, Paulison argued, “Individuals and our partners at all levels of government must be part of the effort.”

Each individual citizen and family has a role to play in their own response

In the past, senior DHS and FEMA leaders have, essentially, been mocked for the regular emphasis we placed on telling people to prepare themselves and their homes. We have repeatedly stressed the need to have water, rations, battery powered radios and other emergency goods on hand and to develop a family plan for evacuation. FEMA needs to get back to this basic message. When roads are flooded, bridges destroyed and the environment is, frankly, dangerous, people need to remember the old Boy Scout motto: “Be Prepared.”

²⁶ United States Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at the National Emergency Management Association Mid-Year Conference,” Press Release, February 12, 2007, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 1, 2007).

There will always be some who are physically or financially unable to make these preparations – and this is where government must move quickly to fill the gap. However, most Americans need to be educated on the steps they can take to avoid relying on the government for short term essentials....Ladies and gentlemen, **too many Americans still do not plan for disaster.**

According to a poll conducted for a major news magazine last summer, only 16% of Americans say they are personally “very well” prepared should a natural disaster or public emergency strike their community. More than half said they had taken no preparations such as those recommended by former Secretary Ridge and which my family makes every year. Even those who lived through Katrina personally are not learning all they could from their experience, with 24% saying they are not prepared for another disaster.²⁷

These numbers are more in keeping with the numerous nationwide assessments and surveys showing dismal numbers for citizen preparedness, and may signal recognition by DHS that citizen preparedness numbers have not improved since Katrina.²⁸

In addressing the Committee, FEMA Director Paulison outlined a “new day” for FEMA and the changes made at the agency in the wake of Katrina. “FEMA has learned from the past and is prepared to move forward... Before Katrina and Rita, FEMA focused on preparing our own resources to respond to a disaster,” Director Paulison admitted. “We did not focus on preparing communities to make plans and preparations before disasters strike nor on the role of tribal, State and local governments afterwards. This was a mistake that will not be repeated.”²⁹ This shift in focus is an important first step in preparing communities.

²⁷ United States Department of Homeland Security, “Opening Statement of R. David Paulison, Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management, U. S. Department of Homeland Security before the U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security,” Friday March 9, 2007, 2, emphasis in original, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 15, 2007).

²⁸ The numbers cited by Director Paulison were from a *TIME Magazine* poll conducted by telephone between August 9-10, 2006 among a national random sample of 1,003 adults, age 18 and older, throughout the United States.

²⁹ Paulison, “Opening Statement,” 4.

According to the testimony, as part of the changes at FEMA and the DHS, a new Directorate of National Preparedness was established within FEMA. There are two divisions under National Preparedness: Readiness, Prevention and Planning (RPP) and the National Integration Center (NIC). Citizen Corps, once within the Office of Grants and Training, was transferred to RPP.³⁰ The *Ready* campaign was not discussed as part of the remarks. The *Ready* campaign was not transferred to FEMA in the restructuring of the department. It is housed in the Office of Public Affairs, a separate DHS entity with a separate reporting structure. The efficacy of housing Citizen Corps and *Ready* in separate areas is discussed *infra* at Chapter VI, Section B, *Stovepipes and Silos*.

Many improvements at FEMA are highlighted as part of the statement to the Committee. They range from disaster operations, improved disaster assistance, major changes in logistics and business processes, to communications issues. In looking toward a large increase in the FEMA budget, the FEMA Director stated: “The Nation needs a strong FEMA; but that cannot be achieved without purposeful new investments.”³¹ The funding for FY 2008 is described as an “unprecedented budget”³² as **“FEMA will have budget authority over more than \$9 billion.”**³³

However, in discussing the value of the new FEMA programs and the budget to carry out bold new initiatives and major reform efforts, there were only two statements referring to the need to create a culture of preparedness.³⁴ In setting forth the core competencies that FEMA will build in its bold new vision, the following are enumerated: (1) Incident Management, (2) Operational Planning, (3) Disaster Logistics, (4)

³⁰ Paulison, “Opening Statement,” 10. According to DHS officials interviewed on January 29, 2008, FEMA is now its own agency within the Department of Homeland Security, headed by an Administrator. The National Preparedness Directorate has four divisions: Preparedness, Policy, Planning and Analysis, the National Integration Center, Community Preparedness (which houses only Citizen Corps), and the Technical Hazards Division.

³¹ Ibid., 12.

³² Ibid., 15.

³³ Ibid., 16, emphasis in original.

³⁴ Ibid., 15 and 17.

Emergency Communications, (5) Service to Disaster Victims, (6) Continuity Programs, (7) Public Disaster Communications, (8) Integrated Preparedness, (9) Hazard Mitigation.³⁵

Citizen Preparedness – or creating a “national culture of personal preparedness” – is mentioned, but not highlighted as a major budget item, despite the extensive opening remarks focusing on the importance of citizen preparedness. Citizen preparedness and building this “national culture of personal preparedness” appears to be grouped under the core competency of “Public Disaster Communications” with \$1 million in funding for this and other significant efforts.

... nearly \$1 million will be set aside for Public Disaster Communications. FEMA will assume a leadership position as coordinator of all hazards messaging to the American public during peacetime and disasters, leading the national campaign for greater personal and community preparedness. Specifically, the funding requested will support FEMA’s efforts to strengthen interagency incident communications systems and capabilities to ensure coordinated public information efforts across all hazards. By working one-on-one with State, local, and major urban area jurisdictions to build knowledge and capability for public information efforts and conducting planning, training, and exercises to ensure integrated crisis communication strategies and messaging **FEMA will facilitate public discourse, outreach, and adoption of a national culture of personal preparedness** and mitigation that will have a direct impact on reducing the loss of life and property. **Through effective public communications and outreach programs, FEMA will ensure the general public is provided with and has access to vital disaster preparedness and planning information including those with special needs and multilingual and multicultural populations.**³⁶ [Emphasis added.]

Embracing citizen preparedness and the need to create a “national culture of personal preparedness” will require the same “purposeful new investments” needed to build a strong FEMA, far exceeding the current budget request of \$15 million for Citizen Corps.³⁷ In addition, although not part of FEMA, the *Ready* campaign FY 2008 budget request of \$2.12 million, down from an enacted budget of \$3.63 million in FY 2007,

³⁵ Paulison, “Opening Statement,” 10.

³⁶ Ibid., 17, emphasis added.

³⁷ See Table 1, *infra*.

represents a substantial decrease from the previous fiscal year.³⁸ Budgets and their impact are discussed more thoroughly in Section C, *infra*.

Despite addressing the issue of citizen preparedness as a priority in a number of venues and speeches, poll after poll shows that Americans remain unprepared. DHS has chosen September as Preparedness Month for the country to coincide with the remembrance of the 9/11 attacks. Focusing on preparedness as part of one calendar month each year is not an effective effort in preparedness for the nation. A sustained effort is required.

DHS has set forth its *Ready* preparedness campaign which has done an excellent job with minimal staffing and funding. The *Ready* website contains interesting and useful items for citizens, parents, businesses and municipalities to use. The website has impressive numbers for unique visitors and *Ready* has also done some excellent advertising campaigns in concert with the Ad Council. However, as of summer 2007, there are only two staff members assigned to *Ready* for the entire nation and *Ready* operates on a minimal budget.

Citizen Corps has been working to evaluate national studies and to develop the key motivators that move people to action.

Citizen Corps is determined to understand what motivates and hinders people from taking action toward personal preparedness, and to have the information necessary to develop messages and programs that will effectively increase awareness and household/community preparedness. The determination to unravel this complex subject has created a strong demand for innovation.³⁹

A “demand for innovation” in the way in which we approach citizen preparedness is essential. Current efforts are clearly not penetrating into the American psyche. As a result of poor funding, evidencing a lack of serious commitment to the issue of citizen preparedness, there is no electrifying force driving citizen preparedness at the national level, no unifying

³⁸ See Table 2, *infra*.

³⁹ ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, Office of Community Preparedness, Office of Grants and Training, Department of Homeland Security, “Methodological Considerations and Key Findings in Preparedness Research,” *Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research*, Issue 1 (Summer 2005).

effort to make individual preparedness a top priority for Americans, and no visible, concerted national effort to create a sustained and steady stream of preparedness messages and programs aimed at making preparedness a part of the social fabric of America. We are not creating the social contagion that leads to the “profound and enduring” change needed to establish a culture of preparedness.

C. DO BUDGETS AND BUDGET REQUESTS REFLECT ACTUAL PRIORITIES?

As Citizen Corps moves toward new models in creating a culture of preparedness and recognizes the “demand for innovation,” funding for such efforts appears to be heading in the opposite direction. Citizen preparedness is not on a level playing field with other pressing needs in preparing the country for disasters and terrorism. Citizen preparedness is on the losing end of the budget year after year. Yet, during that crucial time gap from the onset of a major event and the arrival of federal assets, the forward deployment of relief assets in homes and communities, and cadres of trained citizens assisting fellow citizens, will prove invaluable.

A review of the Citizen Corps budget from the inception of DHS in March of 2003 through the FY2008 budget request (February of 2007) provides an interesting glimpse into the priority placed by DHS on citizen preparedness. For a massive, nationwide effort to create a culture of preparedness, minimal funding has been given to the effort of citizen preparedness, compared to the overall budget for DHS. In 2003, Citizen Corps received \$20 million from an overall DHS budget of \$31.18 billion. In 2004, Citizen Corps received \$40 million from an overall budget of \$36.54 billion. In 2005, the program received \$15 million from an overall DHS budget of \$38.51 billion. In 2006, Citizen Corps received \$20 million from an overall budget of \$40.3 billion, and in 2007, the program received only \$15 million from a budget of \$42.8 billion. Most telling, for FY 2008, only \$15 million was *requested* for the upcoming fiscal year, the lowest amount ever requested for the program, and despite much higher requests in previous years. In 2007, for example, \$35 million was requested, and \$50 million was requested in both 2005 and 2006. An average of only 37% of requested funding for

Citizen Corps for FY 2005, 2006, and 2007 budgets was enacted.⁴⁰ Thus, if recent trends hold true, it is conceivable that only \$5.55 million (37%) of the current \$15 million request will be enacted, signaling the lowest funding for citizen preparedness to date. (See Table 1, *infra*, for a year to year funding comparison for Citizen Corps.)

Similarly, the *Ready* campaign will reach its lowest funding point ever in the FY 2008 budget. The *Ready* campaign began with its website and received funding from the Working Capital Fund (WCF) to support these efforts. *Ready* does not have a line item in the budget and cobbles its budget together from three places: the Working Capital Fund, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (to support *Ready* business), and the Office of Public Affairs. The funding from the Office of Infrastructure Protection will not continue going forward into FY 2008, leaving a \$1.4 million gap in the *Ready* budget for FY 2008 and beyond. This loss of funding represents an enormous loss (38%) to an overall yearly budget of approximately \$3.6 million. (See Table 2, *infra*, showing year to year funding for *Ready*.)⁴¹

The “Budget-in-Brief” document sets forth each year’s key accomplishments as well as the goals for the department in submitting its budget to Congress. As with all budgets, the actual allocations and final budget are different than those in the proposed funding request. A table at the end of this section shows the budget requests made by the department and the final allocation from Congress. In addition, it compares Citizen Corps allocations to the overall Preparedness Grants Budget for state and local preparedness efforts provided by DHS (including the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative Program or UASI, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program or LETPP and Metropolitan Medical Response System or MMRS) as well as a comparison of Citizen Corps to the overall DHS Budget.⁴²

⁴⁰ A cumulative \$135 million was requested over the three fiscal years of 2005, 2006 and 2007 and a total of only \$50 million – or 37% of overall requested amounts -- was enacted.

⁴¹ Budget numbers derived from interview with Kristin Gossel, Director, *Ready* campaign, United States Department of Homeland Security, April 3, 2007.

⁴² It should be noted that Citizen Corps was created in 2002 by the President as part of the USA Freedom Corps. It was part of FEMA until October of 2003, when it was transferred to the Office of Domestic Preparedness. It has now been transferred back to FEMA as part of the reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security.

1. The FY 2008 Budget Goal: Building a Nimble and Effective Emergency Response System and Culture of Preparedness – What about Citizen Preparedness?

Despite the fact that Hurricane Katrina occurred on August 29, 2005, and the release of the Townsend Report occurred in February of 2006, it has taken until the FY 2008 budget preparation cycle in Spring of 2007 to embrace the actual words: “Culture of Preparedness.”⁴³ Unfortunately, in a word search of the *2008 Budget-in-Brief*, developed and issued by DHS, Citizen Corps is never mentioned (in a 124 page document, outlining an overall DHS budget of \$46.4 billion).⁴⁴ The *Ready* campaign is mentioned twice in footnotes, one setting forth its move to Public Affairs, and the other with reference to its budget (\$1.5 million).⁴⁵

The *2008 Budget-in-Brief* begins with the highlights of the department’s accomplishments – which are many and impressive – of the prior year and looks toward the same goals in future years. There are five major goals set forth: *Continue to Protect our Nation from Dangerous People, Continue to Protect our Nation from Dangerous Goods, Protect Critical Infrastructure, Build a Nimble and Effective Emergency Response System and Culture of Preparedness, Strengthen and Unify DHS Operations and Management.*

Under the goal of “*Build a Nimble and Effective Emergency Response System and Culture of Preparedness,*” DHS looks to many accomplishments of the past year, particularly at FEMA, and at its new and aggressive goals for NIMS integration, improved response time (to twenty-five hours after a disaster), improved recovery assistance, and improvements in other significant capabilities (such as logistics). Citizen preparedness efforts are not mentioned under this goal and are not highlighted. The

⁴³ United States Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Announces Eight Percent Increase in Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request,” February 5, 2007, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 3, 2007). See also Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008*, pages 4, 13, 70, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 5, 2007).

⁴⁴ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008*.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 130 and 87.

highlights and accomplishments are followed by a description of \$2.6 billion for preparedness grants from the previous year as follows:

DHS Awards \$2.6 Billion for Preparedness: Included in this total, approximately \$1.9 billion in Homeland Security Grant funds has been awarded to State and local governments for equipment, training, exercises, and various other measures designed to increase the level of security in communities across the Nation. Over \$300 million in grants was awarded to strengthen the Nation's ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that could impact this country's critical infrastructure. Almost \$300 million was also distributed in fire grants to fire departments and EMS organizations to enhance their response capabilities and to more effectively protect the health and safety of the public and emergency response personnel with respect to fire and all other hazards.⁴⁶

Citizen preparedness is most likely part of this overall funding. Some Urban Areas may be developing citizen preparedness programs with federal UASI dollars and others may be using State Homeland Security Grant Program funding. However, this most important capability is not being treated as a separate, important, and pressing issue or priority.

In the *2008 Budget-in-Brief*, in looking *prospectively* at the goal of "*Build a Nimble and Effective Emergency Response System and Culture of Preparedness*," it describes the importance of the goal: "maintaining a high state of readiness is crucial to the Department's ability to deter and respond to acts of terror or other disasters. The following funding requests will strengthen the Department's ability to build an effective emergency response system and culture of preparedness."⁴⁷ As part of the funding request the Department describes some critical factors in addressing this goal:

- An increase of \$100 million is requested for FEMA's **Vision Initiatives** that will enable the agency to intensify and speed the development of core competencies that are central to achieving its disaster readiness, response and recovery mission. A combination of staffing increases, new technologies, and targeted investment in equipment and supplies, will increase FEMA's mission capacity in the areas of Incident Management,

⁴⁶ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008*, 4, bold and italics in original.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

Operational Planning, Continuity Programs, Public Disaster Communications, Hazard Mitigation, Disaster Logistics, and Service to Disaster Victims.

- A total of \$3.2 billion will be available for state and local preparedness expenditures as well as assistance to firefighters in FY 2008...⁴⁸

A more detailed description of the efforts of DHS in creating a “national culture of personal preparedness” can be found under the 2008 initiatives for FEMA. These efforts mirror exactly FEMA Director Paulison’s testimony before Congress in highlighting the \$1 million for the core competency of “Public Disaster Communications” (cited in this chapter, Section B, *supra.*). Here again, DHS is looking toward building a “national culture of personal preparedness” without significant funding.

Reports prepared for Citizen Corps and DHS during 2005 and 2006 all underscore the enormity of the lack of personal preparedness in the country.⁴⁹ The Townsend Report was emphatic about citizen preparedness as a priority in reshaping and revamping the emergency management structure in America. Despite the repeated calls for prioritizing citizen preparedness, changing America in a “profound and enduring manner” and calling for a “demand in innovation” in the way in which the country approaches citizen preparedness, the lack of budget priority for citizen preparedness is clear. Citizen Corps is at its lowest request for funding in the FY 2008 budget since the inception of the

⁴⁸United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008*, 13, emphasis in original.

⁴⁹ See ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, “Methodological Considerations” Citizen Preparedness Review: A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research, Issue 1 (Summer 2005); ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, Office of Community Preparedness, Office of Grants and Training, Department of Homeland Security, “A Post-Katrina Assessment,” *Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research*, Issue 2: Spring 2006; ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizens Corps, Office of Community Preparedness, Office of Grants and Training, Department of Homeland Security, “Patterns in Current Research and Future Research Opportunities,” *Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research*, Issue 3 (Summer 2006); ORC Macro, Macro International for Citizen Corps, “Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness,” *Citizen Preparedness Review, A Quarterly Review of Citizen Preparedness Research*, Issue 4 (Fall 2006).

department, and *Ready* stands to lose 38% of its funding, placing it at its lowest funding point since FY 2004. (See Tables 1 and 2, *infra*, for funding amounts for Citizen Corps and *Ready*.)

2. The FY 2007 Budget: Citizen Preparedness and Citizen Corps are Highlighted

The *2007 Budget-in-Brief* was released on February 6, 2006, seeking a \$42.7 billion budget request, just as the Townsend Report and other Congressional reports were emerging. The concept of a culture of preparedness had not yet made its way into the priorities of DHS:

The proposed budget request supports Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff's agenda for a department that is organized around mission, eliminates duplication, and disciplined in risk management. Central to the department's budget are five themes: increasing overall preparedness, and strengthening the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); strengthening border security and reforming immigration; enhancing transportation security through more efficient and secure system controls; improving information sharing; and strengthening the department's organization in order to maximize performance.⁵⁰

In contrast to the *2008 Budget-in-Brief*, this document recognizes the accomplishments and importance of the Citizen Corps, and the efforts of the Ad Council and *Ready* campaign as "key accomplishments." It should be noted that at this point in time, citizen preparedness programs fell under the Preparedness Directorate which existed "to spearhead the execution of a common preparedness mission."⁵¹

Community and Individual Preparedness. The Department's *Ready* campaign, one of the most successful campaigns in the Ad Council history, topped \$465 million in cumulative donated media support and more than 1.9 billion web site hits. The Department's Citizen Corps program, which promotes grassroots community preparedness, expanded

⁵⁰ United States Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Announces Six Percent Increase In Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request," February 6, 2006, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 10, 2007).

⁵¹ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007*, 69, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 5, 2007).

its service to more than 69 percent of the total population to ensure that citizens are prepared and capable of handling disasters or threats of all kinds.⁵²

Under the accomplishments for the Preparedness Directorate, Grants and Training is highlighted, which does include (though not spelled out) monies for citizen preparedness.

Grant funding awarded in 2005 totaled nearly 2.837 million [*sic*] including \$885 million for high-density urban areas, \$1.1 billion for basic formula grants, \$386 million for law enforcement terrorism prevention grants, and \$174 million for emergency management performance grants. Once FY 2006 funds have been awarded, DHS will have provided nearly \$18 billion in assistance to our nation's emergency first responder communities since 9/11.⁵³

Citizen Corps is set forth as a highlight and accomplishment for the Preparedness Directorate:

Citizen Corps had tremendous growth at both the national and local levels in FY 2005. There are Citizen Corps Councils in 55 of the 56 states and territories. At the local level, Councils now serve nearly 70% of the U.S. population, and there are almost 2,050 Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) programs nationwide.⁵⁴

In looking at the prospective budget year, under the goal of *“Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events either natural or manmade and strengthen FEMA,”* the following bullets describe the planned activities. It is notable that the “general public” is mentioned in preparedness efforts:

- A total of \$50 million is requested for the **National Preparedness Integration Program** to execute Medical Preparedness Coordination, Catastrophic Planning, Emergency Communications Improvements, and Command and Control Alignment.

⁵² United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007*, 4, bold and italics in original.

⁵³ Ibid., 71.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 72.

- An increase of \$294.6 million for the **Targeted Capability Grants**, for a total of \$1.4 billion, will further the Department's National Preparedness Goals. DHS has integrated additional risk-based criteria into its grant-making formulas and created a standard for allocating future grants to state and local partners. Any federal, state or local entity that receives a homeland security grant must demonstrate how that funding contributes to the national preparedness goals and enhances specific abilities of the region and the nation. The Department will work with Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental partners, and *the general public* [emphasis added] to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property and the economy.⁵⁵

Despite the highlighting of the importance of citizen preparedness and successes in the cited programs, in FY 2007 only \$15 million (of \$35 million requested) was allocated to Citizen Corps for this most important mission and \$3.64 million was allocated to *Ready* from an overall DHS Budget of \$42.8 billion.

3. The FY 2006 Budget: A Good Year for Citizen Preparedness?

In the *2006 Budget-in-Brief*, citizen preparedness appeared to have a definite priority. The FY 2006 budget request of \$41.1 billion⁵⁶ revolved around five major themes: *Revolutionizing the Borders; Strengthening Law Enforcement; Improving National Preparedness and Response; Leveraging Technology; and Creating a 21st Century Department*.⁵⁷ In reviewing two full budget cycles since the department was established in March of 2003, DHS highlights “unprecedented levels of funding and resources to state, local and private sector partners to protect and **prepare America's**

⁵⁵ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2007*, 6, emphasis in original, bold emphasis in original.

⁵⁶ United States Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Department of Homeland Security FY 2006 Budget Request Includes Seven Percent Increase,” February 7, 2005, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 8, 2007).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

communities and individual citizens.”⁵⁸ [Emphasis added.] In the furtherance of the budget goal of “*Improving National Preparedness and Response*” the Department states:

No DHS effort has a greater scope, reach and impact upon the citizens across the U.S. than our efforts to prepare the nation to respond to major acts of terror or natural disaster. This Budget continues to support the President’s homeland security directives that establish the processes, methods, and means by which our nation prepares for and responds to critical incidents. Since its establishment, the Department has, and continues to provide, an unprecedented level of financial support to the state, local, and tribal governments and to certain private sector entities. The Budget builds on these efforts and proposes significant resources to provide direct financial assistance to our nation’s first responders, emergency managers, **and citizen volunteers.**⁵⁹ [Emphasis added.]

Most telling with regard to the prioritization of Citizen Corps is the line item in the proposed FY 2006 budget for Citizen Corps: \$50 Million.⁶⁰ In proposing this large increase, “a 233 percent increase, or \$35 million increase over FY 2005 enacted level of \$15 million” the department stated “Citizen Corps will continue to work with local communities to prepare Americans for acts of terrorism and other major emergencies through the education and training of citizens.”⁶¹ The enacted funding for Citizen Corps for FY 2006 was only \$20 million, and *Ready* received \$3.9 million in the overall DHS budget of \$40.34 billion.

4. The FY 2005 Budget: Citizen Corps Viewed as Priority for Funding

The *2005 Budget-in-Brief* requests \$40.2 billion (inclusive of Bioshield) for DHS. The goals of the department focused on Strengthening Border and Port Security, Enhancing Biodefense, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Improving Aviation Security, Support for State and Local Governments and First Responders, Enhancing Immigration and Enforcement, Eliminating the Immigration Backlog,

⁵⁸ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2006*, 1, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 8, 2007).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁶¹ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2006*, 82.

Increasing DHS Preparedness and Response Capability, Strengthening the National Incident Management System. This budget request called for \$50 million to Citizen Corps, an “increase of \$10 million for a new funding level of \$50 million, which is a 25% increase over FY 2004 enacted level. Citizen Corps will continue to empower local communities to respond to threats of terrorism through education and training of the individual citizen.”⁶² The actual enacted funding for Citizen Corps was \$15 million for FY 2005, and *Ready* received \$3.41 million from an overall DHS budget of \$38.5 billion.

5. The FY 2004 Budget: Citizen Preparedness Highlighted

The Department of Homeland Security was created in March of 2003 and the budget increased exponentially from the previous year. The budget request provides for \$36.2 billion, “7.4 percent more than the 2003 level and over 64 percent more than the FY 2002 level for these activities.”⁶³ The budget goals track the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* with highlighted goals: *Securing the Nation’s Borders and Transportation Systems, Securing the Nation’s Ports and Ensuring Safety in Our Waters, Preparing for and Responding to National Emergencies, Advancing and Harnessing Science and Technology, Improving Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Improving Immigration Services, Ensuring Non-Homeland Activities, Decentralizing Execution, Centralizing Leadership*. Under the “Budget Highlights” for the Office of Domestic Preparedness, of a \$3.5 billion budget (representing more than twelve times the enacted 2002 level), the budget request calls for:

\$2.5 billion is requested for state domestic preparedness grants to provide equipment, exercises, strategic planning, and support to the national training and exercise program, ***of which up to \$181 million will support the Citizen Corps activities*** [emphasis added] – local efforts to engage individuals in helping communities prevent, prepare for, and respond to disasters of all kinds, including terrorist incidents.⁶⁴

⁶² United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2005*, 58, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 7, 2007).

⁶³ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2004*, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 7, 2007).

⁶⁴ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2004*, 9.

It is not clear whether this actual request was made, but the enacted funding allocation for Citizen Corps for FY 2004 was \$40 million, and *Ready* received \$3.95 million from an overall budget of \$36.54 billion.

6. FY 2003 Budget: The Creation of Citizen Corps -- Citizen Preparedness Recognized as a High Priority

In *Securing the Homeland Strengthening the Nation*, which was issued by the President to set forth the agenda for homeland security, four “Budget Initiatives” were set forth: *Supporting First Responders, Defending Against Bioterrorism, Securing America’s Borders, Using 21st Century Technology to Secure the Homeland*. There are also five enumerated “Additional Budget Priorities”: *Transportation Security, Federal Law Enforcement, Citizen Corps, Department of Defense Intelligence Community, Protecting our Critical Infrastructure*.⁶⁵

In this document, the President refers to the terrorist threat as a “permanent condition to which America and the entire world must adjust.” He refers to homeland security as a “new national calling” involving “new and expanded efforts by State and local governments, private industry, non-government organizations, **and citizens**.”⁶⁶ [Emphasis added.] In looking toward a prepared country, the President states: “The American people should have no doubt that we will succeed in weaving an effective and permanent level of security into the fabric of a better, safer, stronger America.” This may be the first effort to frame the concept of a culture of preparedness as part of the “fabric” of our nation.

The importance of citizen preparedness is highlighted as a major priority in setting forth the budget for the Office of Homeland Security. The fact that Citizen Corps rated as one of the top priorities for the homeland security agenda was an important moment in citizen preparedness: “The President’s Budget for fiscal year 2003 requests \$144 million in matching funds to support the formation and training of local Citizen

⁶⁵ United States, White House, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening Our Nation,” n.d., www.dhs.gov (accessed April 10, 2007).

⁶⁶ United States, White House, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening Our Nation,” 3.

Corps Councils...”⁶⁷ In addition, “The President’s fiscal year 2003 Budget provides more than \$230 million for these efforts”⁶⁸ to support and/or create Citizen Corps programs including: Volunteers in Police Service, Medical Reserve Corps, Operation TIPS (Terrorist Information and Prevention System), Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Neighborhood Watch Programs, and development of a Citizens’ Preparedness Guidebook.⁶⁹ It is unclear whether the large requests were made, but funding enacted for Citizen Corps for 2003 was \$20 million. (With regard to the *Ready* campaign, budget numbers prior to FY 2004 are not available and *Ready* in FY 2003 essentially consisted of the website only.)

7. Year-to-Year Comparison of Requested and Actual Budgets: Does the Stated Importance of Creating a Culture of Personal Preparedness in Strategies, Reports, Speeches and Documents Match Federal Funding for Citizen Preparedness Efforts?

Table 1 below shows the progression and regression of Citizen Corps funding from 2003 through the current proposal for the FY 2008 budget. Despite increases averaging \$3 billion each year in the overall DHS Budget, Citizen Corps funding has declined. Despite an infusion of early dollars in 2003 and 2004, funding requests in 2005, 2006, and 2007 have averaged 37% of the requested funding. In 2005, \$50 million was requested and \$15 million was enacted; in 2006, \$50 million was requested and \$20 million was enacted; and in 2007, \$35 million was requested and \$15 was million enacted. For FY 2008, only \$15 million was requested, down substantially from previous requests.⁷⁰ If the recent trend holds true, at 37% of requested funding, Citizen Corps will be at an all time low when DHS officials are placing the importance of citizen preparedness at an all time high in speeches and appearances. The data presented in this table was provided on March 15, 2007 by a reliable Department of Homeland Security official who asked not to be referred to by name. According to this official, the data is

⁶⁷ United States, White House, “Securing the Homeland Strengthening Our Nation,” 24.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ It is unclear in the budget as to what exactly went forward as a request. FY 2004 enacted allocation to Citizen Corps was \$20 million.

⁷⁰ See Table 1.

derived from the Presidents' budget and appropriations for DHS for each of those years. This same official verified and qualified the data as of November 11, 2007. According to this same official, with regard to final 2008 enacted budget numbers, the 2008 budget had yet to be enacted and DHS was operating under a Continuing Resolution that funds critical operations at the 2007 level until Congress passed and the President signed the 2008 Appropriations Bill. In addition, Citizen Corps data was verified on April 2, 2007 as accurate by another reliable Department of Homeland Security official, who also asked not to be referred to by name.

FY 2008*	Funding Requested for Citizen Corps by DHS (\$M)	Amount Allocated (\$M)	Amount of Overall Preparedness Grant Program (\$M)	Citizen Corps Percentage of Overall Preparedness Grant Program	Overall DHS Budget (\$M)	Citizen Corps Percentage of Overall DHS Budget
FY 2007	\$35	\$15	\$1,718	0.87%	\$42,804	0.04%
FY 2006	\$50	\$20	\$1,740	1.15%	\$40,345	0.05%
FY 2005	\$50	\$15	\$2,405	0.62%	\$38,510	0.04%
FY 2004	n/a	\$40	\$3,015	1.33%	\$36,540	0.11%
FY 2003	n/a	\$20	\$2,836	0.71%	\$31,182	0.06%

* = FY08 figures are based on budgetary requests. Final figures/percentages will vary based on actual allocations.

Table 1. Comparison of Citizen Corps Budget (Proposed and Enacted) with the Overall Preparedness Grant Programs and Overall DHS Budget

Table 2 shows funding for the *Ready* campaign. The *Ready* budget is cobbled together from three sources: the Office of Public Affairs, Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the Working Capital Fund (WCF) which provides funding for the website. The IP funding was directed at *Ready* Business and the funding was limited to four years only. This funding terminates with the FY 2008 budget cycle, leaving *Ready* with an approximate 38% reduction in funding.

***Ready* Campaign Funding: Fiscal Years 2004 – 2008**

Fiscal Year	OPA Funding	IP Funding	WCF Funding	Total Funding
2004	\$2,153,371	\$1,287,461	\$511,000	\$3,951,832
2005	\$1,574,663	\$1,332,522	\$505,800	\$3,412,985
2006	\$1,933,508	\$1,379,160	\$595,000	\$3,907,668
2007	\$1,629,000	\$1,400,000	\$607,000	\$3,636,000
2008 Budget Request	\$1,500,000	\$0	\$618,000	\$2,118,000

Table 2. Ready Campaign Funding for FY 2004 through 2008⁷¹

It should be noted that under guidance provided for state Homeland Security Grants and under the Urban Area Security Initiative and other programs, funding may be used for citizen preparedness efforts, but there is *no requirement* to use funding for this purpose.⁷² Citizen preparedness efforts must compete with a variety of pressing needs in a state or urban area within the realm of homeland security and disaster preparedness. The federal budget for Citizen Corps and *Ready* are used as a general gauge to indicate the level of priority that the issue garners within the DHS budget. Despite the fact that Hurricane Katrina and surveys post-Katrina exposed an alarming lack of personal preparedness in the country, the federal budget for FY 2008 does not bode well for creating a culture of preparedness based on “profound and enduring” changes. Congress has played a significant role in the lack of funding for citizen preparedness, as DHS has

⁷¹ All data for this table was provided by Kristin Gossel, Director, *Ready* campaign, United States Department of Homeland Security, April 3, 2007.

⁷² See Citizen Corps, “2007 Funding and Community Preparedness,” March 29, 2007, www.citizencorps.gov (accessed April 30, 2007).

requested funding for Citizen Corps each year, but approximately only 37% of the requested funding is enacted for this most important program.

D. IS CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS A PRIORITY FOR STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT? ARE THEY ENGAGED IN CREATING A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS?

1. The State Level

The National Governors Association has no major policy on the importance of creating a culture of preparedness or on the importance of citizen preparedness. In a review of policy statements from 2000 onward, citizen preparedness has not been an official priority. A “Policy Position on Emergency Management” was issued in August of 2006. This policy position states in its preamble:

Emergency management consists of the coordination of resources at all levels of government within an integrated framework based on preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and hazard mitigation. Effective emergency management involves interaction among federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, and **volunteer organizations**.⁷³ [Emphasis added.]

This Policy Position does state a formal position on Community Involvement in Emergency Preparedness:

13.5 Community Involvement

FEMA should work with state and local emergency managers to ensure a renewed emphasis on family and community preparedness so that citizens have the necessary skills to survive a catastrophic disaster. The National Warning System, which is maintained by FEMA, has been downsized in recent years. This system was designed to provide rapid communications and warning capabilities among federal, state, and local emergency management agencies. Given the attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent alerts, Congress should provide funding to rapidly upgrade and expand a sustainable national intergovernmental communication and warning system. Also, FEMA and other agencies should develop guidance

⁷³ National Governors Association, Policy Position, “HHS-13 Emergency Management,” Section 13.1, Preamble, August 10, 2006, www.nga.org (accessed March 1, 2007).

on "shelter in place" strategies for biological, chemical, radiological, and other weapons of mass destruction events, especially in urban centers.⁷⁴

The policy statement suggests skills and "shelter in place" strategies, not supplies, as the key to preparedness for citizens and communities. There is no call for a major citizen preparedness effort in the country and the policy position places responsibility to prepare and educate citizens on FEMA, not on the governors themselves.

The NGA has produced three significant guides for governors in dealing with disasters, emergency management, and terrorism. The first document, produced in 2001, was *Volume One: A Governor's Guide to Emergency Management: Natural Disasters*; the second, produced in 2002, is *Volume Two: A Governor's Guide to Emergency Management: Homeland Security*; and the third, issued on March 15, 2007, was entitled *A Governor's Guide to Homeland Security*. These three documents provide extensive advice on preparing for, mitigating against, responding to, and recovering from natural and manmade disasters and acts of terrorism.

Personal preparedness and having a governor place a high priority on establishing a robust citizen preparedness program is not addressed in any of the three volumes. There is significant attention to mitigation efforts in Volume One (*Natural Disasters*), such as the purchase of flood insurance, but no mention of personal preparedness as a major mitigation measure, or trained citizens and prepared households as essential to response and recovery efforts. Most information regarding interaction with citizens falls into the post-disaster communications strategies or on applying for post-disaster federal financial assistance.⁷⁵

Volume Two (*Homeland Security*) sets forth "The Basics: What Every Governor Should Know."⁷⁶ Creating a well-informed, well-prepared citizenry is not included as essential in preparing for, responding to, or recovering from a terrorist attack in this 128-

⁷⁴National Governors Association, Policy Position, "HHS-13 Emergency Management," Section 13.5 "Community Involvement," bold in original.

⁷⁵ National Governor's Association, *Volume One: A Governor's Guide to Emergency Management: Natural Disasters* (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2001).

⁷⁶ National Governors Association, *Volume Two: A Governor's Guide to Emergency Management: Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2002), 10.

page guide. Communicating with the public during a crisis is addressed, but encouraging preparedness and engaging in a robust citizen preparedness, awareness, and education program is not addressed as a priority for a governor in preparing a state for disaster or terrorist acts. The guide does acknowledge that “the media can play a central role in assisting local, state, and federal government prior to a terrorist attack by disseminating information about preparedness and response ahead of time.”⁷⁷ Likewise, the guide acknowledges “Homeland security presents a challenge to governors because of the need to educate the public without engendering unnecessary fear.”⁷⁸ However, the guide does not address the need for, or how to accomplish, a major effort in citizen preparedness, awareness, and education, nor acknowledge the importance of a trained and prepared citizenry in response and recovery.

The newest guide, *A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security*, states in its Foreword:

The images of flooded homes, lost lives, and stranded survivors on the rooftops of New Orleans – and of the debris field that had once been Gulfport – haunted America and much of the world throughout the autumn...the struggle to recover and the millions of individual stories of success – and failure – illustrate most clearly a point that has been made so often as to be almost clichéd: all disasters are local...

The Guide draws heavily on the experiences of governors who have managed during emergencies and disasters of all sizes and on the lessons learned by states in the years since the September 11 attacks...This document focuses on areas governors must immediately be aware of and the resources they are most likely to rely on during the initial response to an incident.⁷⁹

Despite this foreword, and the recognition of the suffering of residents in the aftermath of a major hurricane, citizen preparedness is not mentioned in this eighty page document as a priority for a governor in preparing a state for a major event. Prepared

⁷⁷ National Governors Association, *Volume Two: A Governor’s Guide to Emergency Management: Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2002), 27.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁹ National Governors Association, “Foreword,” *A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2007), 3.

citizens should be viewed as a resource a governor is “most likely to rely on.” Surprisingly, if the guides are built from experience and lessons learned from governors and staff members who have managed disasters, how can citizen preparedness be so glaringly absent in a post-Katrina publication?

Citizen preparedness is mentioned as an aside as part of developing a public communications and media strategy in “helping the state’s residents understand what they should do prior to a disaster, including guidance on when to evacuate and where to go during an evacuation; when to stay where they are and what supplies they should have on hand; and the need for comprehensive home and work preparedness plans.”⁸⁰ There is no other guidance or priority placed on citizen preparedness, education, and awareness efforts as an integral part of the overall preparedness for a state. There is no emphasis on the important role a governor must take in ensuring a robust program exists to create a well educated, well prepared citizenry and the importance of the forward deployment of relief assets in homes across a state and the presence of trained citizens as force multipliers in times of disaster. The guide does recognize “state and local government share responsibility for preparing their citizens for disasters and helping them recover when disaster strikes.”⁸¹ However, no guidance is given as to how to accomplish the preparation of citizens for disaster, nor is there any priority placed on this particular responsibility.

In searching for a formal policy on the importance of citizen preparedness, the glaring lack of a formal policy statement by the NGA, expounding upon the need for all citizens to be prepared, is disturbing. Likewise, the absence of the priority of citizen preparedness programs from the essential “how to prepare and respond” guides produced by the NGA for America’s governors is equally distressing.

The NGA “is the instrument through which the nation’s governors collectively influence the development and implementation of national policy and apply creative

⁸⁰ National Governors Association, “Foreword,” *A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2007), 11.

⁸¹ Ibid., 12.

leadership to state issues.”⁸² Although individual governors may be engaged in supporting citizen preparedness efforts in their states, the recognized, collective voice through which the governors speak in unison to DHS and to Congress has not embraced the call for creating a culture of preparedness. All governors must be engaged in this effort as a priority for the nation and play an integral part in creating a social contagion leading to the type of “profound and enduring” change needed in creating a cultural shift throughout the country. Governors, like mayors, will be held accountable for disaster relief and response efforts within the first several days of an event and should view prepared households and trained citizens as a forward deployment of relief assets and additional responders in a time of crisis. Governors are also influential messengers who must be recruited to enhance the efforts to raise awareness of the importance of being prepared. Likewise, the governors, collectively, can play a major role in demanding increased funding for preparedness programs at the federal, state and local levels.

2. The County Level

Emergency management is usually a county responsibility, with the county assisting the towns, cities, and municipalities within its jurisdiction in preparing for and responding to a disaster. It is disheartening to see that in a review of official policy statements by the National Association of Counties, citizen preparedness has not been embraced as a critical and important component of disaster preparedness. The 2004 *Policy Agenda to Secure the People of America’s Counties* states that its purpose is to “assist the President, DHS and Congress as they continue to make investments and decisions in local programs to improve homeland security.”⁸³ This document, with twenty-four objectives ranging from public health to information sharing and critical

⁸² National Governors Association, “Foreword,” *A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C.: NGA Center for Best Practices, 2007), inside front cover.

⁸³ National Association of Counties, “Policy Agenda to Secure the People of America’s Counties” (Washington, D.C.: National Association of Counties, July 2004), www.naco.org (accessed March 5, 2007).

infrastructure, border security, safe water supplies, emergency planning, evacuation planning, training, and mutual aid to communication interoperability, never mentions citizen preparedness.

The lack of prioritization of citizen preparedness is underscored in a document released in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in November of 2005 by the National Association of Counties entitled “Policy Agenda for Disaster Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery”.⁸⁴ This agenda sought to enhance assistance to the Gulf States for recovery efforts and to partner with the federal government to ensure communities are prepared and ready to respond to future disasters. However, this document, released in the post-Katrina world, evidences an absolute lack of appreciation for the importance of public preparedness, as the subject matter is not even mentioned in this seven-page report of recommendations. This absence is telling: even county (local) government, in the wake of Katrina, is not making citizen preparedness a priority. There appears to be a fundamental lack of understanding and appreciation for the fact that a prepared citizenry will alleviate pressure on the first responders and local government during the acute phase of emergency response, when the most pressure is on local government for search and rescue operations, medical care and transport, shelter and mass feeding needs, and restoring lifelines.

3. The Mayor Level

Further evidence of the lack of attention to citizen preparedness and the true importance of this vital issue is seen in the current agenda for the United States Conference of Mayors issued in January of 2007. The mayors of America issued a “10 Point Legislative Agenda on Issues Impacting Cities and Families” as a result of their Winter Meeting.⁸⁵ This Agenda was entitled *Strong Cities, Strong Families for a Strong*

⁸⁴ National Association of Counties, “Policy Agenda for Disaster Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery,” n.d., released November 1, 2005. See also National Association of Counties, “Counties Urge President, Congress to Increase Funding and Support to Deal with Disasters,” Press Release, October 31, 2005, www.naco.org (accessed March 15, 2007).

⁸⁵ United States Conference of Mayors, “Mayors Release 10-Point Legislative Agenda on Issues Impacting Cities and Families at 75th Winter Meeting of The U.S. Conference of Mayors,” Press Release, January 24, 2007, www.usmayors.org (accessed March 10, 2007).

America. The ten-point agenda includes Energy and Environment Block Grants, Federal-Local Partnership on Crime Prevention, Community Development Block Grants, Affordable Housing, Public Housing, Infrastructure Tax Incentive and Bonds, Competitive Workforce, Children and Youth, Unfunded Mandates/Preemptions, and Homeland Security. The homeland security agenda emphasized three areas only: interoperable communications, transit security, and improved grant application processes.⁸⁶

In the past few years, the United States Conference of Mayors has tracked a number of grants for homeland security funding and has in some reports looked at CERT teams and CERT funding, but the issue receives only a few sentences in these reports.⁸⁷ In September of 2002, citizen preparedness had a small highlight in an introduction to a report issued one year post-9/11, stating “cities have vastly expanded public information and education efforts” (citing no examples or measurements of success or growth of programs) as one of the efforts Mayors had taken to prepare their cities for terrorism. However, the text of the document, outlining “key concerns” of America’s mayors, did not address the issue of citizen preparedness at all.⁸⁸

No major policy statement appears to have been made by the United States Conference of Mayors with regard to citizen preparedness and its importance in building a disaster-resilient community. In December of 2001, in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States Conference of Mayors held a summit and issued *A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities*.⁸⁹ The introduction states: “through the years, mayors and public safety officials have consistently attached a high priority to preparing

⁸⁶ United States Conference of Mayors, *Strong Cities, Strong Families for a Strong America, Mayors’ 2007 10-Point Plan*, January 24, 2007, www.usmayors.org (accessed March 10, 2007).

⁸⁷ See reports at www.usmayors.org, for example *First Mayors’ Report to the Nation: Tracking Federal Homeland Security Funds Sent to the 50 State Governments*, September 2003 (accessed March 12, 2007).

⁸⁸ United States Conference of Mayors, *One Year Later: A Status Report on the Federal-Local Partnership on Homeland Security*, September 9, 2002, www.usmayors.org (accessed March 12, 2007).

⁸⁹ United States Conference of Mayors, *A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities*, December 2001, www.usmayors.org (accessed March 12, 2007).

themselves, their personnel and their citizens for the possibility of disasters.”⁹⁰ This *Action Plan* has four priority areas: transportation security, emergency preparedness, federal-local law enforcement, and economic security. The emergency preparedness section focuses on communications, emergency management improvements, equipment and training for first responders, and the public health system. Within the text, the Action Plan does mention as an aside and **not** as a major policy statement: “effective preparedness efforts require an empowered community and the involvement of community representatives in the development of emergency response plans. The public should be educated in basic lifesaving techniques so that bystanders can provide assistance to those injured until help arrives.”⁹¹ There are no other statements regarding citizen preparedness.

An effort was made to track the progress of the *Action Plan* developed in 2001. A working paper from meetings after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was developed with input from impacted cities and from other leadership meetings and was issued in October of 2005, just sixty days after the devastating storms. This working paper became the actual *2005 Action Plan Update* and was “presented directly to Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and his top officials, and was sent to Congress.”⁹² This report set forth the key recommendations and priorities of America’s mayors in October of 2005: Fixing the FEMA Disaster Response System, Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery, Communications Interoperability, Enhanced Transportation Security, First Responder Funding – A Better Distribution System is Needed.⁹³ Despite the proximity in time to Hurricane Katrina and the direct participation of Gulf State mayors in setting the agenda for the priorities, as well as numerous polls and surveys showing the

⁹⁰ United States Conference of Mayors, *A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities*, Background.

⁹¹ United States Conference of Mayors, *A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in America’s Cities*, December 2001, www.usmayors.org (accessed March 12, 2007), 11.

⁹² United States Conference of Mayors, “Foreword,” *Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post Katrina: The State of America’s Readiness*, July 26, 2006, www.usmayors.org (accessed March 12, 2007).

⁹³ United States Conference of Mayors, *2005 National Action Plan on Safety and Security in America’s Cities*, Working Paper of 10/24/05, 1, www.usmayors.org (accessed March 12, 2007).

widespread lack of personal preparedness in the country, no mention of the creation of a robust and dynamic citizen preparedness effort was made anywhere among the priorities or recommendations.

Individual mayors throughout the country may be working on citizen preparedness efforts in their respective cities, and indeed, many are. However, the collective voice of America's mayors should be placed behind the effort to create a culture of preparedness. Mayors are on the front line of disasters and should be collectively calling upon the federal government to allocate significant funding for the effort to create a robust program leading to a cultural shift toward citizen preparedness. Local officials can be influential messengers in convincing citizens to prepare. Mayors will also be called upon in the first several days of a disaster to miraculously provide relief and supplies to citizens before significant outside help arrives. The prepared citizen, prepared households, and prepared communities will play an integral role in the survival of a city. Every point of preparedness should be viewed as a point of forward deployment of assets. Unfortunately, no formal policy exists which shows that America's mayors are taking up the call to create a culture of preparedness or that America's mayors embrace citizen preparedness as an integral part of the preparedness, response, recovery, and survival of a city in times of disaster.

4. Do Governors Think It's not Their Responsibility and do Counties and Mayors Have a False Assumption that Citizens are Actually Prepared?

In looking at the National Association of Governors' three voluminous guides on Emergency Management and Homeland Security and the minimal formal policy on citizen preparedness, it appears that perhaps governors, as a whole, do not see citizen preparedness as their responsibility or as a priority for them to address. In the policy statement of 2006, cited above, the NGA actually places the responsibility on FEMA to educate citizens about the importance of preparedness and what to do in a terrorist event. The federal government, at the senior level, is doing an admirable job of promoting citizen preparedness in *talking* about its importance (*funding* is another matter), as evidenced in speeches, national policy, and statements to Congressional committees.

However, it does not seem to be resonating with governors, counties, and mayors as a collective whole in creating a culture of preparedness. The institutions through which these officials speak with a collective voice have not called for a robust and effective national program directed at citizen preparedness and education.

Two studies may be illuminating with regard to county officials and mayors. There is some indication that these groups may believe that their constituents are better prepared than what national surveys indicate.

In August of 2006, the National Association of Counties released a national survey (conducted in March and April of 2006) entitled *Emergency Management in County Government* which surveyed 564 counties across the United States. In this survey the question of “the extent to which the majority of citizens” are prepared for emergencies was posed to the national emergency management community through the county clerks. Nationally, the results showed that members of this community believe (with regard to their county) that 11% of the majority of citizens are prepared to a great extent, 47% at a moderate extent, 38% to some extent and 2% to “no extent.” When broken down for the West, the results show that this community believes 0% of the majority of citizens are prepared to a very great extent, 11% to a great extent, 54% to a moderate extent, 36% to some extent and 0% to “no extent.”⁹⁴ Thus, the survey suggests that the county-level emergency management community believes that, nationally, 85% of the majority of citizens are either “moderately” or to “some extent” prepared, with only 13% falling in the preparedness category of being prepared to a “great” or “very great” extent, and only 2% to “no extent”. As discussed in Chapter IV, *infra*, “preparedness” has many definitions and it is difficult to assess. This particular survey did not look at food, water, emergency plans, and education and skills as preparedness, but asked “To what extent are the majority of the people in your county prepared for the types of disasters that have hit your county in the past or are likely to affect the county in

⁹⁴ Wes Clark, *Emergency Management in County Government: A National Survey*, (University of Georgia, Georgia: National Center for the Study of Counties, Carl Vinson Institute of Government, August 2006).

the future?”⁹⁵ The results suggest a much more prepared country than what other nationwide surveys have shown. See Chapter III, *infra*, for a discussion of surveys and polls on citizen preparedness.

America’s mayors, on the front lines of disasters, have not, as a collective whole, demanded a robust and effective effort in the country to create a culture of preparedness despite knowing that they will be held accountable for providing food, water, and assistance in the first seventy-two hours post-disaster. In July of 2006, a survey of mayors showed the level of confidence in FEMA to respond quickly after a major disaster: 44% responded with a 5 on a scale of 1 to 10, the average being 5.2. Larger cities (300,000 plus) scored FEMA at 5.7, mid sized cities (100,001 to 300,000) scored FEMA with a 5.1 and small cities (up to 100,000) scored FEMA with an average of 5.0.⁹⁶ In asking mayors “your level of confidence that your city is prepared to survive on its own for up to 72 hours,” over 56% had an astounding confidence rating of 8. The average response was 6.9, with small cities at 6.8, mid-sized cities at 7.4, and large cities at 6.7.⁹⁷ Thus, it appears that in mid-2006, mayors had little confidence that FEMA would arrive in time, but had somewhat strong confidence in their own city’s ability to survive for seventy-two hours without outside help and assistance. This confidence runs counter to nationwide polls showing consistently abysmal preparedness numbers both pre- and post-Katrina.

⁹⁵ Wes Clark, *Emergency Management in County Government: A National Survey*, 38.

⁹⁶ U.S. Conference of Mayors, *Five Years Post 9/11*, 3-4.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

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III. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: WOEFULLY UNPREPARED

A. SURVEYS AND STUDIES INVOLVING CITIZEN PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS: A DISMAL PICTURE

In July of 2004, the Council for Excellence in Government (herein “CEG”) convened a high-level national symposium in partnership with the American Red Cross (herein “ARC”), The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, and DHS entitled “Public Preparedness – A National Imperative” (herein *Symposium Report*). The *Symposium Report* is a helpful roadmap for local planning.⁹⁸ The symposium was personally attended by then-Secretary Ridge and then-ARC President and CEO Marsha Evans. The forward to the *Symposium Report* states: “The public remains largely disengaged in the very activity that could safeguard their health and safety.”⁹⁹ The purpose of the symposium was to “identify the barriers to public preparedness and to begin a dialogue on possible solutions for quickly and effectively breaking through those barriers.”¹⁰⁰ A number of issues raised during the symposium are applicable to any major urban area in addressing citizen preparedness.

During the symposium, CEG and ARC presented the findings of two surveys. The CEG nationwide study was conducted in February of 2004.¹⁰¹ The information, as synthesized in the *Symposium Report*, highlighted the fact that, in general, Americans did not know what to do in an emergency. Many states and cities may have improved plans and become better prepared; the problem, according to the *Symposium Report*, is that “Those plans, however, assume that the public knows its role and is ready to act appropriately.” In fact, the research (as presented in the *Symposium Report*) shows that:

- 18% of Americans are aware of their state’s emergency plans (1)

⁹⁸ Council for Excellence in Government (CEG), et al., *Symposium Report*, from “Public Preparedness – A National Imperative,” held in Washington, D.C. in July 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Council for Excellence in Government, January 2005).

⁹⁹ Ibid., Foreword.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Hart-Teeter, *From the Home Front to the Front Lines: America Speaks Out About Homeland Security*, (Washington, D.C.: Council for Excellence in Government, March 2004), 51.

- 19% of Americans are aware of their local emergency plans (1)
- About 50% of Americans are familiar with the disaster plan at their workplaces (2)
- About 50% of parents know the disaster plans of their children's schools or daycare centers (2)
- 34% of Americans have sought information about what to do in the event of a disaster or developed a plan for communicating with their families (1)
- 30% of Americans have taken a training class in civil preparedness, first aid or CPR (2)
- About 10% of American households have a family emergency plan, a disaster kit, and training in first aid and CPR (2)
- About 20% of Americans feel very prepared for a catastrophic event (2).

Specifically, research indicates that:

- 76% of Americans believe that there will be another terrorist attack (1)
 - 50% of Americans think that the attack may be where they live or work (1)
 - 84% of Americans agree that when all Americans are prepared for all types of disaster, it strengthens national security (2)
 - About 67% of Americans say they would volunteer their time to get trained and prepare to help, but they do not know how (2)
- (1) The council presented data derived from national polls of citizens and first responders and town hall meetings that were conducted through the *Homeland Security from a Citizen's Perspective* initiative in 2003.
- (2) The Red Cross presented findings from a national survey of 1,001 adult Americans that was conducted in conjunction with Wirthlin Worldwide in 2004.¹⁰²

This CEG study (published in March of 2004) and *Symposium Report* (released in January of 2005) are consistent with more recent surveys conducted on the topic of the preparedness of the American public for disaster.

Professor Paul Light, Founding Director of the Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response at NYU, conducted two surveys: one in July of 2005, just

¹⁰² CEG, et al., *Symposium Report*, 9-10.

weeks prior to Katrina, and a second survey in October of 2005, a few weeks after Katrina. His reports (cited in the Introduction of this thesis) found that

Most Americans are unprepared for disasters, unaware of their local government's plans for response and recovery, and deeply confused about what to do in the event of an actual catastrophe such as a bombing of a local shopping center or supermarket or the release of a deadly disease or virus that spreads across their communities.¹⁰³

Light's report is disturbing in that he states: "Having been told to expect everything, many Americans may have concluded that they can prepare for nothing."¹⁰⁴

Like the CEG study, the July 2005 NYU study clearly indicates that Americans understand the threat of terrorism. The report found that 69% of respondents believed that a terrorist bombing at a local shopping center or grocery store was very or somewhat likely to occur somewhere in the United States within that next year, and 83% believed it would happen in the next five years. Over one-half (53%) believed the release of a deadly virus was very or somewhat likely in that next year, and that number increased to 73% over the next five years.¹⁰⁵ "Despite these relatively high probabilities, most Americans do not believe such an attack is likely in their own community."¹⁰⁶

The July 2005 NYU study looked at the issue of individual preparedness among Americans. The report found 10% of respondents believed they were very prepared, 43% believed they were somewhat prepared and 46% were either not too prepared (24%), or not prepared at all (22%).

Explanations for the failure to prepare are informative and provide insight for future citizen preparedness efforts:

- 53% wished they had more time to get prepared
- 53% wished they had more money to get prepared
- 49% were not sure where to turn for help

¹⁰³ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 1.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

- 65% wished they were more organized
- 78% were not sure what to expect
- 23% did not want to think about 9/11

However, 46% said they were aware of their workplace's emergency plans and 47% of parents with children were familiar with their local school's plans (although those plans may consist of nothing more than the closing of the school and pickup of the children). Unfortunately, respondents stated that in looking at their pre-9/11 situation and preparing for emergencies of all kinds, 54% said their household preparedness remained about the same or somewhat less, while 44% said they were either more prepared (17%) or somewhat more prepared (27%).¹⁰⁷

The numbers in the second NYU study (October 2005) offer a discouraging view. Respondents were asked to compare their current (October 2005) level of preparedness to their preparedness before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita arrived. Only 12% said they were much more prepared to deal with emergencies and 21% said they were somewhat more prepared. Shockingly, 57% said they were about the same, with 8% saying they were somewhat less or much less prepared.¹⁰⁸

In a poll completed in October of 2005 by ABC news, 40% of those surveyed responded that they had created family communication plans. This was a significant increase from 26%, as evidenced by an earlier poll conducted by ABC news in August of that same year. Katrina was cited as the likely factor in the increase. The poll also found that 53% of Americans felt they were prepared for a terrorist attack, but only 44% of the women versus 62% of men felt they were prepared. However, the same poll found that only one in ten said they were "very prepared" and most lacked recommended preparedness items, particularly bottled water and facemasks. The poll found that of the recommended items, only 5% had all eight items on the *Ready.gov* list. Excluding

¹⁰⁷ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 4.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

facemasks from the list, the preparedness number increases to 21%. By excluding water from the list, that number climbs to 43%, which meant over one half the public was without recommended items.¹⁰⁹

The July 2005 NYU survey had similar, though more disturbing results.

Moreover, even though the vast majority has enough bottled water in their house to last for three to four days (63 percent) and canned goods (90 percent), only 37 percent have a family plan with friends or family about who everyone would contact in the event of a terrorist attack.

When these three questions about the elements of basic preparedness are combined, the public's lack of general preparedness is also clear: 7 percent had none of the three elements, 25 percent had just one of the three elements, 39 percent had two of the three elements and just 29 percent had all three.¹¹⁰

An important survey took place in August and October of 2005, conducted for the Council for Excellence in Government in partnership with the American Red Cross. Two samples compared preparedness in the days immediately before and following Hurricane Katrina hitting the Gulf States – “before the full devastation in New Orleans was widely known” – and again in late October.¹¹¹ This report claims “the most remarkable finding” was that “Americans’ response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita – indeed even to September 11, 2001 – is nearly nonexistent in terms of their personal preparedness for disaster. The lessons the public learned from these most recent disasters appear to be extremely limited.”¹¹² The report goes on to state:

¹⁰⁹ Jon Cohen and Gary Langer, “Poll: Confidence in Anti-Terror Response Drops: ABC News Poll Shows Americans Concerned About Emergency Preparation for Nuclear Threat,” www.abcnews.go.com (accessed November 4, 2005). Author’s note on methodology: first poll conducted August 18-21, 2005, random national sample of 1,002 adults, second poll September 28 to October 2, 2005, random national sample of 1,014 adults, three point margin of error.]

¹¹⁰ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 5.

¹¹¹ Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, *The Aftershock of Katrina and Rita: Public Not Moved to Prepare* (Washington, D.C.: Council for Excellence in Government, December 2005), 2.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

For many, the answers seem to be a pervasive sense that disasters happen in other parts of the country to other people...More than half (54%) of Americans say one reason they have not done more to prepare is because they do not think another disaster is likely to happen.

...People appear to remain unmotivated to actively prepare for a disaster near *their* home affecting *their* family. Fully two in five (38%) of Americans say Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have given them absolutely no motivation to prepare for an emergency; an additional quarter (24%) say that the hurricanes have given them “just some” motivation.¹¹³

The survey concludes that “Americans are no more prepared now than they were before Katrina and Rita hit.”¹¹⁴ In fact, “people in urban areas show no greater proclivity to prepare, despite the fact that two major urban areas were disaster locations” and labels this “an important and disturbing finding.”¹¹⁵ More than one-third of the public had done nothing to prepare, slightly better than the 42% identified in August. Although only half of Americans in both samples say “they have done ‘some things’ but could do more to prepare. We suspect that ‘some’ means less rather than more.”¹¹⁶

The troubling numbers from the survey continue. Few people (43%) have prepared an emergency kit: “On one of the most basic benchmarks of preparedness, Americans fall dangerously short.”¹¹⁷ Communications plans were also lacking with 36% reporting that they had an established plan and only 25% had an established meeting place.¹¹⁸

The survey found that “many Americans seem to regard preparedness as unnecessary or ultimately ineffective” and described the situation as a public that “continues to approach preparedness with a detached sense of reality.”¹¹⁹ A majority

¹¹³ Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, *The Aftershock of Katrina and Rita: Public Not Moved to Prepare* (Washington, D.C.: Council for Excellence in Government, December 2005), 3, emphasis in original.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 5.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 6.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 6.

believe disaster will not impact them personally – 54% in October, up from 47% in August. More than half of Americans (52%) state that one reason they do not prepare is because “they have not thought about it” and 45% cite as a reason not to prepare that “nothing they could do would really be effective.”¹²⁰

A very important finding in this survey showed that 44% of respondents stated they did not know what they should be doing to prepare as the reason they are not preparing for disaster. The cost of preparing was cited by 37% of respondents as a reason to not prepare and lack of time was cited as a barrier by 35% of the respondents.¹²¹ This survey paints a picture of an American public that is woefully unprepared for disaster: over half have not thought about preparing, substantial numbers think preparing would not ultimately be effective, staggering numbers of citizens state they don’t know what to do to prepare, and large numbers of Americans state they do not or cannot spend the money to prepare, and a large percentage state they do not have the time.¹²²

At about the same time that the second sample in the above CEG/ARC survey was taking place (October of 2005 – six weeks after Katrina and two and one-half weeks after Rita), another survey was being conducted by a contractor for Citizen Corps, ORC Macro. This survey found only 31% of Americans they felt they were prepared for a natural disaster (up from 28% in 2003), while 22% felt they were prepared for a terrorist attack (up from 20% in 2003).¹²³ According to this survey, “Americans are no more prepared for a natural disaster or terrorist attack than they were in 2003.”¹²⁴

The Citizen Corps survey shows that, in October of 2005, there had been a “significant decline in those who indicate that they have a disaster plan and those who indicate that they have an emergency supply kit.”¹²⁵ Those indicating they had a disaster

¹²⁰ Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, *The Aftershock of Katrina and Rita: Public Not Moved to Prepare*, 7.

¹²¹ Ibid., 7.

¹²² Ibid, all pages.

¹²³ ORC Macro, Macro International, Inc., *Post Katrina Survey on Household Preparedness* (Washington, D.C.: Citizen Corps, December 22, 2005), 3-4.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

plan decreased from 58% in 2003 to 43% in October of 2005. When pushed on the question of how thorough a plan was in place, many did not have the basic elements prescribed by various organizations, and only 35% had a plan that included a predetermined meeting place.¹²⁶

Though 46 percent of Americans (compared with 50 percent in 2003) indicate that they have an emergency supply kit, only 27 percent have a kit that includes recommended basic supplies (i.e., food, water, flashlight, radio, first aid kit, and batteries). Only 9 percent have what can be considered a complete kit, including photocopies of personal identification, cash, and financial documents.

Only 17 percent of Americans have both a plan that includes a meeting place that has been discussed with family members, and a basic emergency kit that includes a supply of food and water, a flashlight, battery powered radio, spare batteries, and a first aid kit.¹²⁷

In keeping with the sense that Americans are listening to messages, but not taking action, the survey found that “Americans are aware of basic steps that they should take, but have not carried out those steps.”¹²⁸ When asked why they thought they were not prepared, 54% did not “know how to achieve preparedness,” while nearly a third (32%) indicated that cost was a factor. Reasons for not having an emergency kit prepared ranged from those who “did not think it was important” (25%) to “time constraints (12%), lack of knowledge (10%), and cost (8%).” ORC Macro asked respondents who indicated that they were not prepared for a terrorist attack, natural disaster, and/or household emergency why they thought they were not prepared. The most common responses relate to the lack of preparedness measures taken, such as not having a disaster plan (61%) or an emergency kit (55%).¹²⁹

¹²⁶ ORC Macro, Macro International, Inc., *Post Katrina Survey on Household Preparedness* (Washington, D.C.: Citizen Corps, December 22, 2005), 4.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 7.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 7-8. See also power point presentation by ORC Macro at National Citizen Corps Meeting in June of 2006, “Understanding Personal Preparedness Motivators and Barriers: Developing a Behavior Change Model to Inform Research and Strategy,” available on the Citizen Corps website at www.citizencorps.gov, accessed March 3, 2007.

In this same survey, respondents who indicated they *had* taken action toward preparedness were asked what motivated them to prepare: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 39%; concern for household or personal safety, 12%; event in their own life 9%; advice of neighbors or community, 4%; advice of family and friends, 3%; change in the threat advisory level, 2%; and community offering education or training, 2%.¹³⁰

In May of 2006, a nationwide Harris poll found 72% of Americans believe hurricanes are the most destructive natural or manmade disaster.¹³¹ A vast majority (81%) stated they were very or somewhat prepared for snow and ice storms, but only 28% were very or somewhat prepared for terrorism (meaning 72% were not very prepared or not prepared at all), 29% were very or somewhat prepared for earthquakes (with 71% not very prepared or not prepared at all) and 35% were very or somewhat prepared for hurricanes (with 65% not very prepared or not prepared at all).¹³² When broken down by region, only 35% of those who said a hurricane would impact them said they were somewhat or very prepared, with only 52% in the South stating they were somewhat or very prepared, despite the devastation of Katrina.

In May and June of 2006, the Council for Excellence in Government conducted a study looking at the preparedness of Americans. Published in December of 2006, the CEG also introduced a new measurement tool for citizen preparedness, the “Public Readiness Index” (herein the PRI), which is discussed more fully in Chapter IV, *infra*. The PRI measures ten items, three knowledge-based and seven behavior-based, to measure preparedness on a ten point scale. Nationally, the average was a 3.31. This survey showed that 63% of Americans have taken first aid classes, 42% have a disaster supply kit at home, 36% have a portable kit, 29% have a communications plan, 21% have a set meeting place in case of separation during an emergency, 26% have practiced or drilled in what to do in an emergency, and 15% have volunteered to help prepare or

¹³⁰ ORC Macro, *Post-Katrina Household Survey*, 8.

¹³¹ Harris Poll #39, May 16, 2006, www.harrisinteractive.com accessed March 1, 2007.

¹³² *Ibid.*, Table 3A.

respond in an emergency.¹³³ The survey showed that age, education, and income level all play a role in preparedness. Persons over age 65 are less prepared than younger people, persons with some high school education (or less) are significantly less prepared than those with a high school education (or higher) and households with income of less than \$40,000 per year are less prepared than others.¹³⁴

The preparedness of a workplace or school played a role in overall preparedness. “The data indicates that participation in the workplace and having school-aged children correlate highly with individual and family preparedness.”¹³⁵ More importantly, “these findings indicate that workplaces and schools provide opportune venues for communities to leverage the message of individual and family preparedness.”¹³⁶

This survey also looked at the 32% of Americans who stated they were not prepared and had done nothing to prepare for disasters. The reasons cited were consistent with other surveys: 45% simply had not thought about it, 34% did not think an emergency would happen to them or their family, 25% thought that nothing they could do would be effective, 24% said they did not know what to do to get prepared, 18% said it takes too much time, and 16% cited cost.¹³⁷

Of those who had taken at least one step toward preparedness, 80% cited the need to be self-sufficient and not reliant on others, while 49% cited responsibility for children as a reason to prepare. In San Francisco and Miami, high percentages (61% and 62% respectively) cited steps were taken to prepare because they were in a high risk area.¹³⁸

Another survey was discussed in an article in *TIME Magazine* in August of 2006, entitled “Why We Don’t Prepare.”¹³⁹

¹³³ Council for Excellence in Government, *Are We Ready? Introducing the Public Readiness Index: A Survey-Based Tool to Measure the Preparedness of Individuals, Families and Communities*, (Washington, D.C.: Council for Excellence in Government, December 14, 2006), 9.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

¹³⁹ Amanda Ripley, “Why We Don’t Prepare,” *TIME Magazine*, 28 August 2006, 55.

...Historically, humans get serious about avoiding disasters only after one has just smacked them across the face. Well, then, by that logic, 2006 should have been a breakthrough year for rational behavior. With the memory of 9/11, the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, still fresh in their minds, Americans watched Katrina...on live TV. Anyone who didn't know it before should have learned that bad things can happen....Granted, some amount of delusion is probably part of the human condition...But a review of the past year in disaster history suggests that modern Americans are particularly, mysteriously bad at protecting themselves from guaranteed threats. We know more than we ever did about the dangers we face. But it turns out that in times of crisis, our greatest enemy is rarely the storm, the quake or the surge itself. More often, it is ourselves.¹⁴⁰

The article refers to America as having “A National Culture of Unpreparedness,” pointing out that “it’s not just bureaucrats who are unprepared for calamity. Regular people are even less likely to plan ahead.” Although about half of those surveyed had personal experience of a natural disaster or public emergency, only 16% said they were “very well prepared” for the next one. According to the *TIME* poll, about half of those 84% who were not very well prepared said it was because they didn’t live in a high-risk area. This is despite the fact that “91% of Americans live in places at a moderate-to-high risk of earthquakes, volcanoes, tornadoes, wildfires, hurricanes, flooding, high-wind damage or terrorism,” according to an estimate by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute at the University of South Carolina.¹⁴¹

The *TIME* article synthesizes the findings of a report by Robert Blendon, Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health. This report was based on a survey of 2,000 respondents in eight hurricane-prone states, looking at the reasons why people failed to evacuate and what might motivate people to evacuate in the face of another major hurricane.

Overall, 33% said they would not leave or were not sure whether they would leave if an evacuation order was given. But it was homeowners, at 39%, who were particularly stubborn. Lack of funds or transportation does play a role for stay-behinds, but according to the poll, a greater

¹⁴⁰ Amanda Ripley, “Why We Don’t Prepare,” *TIME Magazine*, 28 August 2006, 56.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

consideration is a vague belief their home is well built enough to survive a storm – a justification offered by a whopping 68%.

People cherry-pick the lessons of Katrina to avoid taking action. Fifty-four percent of those who say they wouldn't evacuate are worried that the roads would be too crowded, and 67% believe shelters would be dangerous.¹⁴²

In another, more recent, survey (unpublished), conducted in August of 2006 by Dr. David Abramson, National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University, a number of reasons were given as a barrier to having a complete family emergency plan:

- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| • No time | 26.4 |
| • Not sure what to do | 22.4 |
| • Will not make a difference | 13.6 |
| • Too expensive | 5.7 |
| • Supplies will be provided by government/others | 2.4 |
| • Unlikely there will be an emergency | 2.1 ¹⁴³ |

In this survey, when asked if respondents had taken action (whether gathering supplies or developing an emergency plan), 40% stated that they were not planning to do anything about preparing, 15% stated they had not prepared, but intended to in the next six months, 5% stated they had not yet prepared but intended to in the next month, 12% had just recently begun preparing, and 28% responded that they had been prepared for at least six months.¹⁴⁴ Thus, 60% of overall respondents were unprepared and without the basics of preparedness, with a large percentage of overall respondents (40%) not planning on taking any action to get prepared, and only 20% “intending” to take some type of action within the next month to six months. When asked why Americans are not getting

¹⁴²Amanda Ripley, “Why We Don’t Prepare,” *TIME Magazine*, 28 August 2006, 57.

¹⁴³ Dr. David Abramson, PhD MPH, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University, “Preparedness as a Complex Phenomenon: Modeling Behavioral, Psychological, Attitudinal, and Cognitive Elements,” Research Presentation at Department of Homeland Security Research Roundtable, Washington, D.C., February 21, 2007.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

prepared and where we are failing to reach people, Dr. Abramson responded: “It [preparedness] is not salient at the individual level...we haven’t made a compelling case, we just haven’t made it salient.”¹⁴⁵

B. EXCUSES, EXCUSES: FROM NO MONEY, NO TIME, TO UNDERPERCEIVING RISK, FUTILITY AND FATALISM, AND THE BELIEF THAT THE CAVALRY WILL ARRIVE

Many reasons are given for not preparing – no money, no time, or it’s not important. In addition, there are other themes at work: underperceiving risk, a sense of futility or fatalism (“there’s nothing I can do about it”), and a belief that the cavalry will arrive to save the day.

All of these reasons coincide with the experience of emergency managers across the country in promoting public preparedness efforts:

... Americans have a tendency to be die-hard optimists, literally. It is part of what makes the country great – and invincible. “There are four stages of denial” says Eric Holdeman, director of emergency management for Seattle’s King County which faces a significant earthquake threat: “One is, it won’t happen. Two is, if it does happen, it won’t happen to me. Three: if it does happen, it won’t be that bad. And four: if it happens to me and it’s bad, there’s nothing I can do to stop it anyway.”¹⁴⁶

Complacency is an obstacle to preparing citizens for disaster. In San Francisco, this author encountered the attitude that the Loma Prieta earthquake was not so disruptive. The individuals expressing this opinion needed constant reminders that the epicenter was sixty miles away from the city and was not our generation’s “Big One.”

In the ORC Macro survey (conducted October 2005) 31% of respondents agreed with the statement “In a disaster, [the] events will likely overtake any preparations you and your household may have made.” This sense of fatalism may play a role in why citizens are unlikely to prepare. “More than half (52%) of Americans who agree that

¹⁴⁵ Telephone Interview with Dr. David Abramson, March 5, 2007.

¹⁴⁶ Amanda Ripley, “Why We Don’t Prepare,” 57.

their efforts would be overcome by disaster have done nothing to prepare.”¹⁴⁷ The CEG/ARC study (cited *supra*) points to this same phenomenon.

Others under-perceive the risk. Dr. Dennis Mileti, a recognized expert in human behavior before and after disaster, contends that “We know exactly – exactly – where the major disasters will occur...But individuals under-perceive risk.”¹⁴⁸

An interesting and disturbing trend starts to appear in some of these surveys. Despite a lack of faith in government, as cited by a variety of surveys and polls (discussed more fully in Chapter VI, Section F, *infra*), and the devastating images from Katrina (with Americans in desperate need for basic food, water and supplies days after an event) Americans still have an odd faith that help will arrive in time to save them. The above-referenced survey conducted by Professor Beldon found that “ironically, 66% of those surveyed were also confident that if they stayed at home, they would be eventually rescued – a faith hardly justified by the Katrina experience. Ours is a strange culture of irrational distrust – buoyed by irrational optimism.”¹⁴⁹

Dr. Abramson’s study (cited *supra*) also showed a trend in believing that the cavalry will arrive. In responding to the question “In the event of a major disaster in your community, such as a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or emergency weather event, how long do you believe it will take first responders, such as fire, police, paramedics or the National Guard to arrive and assist you?” Forty-seven percent of New Yorkers believed help would arrive in less than one hour, with 28% believing help would arrive within several hours, followed by 15% believing help would arrive within one day, and 10% within several days. In looking at Louisiana and Mississippi, 33% and 37% respectively, believed help would arrive in less than one hour, 26% and 27% within several hours, 15% for each sampling believed help would arrive within one day, and 25% and 21% believed help would arrive within several days. The nation as a whole was not as

¹⁴⁷ ORC Macro, *Post-Katrina Household Survey*, 6.

¹⁴⁸ Amanda Ripley, “Why We Don’t Prepare,” 56.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 57.

optimistic as New Yorkers or residents of the Gulf States. Nationally, 33% of respondents believed help would arrive within one hour, 31% within several days, 18% within one day and 18% within several days.¹⁵⁰

These recent numbers are astounding in the post-Katrina world and work at odds with efforts to prepare Americans to be self-sufficient for several days in the event of a disaster. If the general population believes help will arrive immediately, then how do we make a compelling case to the contrary?

¹⁵⁰ Dr. David Abramson Presentation, "Preparedness is a Complex Phenomenon," February 21, 2007.

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IV. CREATING A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS: WHAT IS PREPAREDNESS AND HOW DO WE MEASURE IT? WHAT IS A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS? ARE WE MAKING EFFORTS TOWARD BECOMING PSYCHOLOGICALLY PREPARED FOR TERRORISM AND CREATING RESILIENCY?

A. WHAT IS PREPAREDNESS AND HOW DO WE MEASURE IT?

Significant investment is needed to create a culture of preparedness in this country. Strategic investment, aimed at elevating preparedness, requires a definition of preparedness, a clear vision of what we are trying to achieve, and a measurement tool to establish a baseline from which to measure improvements derived from (or the failure of) bold new initiatives. The need for a measurement tool and clear, defined goals is highlighted in a recent article revealing serious flaws in the government's ability to measure success in bioterrorism programs. "More than five years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the government cannot show how \$5 billion given to the public health departments has better prepared the country for a bioterrorism attack or flu pandemic."¹⁵¹ This article shows the difficulty in measuring success and progress and the CDC cites "difficulty getting health departments to agree about what the government should measure."¹⁵²

The same debate needs to take place in defining preparedness and what to measure in terms of preparedness. Indeed, the very idea of a culture of preparedness needs to be developed and defined. How will we know when we have achieved success when we have not defined the goal and the end state? Is a culture of preparedness when 30%, 50%, 90% of the population has food and water stored to survive on its own for a minimum of seventy-two hours? When every American has a family emergency plan in place? When the majority of Americans has undergone training and understands how to respond to the hazards to that community? And, more importantly, how are we preparing

¹⁵¹ Kevin Freking, "CDC lacks data to track bioterror preparedness: Difficulty is in documenting states' readiness since 9/11 attacks," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 11, 2007, A20.

¹⁵² Ibid.

for terrorism, the purpose of which is to inflict harm with the goal of instilling widespread fear and psychological trauma in a population? What measures are we taking and how will we measure success in preparing for the consequences of terrorism?

1. The Public Readiness Index: Measuring the Basics

Myriad websites and brochures from government at all levels and non-profit organizations list the things one must have on hand for a preparedness kit and supplies, offer checklists for emergency plans and contacts, and encourage residents to “get involved” or “get informed” by participating in CERT programs, Red Cross training and other community efforts. These sources provide the basics of personal preparedness.

The Council for Excellence in Government (CEG), in consultation with many entities, has developed the “Public Readiness Index” as a tool for measuring basic preparedness. This tool measures ten items – three that are knowledge-based and seven that are behavior-based – to provide a city, community or individual, with their Readiness Quotient or RQ.

Public Readiness Index – 10 Point Scale

Knowledge Elements (Questions 1-3)

- Does your local government have an emergency or disaster plan for your community?
- Do you know how to find the emergency broadcasting channel on the radio?
- In the past 30 days, have you seen or heard any messages that encourage people to take steps to be prepared for emergency situations in your community?

Behavior Elements (Questions 4-10)

- Have you actually prepared a disaster supply kit with emergency supplies like water, food and medicine that is kept in a designated place in your home?
- Have you actually prepared a small kit with emergency supplies that you keep at home, in your car or where you work to take with you if you had to leave quickly?

- Have you actually made a specific plan for how you and your family would communicate in an emergency situation if you were separated?
- Have you actually established a specific meeting place to reunite in the event you and your family cannot return home or are evacuated?
- Have you actually practiced or drilled on what to do in an emergency at home?
- Have you actually volunteered to help prepare for or respond to a major emergency?
- Have you actually taken first aid training such as CPR in the past five years?

The CEG's PRI is a healthy first start in looking at preparedness and measuring a baseline of basic preparedness issues from knowledge of where to turn for information, to storing supplies, to plans and meeting places, to some basic training in first aid and volunteering to help prepare for or respond to disaster. This scale was intentionally geared toward measuring the very basics of personal preparedness.¹⁵³

2. The Fritz Institute: Measurements Need to Look Beyond Activities to the Quality of Preparedness Efforts and View Preparedness as an Ongoing Process

The Fritz Institute, based in San Francisco, is studying the issue of citizen preparedness and developing new programs. It has recently produced a white paper suggesting that a more sophisticated modeling approach be used for measuring preparedness. This approach would take into account many years of study and research at the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, Boulder, as well other works, databases, and studies focusing on disaster preparedness and measuring preparedness for households, businesses and government entities that have been developed over the past few decades. Dr. Kathleen Tierney, Director of the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder, co-authored the study. In advocating for a measurement tool, the report states, "The federal government has prioritized national preparedness without developing a system to achieve

¹⁵³ Author was member of Council for Excellence in Government Advisory Council.

and maintain it.”¹⁵⁴ The purpose of the report is to suggest ways to develop a “standardized index to measure disaster preparedness.”¹⁵⁵ The report looks at the question of “What is Disaster Preparedness?” referring to preparedness in a number of different ways, including: “developing planning processes to ensure readiness; formulating disaster plans; stockpiling resources necessary for effective response; and developing skills and competencies to ensure effective performance of disaster-related tasks.” The report recognizes that

Preparedness is commonly viewed as consisting of activities aimed at improving response activities and coping capabilities...However, emphasis is increasingly being placed on *recovery preparedness* – that is, on planning not only in order to respond effectively during and immediately after disasters but also in order to successfully navigate challenges associated with short and long term recovery.¹⁵⁶

In looking at household preparedness, there are six common areas measured or studied in past surveys and studies: hazard knowledge, formal and informal response plans and agreements, life safety protection, property protection, emergency coping and restoration of key functions, and initiation of recovery. According to this report, “the main emphasis tends to fall in the area of hazard knowledge, life safety, and property protection, with specific attention placed on assembling a disaster supplies kit, mitigation activities, and developing a family communications plan.”¹⁵⁷

This white paper looks at the standard measurements and suggests there is far more to the issue of “what it means to be prepared for disaster” and makes recommendations to look further than measuring simple activities to measuring the quality of the preparedness efforts. As stated in the report, “preparedness is a process, not a product.”¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴ Jeanette Sutton, Kathleen Tierney, *Disaster Preparedness: Concepts, Guidance, and Research*, Natural Hazards Center, Institute for Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, Report prepared for the Fritz Institute Assessing Disaster Preparedness Conference, Sebastopol, California, November 3 and 4, 2006, 1.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 14.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 31-32.

The report is meant as a “first step in the collaborative development of assessment strategies for household, community, and organizational preparedness.”¹⁵⁹ Psychological preparedness for the impact of terrorism is not mentioned in the report, but these new efforts are moving past just the basics of measuring food, water and supplies present in the household to the actual quality of the preparedness efforts; this effort also is moving toward measurement of recovery preparedness.

3. The National Preparedness Goal, the Target Capabilities List and Performance Measures and Metrics

As set forth in Chapter II, the federal government has been prioritizing citizen preparedness in speeches and documents including the Townsend Report, HSPD-8, the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the *Interim National Preparedness Goal*, the *National Preparedness Goal* and its accompanying *Target Capabilities List*. The *National Preparedness Goal* is based on the requirements of HSPD-8. “The ***National Preparedness Goal*** (The Goal) envisions a national preparedness system in which all entities have target levels of capability in place and effectively communicate and coordinate resources. Implementing such a system will be a complex undertaking. To guide implementation in the short term, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8...calls for the Goal to include ***measurable national priorities*** to be achieved.” The Goal is designed to address essential capabilities and to “establish measurable priorities, targets, and a common approach to developing needed capabilities.”¹⁶⁰ The Goal spells

¹⁵⁹ Jeanette Sutton, Kathleen Tierney, *Disaster Preparedness: Concepts, Guidance, and Research*, 37, italics and emphasis in original.

¹⁶⁰ United States Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet, A Common Starting Point: The National Priorities," undated, www.dhs.gov, (accessed March 14, 2007 and October 9, 2007).

out the National Priorities (to meet the most urgent needs¹⁶¹) as well as the thirty-seven capabilities and associated outcomes from the *Target Capabilities List*.

“Citizen Preparedness and Participation” is a target capability. This capability is subject to future revisions as a result of Hurricane Katrina.¹⁶² Under the *Target Capabilities List*, a “Capability Definition” is provided for “Citizen Preparedness and Participation:”

Everyone in America is fully aware, trained, and practiced on how to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards. This requires a role for citizens in personal preparedness, exercises, ongoing volunteer programs, and surge capacity response.¹⁶³

There are five activity areas discussed as part of this capability. The most relevant to a discussion of how to measure citizen/individual preparedness falls under the activity of “Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas.” The definition states: “Ensure the public is educated and trained in prevention, protection, response, and recovery for all hazards, with specific consideration for high-threat hazards for the area in which they live, work, or attend school and for special needs.”¹⁶⁴ A variety of “Critical Tasks” are listed and detailed “Performance Measures” and “Metrics” are provided.

The *TCL* sets some very high standards for measuring citizen preparedness. Although no common definition of citizen preparedness exists, the performance measures

¹⁶¹ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Final National Preparedness Goal*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 2005), 13. The seven National Priorities are three overarching priorities – Implement NIMS and the NRP, Expand Regional Collaboration, Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan – and four capability-specific priorities from the TCL – Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration, Strengthen Interoperable Communications, Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response and Decontamination Capabilities, Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities. An additional priority was added after Hurricane Katrina: Strengthen Emergency Operations Planning and Citizen Protection Capabilities (mostly focused on mass care, shelter, evacuation, or in-place protection). See United States Department of Homeland Security, “Hurricane Katrina Impact on the National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities List,” www.dhs.gov, (accessed March 10, 2007 and October 15, 2007).

¹⁶² See DHS, “Hurricane Katrina Impact on the National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities List.”

¹⁶³ DHS, *Draft Target Capabilities List*, September 2006, 107.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 109.

and metrics provided in the *Target Capabilities List* do give an indication of what the federal government is striving for in developing a robust citizen preparedness effort. The items measured go far beyond the PRI and all of the surveys to date in measuring preparedness. Generally, the metrics call for a 5% annual increase in each area measured until 80% of the stated performance measurement is achieved. The metrics measure many things including education and training, awareness, knowledge on a variety of subjects, maintenance of skills and knowledge, shelter in place preparations, planning, CBRNE training and decontamination, first aid, life-saving skills, and implementation of mitigation measures, among others.

The *TCL* sets forth the performance measures and metrics as shown in the excerpted pages.

Excerpt from Draft Target Capabilities List, September 2006
Common Mission: Community Preparedness and Participation
Pages 110 to 111

Performance Measures	Metrics
Percent of citizens educated and trained in UNIVERSAL all-hazards capabilities ³	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of population is educated and trained
Percent of citizens who are aware of heightened jurisdictional threat levels	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of citizens maintain awareness
Percent of citizens who know the relevant immediate response for technological, natural and terrorist incidents	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of citizens maintain knowledge
Percent of citizens within the jurisdiction who are alert to unusual behavior in others that might indicate potential terrorist activity and understand appropriate reporting procedures	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of citizens maintain skills
Percent of privately held critical infrastructure computer owners who implement appropriate virus protections and act on virus alerts	5% annual increase until 80% of owners achieve implementation
Percent of households that conduct pre-incident preparation – to include maintaining a communication plan, disasters supplies, and a practicing evacuation/shelter-in-place	5% annual increase until 80% of households maintain pre-incident preparation
Percent of citizens prepared to evacuate or relocate to designated shelter	5% annual increase until 80% of population is prepared
Percent of jurisdiction's population knowledgeable of workplace, school, and community emergency plans	5% annual increase until 80% of population maintains knowledge

³ Specific capabilities for UNIVERSAL all-hazards preparedness will be determined through a collaborative process with emergency responders; expected to be finalized by Dec 2006. Possible capabilities are included here.

Performance Measures and Metrics continued

Percent of citizens prepared to shelter-in-place and have emergency supplies on hand as advised by local authorities	5% annual increase until 80% of population prepared to shelter in place
Percent of citizens trained in basic first aid	5% annual increase until 80% of population maintains skills
Percent of citizens educated and trained in RISK-BASED capabilities for high-threat incidents in their area, to include natural hazards, technological hazards, and terrorism ⁴	An annual increase of 5% until 72% ⁵ of population (80% of those living in high-threat area) are educated and trained per appropriate hazard
Percent of citizens who know the appropriate detailed response for specific high-threat incidents in their area, to include multiple incidents where appropriate	An annual increase of 5% until 72% of population (80% of those living in high-threat area) have specialized awareness
Percent of population trained in CBRNE and decontamination procedures	5% annual increase until 46% of population (80% of those living in urban areas) maintain skills
Percent of population with risk-based life-saving skills	An annual increase of 5% until 72% of population (80% of those living in high-threat area) maintain specialized skills.
Percent of households, businesses, and schools that have implemented mitigation measures to protect property from specific high-threat	5% annual increase until 72% households, businesses, and schools (80% of those in high-risk areas) have implemented mitigation measures

⁴ Specific capabilities for RISK-BASED, hazard-specific preparedness will be determined through a collaborative process with emergency responders; expected to be finalized by Dec 2006. Possible capabilities are included here.

⁵ As stated in the planning assumptions, 90% of the U.S. population lives in area with high-risk for at least one major hazard/threat. Using a target of 80% of the population applied to this at-risk base of 90%, provides a target of 72% of the total population.

Taken as a whole, the fifteen highlighted areas for measurement provide a roadmap for a robust citizen preparedness effort. They represent the most thorough

attempt to date in developing a comprehensive scope of what it would take to create a highly trained, knowledgeable, prepared, and resilient citizenry. However, it may be unrealistic to expect 5% yearly increases and a goal of 80% of the population prepared in these fifteen areas, given the difficulties of just getting the public to store food and water or take preparedness measures and the threat of terrorism seriously. The TCL is an admirable first effort to define what a truly prepared public should look like, but the lack of resources allocated for citizen preparedness and the lack of attention paid by government and citizens to the issue presents an enormous hurdle to creating a culture of preparedness.

4. Reports Show Need for Consistency in Measurement in National Studies/Surveys: Perceived Preparedness Differs from Actual Preparedness, Terrorism Preparedness Not Measured

In reviewing national surveys and polls, it is interesting to note that many of the questions asking how “prepared” a citizen is often do not delve into exactly *what* the individual has done to get prepared. Thus, a respondent’s perception of his or her own preparedness may not mean that individual actually has the basics of preparedness.

A striking finding is that respondents’ perceptions of their preparedness for disaster (as measured by those who responded that they were prepared or somewhat prepared) are much greater than their actual preparedness, given responses to questions on specific preparedness activities such as having a plan or preparing a kit.¹⁶⁵

A clear, consistent measurement of preparedness is necessary to accurately reflect a baseline of preparedness across the country. The analysis cited above also found that “people may report taking steps toward preparedness, but when asked follow-up questions, it is revealed that their actions are inadequate.”¹⁶⁶ This observation is

¹⁶⁵ ORC Macro, “Methodological Considerations,” 1.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 8.

supported by the studies discussed in Chapter III, *supra*, where respondents are actually asked specific questions about supplies on hand or elements of a disaster plan, versus their initial response of being prepared.

It has been recognized that “the emphasis on a disaster plan and home-related supplies limits our understanding of other aspects of preparedness.”¹⁶⁷ After reviewing preparedness surveys from across the country, conducted over the past several years, a recent study concluded that only two main aspects of preparedness were explored – disaster plans and gathering supplies. Only a few surveys or studies went further to look at volunteering, training, or knowing what actions to take during and after an emergency.¹⁶⁸

This same study also recognizes that preparedness for terrorism has not been measured.

Because terrorism is often used as a monolithic term, it is difficult to gauge a citizens’ perceptions of, and preparedness for, specific types of terrorism. Furthermore, research findings on preparedness for a particular type of natural hazard do not necessarily indicate preparedness for other types of natural hazards or for events caused by terrorism. This complicates the ability to use the results to measure levels of preparedness relative to specific threats and to design targeted messages and campaigns.¹⁶⁹

Measuring preparedness for the psychological impact of terrorism will be challenging. This may not fit within the current all-hazards approach to citizen preparedness, where resiliency, an immediate return to normalcy, and overall psychological preparedness for terrorism are needed. These concepts are more fully developed in Chapter V, *infra* in the context of the Israeli approach to creating a culture of preparedness.

¹⁶⁷ ORC Macro, “Patterns in Current Research and Future Research Opportunities,” 5.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

B. A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS AS RELATED TO TERRORISM, THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS

The term “culture of preparedness” has been used throughout speeches and was established as a goal in the Townsend Report. But what does it mean? According to FEMA’s own definition, “a culture is the special way of life that holds a group of people together and makes it different from all other groups.”¹⁷⁰ Others define culture as “the accumulated habits, attitudes, and beliefs of a group of people that define for them their general behavior and way of life; the total set of learned activities of a people.”¹⁷¹ Culture can also be defined as a set of shared beliefs and values of a group – the beliefs, customs, practices and social behavior of a particular nation or people; people with shared beliefs and practices – a group of people whose shared beliefs and practices identify the particular place, class or time to which they belong; or shared attitudes – a particular set of attitudes that characterizes a group of people.¹⁷² Community preparedness and individual preparedness are key to creating a true culture of preparedness.

In developing a culture of preparedness can we ignore the aspects of psychological preparedness for terrorism? “Terrorism is about psychology...It is about making ordinary people feel vulnerable, anxious, confused, uncertain, and helpless.”¹⁷³

Because of its unique characteristics, citizen preparedness for the psychological impact of terrorism (fear) may not fit neatly into an “all-hazards” approach. But in creating a true culture of preparedness, the resiliency of individuals and the community to deal with the intended impact of terrorist acts must be developed, addressed, and measured.

¹⁷⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Glossary,” Earthquakes – FEMA, 159, www.FEMA.gov/library/file (accessed April 15, 2007).

¹⁷¹ The Glossary of Geography, www.geographic.org (accessed April 17, 2007).

¹⁷² Encarta Dictionary, English (North America), www.encarta.com/dictionary (last accessed April 12, 2007).

¹⁷³ Rachel Yehuda, Steven E. Hyman, “The Impact of Terrorism on Brain, and Behavior: What We Know and What We Need to Know.” *Neuropsychopharmacology* 30, (2005): 1773, quoting Dr. Phillip Zimbardo.

Ignoring psychological preparedness in response to terrorism cannot continue. Americans do believe that we will be attacked again. The government should initiate an open and frank dialogue about psychologically preparing the population for terrorism and its impact. In 2005, 76% of Americans believed that Osama Bin Laden was currently planning a significant terrorist attack against the United States. In 2006, this number decreased to 70% but still remains very high. When asked, in 2005, whether Bin Laden would be successful in launching an attack, 53% of Americans thought such an attack would be successful; in 2006, fewer (42%) thought he would be successful.¹⁷⁴ These numbers show, as do other studies such as those by Dr. Light at NYU and others cited *supra* in Chapter III, that Americans believe there is a strong likelihood of attack. These numbers may also indicate a willingness on the part of the American people to engage in a dialogue about preparing for terrorism.

As widespread fear is the intended impact of terrorism, efforts must be made to take the “terror” out of terrorism. In a poll conducted in October of 2001, 26% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that it is the duty of Americans not to show fear about the threat of terrorism, while 71% stated there is nothing wrong with showing fear about terrorism. More recently, Gallup issued a report showing that in September of 2001, 58% of Americans were very or somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would be a victim of terrorism. This number has decreased to 45% in 2007, but is still significant.

Americans’ personal concern about terrorism remains significant, though it is much lower now than after 9/11...terrorism has faded as a top-of-mind concern for many Americans when they are asked to say what is the most important problem facing our country. However, the issue still ranks near the top of the list when Americans are asked to assess the importance of various issues as priorities for the President and Congress or as factors in their voting decisions. Terrorism is a sleeper issue that could quickly

¹⁷⁴ The Gallup Organization, Gallup Brain, “Osama Bin Laden,” www.institution.gallup.com (accessed on March 1, 2007).

overtake other issues as the dominant concern for Americans (a position that the war in Iraq currently holds) with new attacks or an increased threat of attacks.¹⁷⁵

Government and the public must be prepared to deal with the psychological impacts of terrorism long before the next terrorist attack.

A number of recent articles and studies have begun to look at the long term implications of terrorism and the need for government, public health, and the medical community to prepare for the impact of a terrorist attack.¹⁷⁶ This area of study should also be explored and developed to find ways to psychologically prepare citizens to ameliorate the impact of terrorism, creating a resilient population. The importance of psychological preparedness and resiliency is addressed in the next chapter in the discussion of Israel as a culture of preparedness.

¹⁷⁵ The Gallup Organization, Gallup Brain, "Terrorism in the United States, Gallup's Pulse of Democracy: Terrorism," www.institution.gallup.com (accessed March 1, 2007).

¹⁷⁶ See Edna B. Foa, Shawn P. Cahill, Joseph A Boscarino, Stevan H. Hobfoll, Mooli Lahad, Richard J. McNally, Zahava Solomon, "Social, Psychological, and Psychiatric Interventions Following Terrorist Attacks: Recommendations for Practice and Research," *Neuropsychopharmacology* 30, (2005): 1806-1817. See also Thomas A. Glass, Monica Schoch-Spana, "Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a City Against Panic," *Clinical Infectious Disease* 34 (2002): 217-223.

V. CREATING A CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS: ISRAEL AS A MODEL, LESSONS LEARNED FOR TERRORISM, THE IMPORTANCE OF RESILIENCY AND EDUCATION

Israel has made preparedness a way of life. Preparedness has been integrated into its culture through a variety of means. Some of the lessons learned from Israel, particularly in the areas of preparedness education in all primary schools, using an integrated curriculum, as well as education and training for all upper high school grade students and requiring these students to perform volunteer work in emergencies, may prove helpful in establishing a culture of preparedness in the U.S. Unlike Americans, Israelis live every day with the constant threat and reality of terrorism. Israel has taken extreme measures in education and preparedness, which may not fit with the American lifestyle or culture, with a particular emphasis on terrorism. That is, unless and until suicide bombings and/or additional terrorist events take place on American soil and in American cities.

Terrorism is psychological warfare, intended to create fear and panic within a citizenry. Traditionally, actual fatalities and injuries resulting from a terrorist act are limited.¹⁷⁷ The real impact is the fear and uncertainty that terrorism spreads and the feeling that government cannot protect its citizenry. Resiliency in the face of terrorist acts and taking the “terror” out of terrorism has been a hallmark of the Israeli approach. Citizens are educated about risks and survival strategies and embrace their personal responsibility for knowing what to do in an emergency. This empowerment serves to defeat terrorism. Preparedness is considered a partnership between government and the citizenry.

Another important factor in the Israeli success in preparedness lies in the credibility of the messenger communicating the threat to the citizenry, and what actions citizens should take to prepare themselves and their families for disaster. The Home

¹⁷⁷ The World Trade Center, with nearly 3,000 dead, was an anomaly.

Front Command (herein “HFC”) is held in high regard and citizens listen to this government entity. Israeli citizens do feel that government is protecting them and have faith in this government institution to provide accurate advice.

In contrast, studies show that the U.S. citizenry believes there will be additional terrorist attacks in the U.S., but have little faith in government to protect them from various forms of attack.¹⁷⁸ The use of a trusted institution and trusted messenger to inspire and motivate citizens to be prepared is key to a successful effort in emergency preparedness and awareness.

A comparison of the U.S. and Israel presents several challenges. The two countries differ in government structure (no federalism issues in Israel), the presence of enemies on all borders (Americans feel buffered by oceans), demographics (less ethnically diverse group than a highly diverse U.S. population), and a vastly different geographic and population size. Israel is 20,330 square kilometers in size (exclusive of water), slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey, whereas the U.S. is 9,832,630 square kilometers (exclusive of water). The population of Israel is approximately 6.4 million, compared to the U.S. population of approximately 298 million.¹⁷⁹ These factors all play a part in the success of Israel’s programs, policies, and strategies and may present some challenges to applicability of these programs and policies in the U.S. However, Israel offers several lessons which can be adapted or adopted to enhance U.S. efforts to create a culture of preparedness.

A. ISRAEL AS A TRUE CULTURE OF PREPAREDNESS, TERRORISM AS A PART OF LIFE, REQUIRED EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM, A PSYCHOLOGICALLY RESILIENT POPULATION

The Israeli approach to preparedness and communication with the citizenry can be seen on the Home Front Command website.¹⁸⁰ The messages to the public are very

¹⁷⁸ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*.

¹⁷⁹ United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 2007*, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (accessed on April 12, 2007).

¹⁸⁰ Home Front Command website, www.1.idf.il/oref/site/EN/main.asp (accessed throughout August and September 2006).

“matter of fact” and straightforward. As the citizens and government live under the constant threat of terrorism, its impact is a very real part of everyday life. Citizens have been effectively engaged in the process, however, and preparedness and awareness has become part of the culture.

Standardized preparedness curriculum is integrated into schools at the primary level.¹⁸¹

In Israel, citizen preparedness is a major part of national readiness and disaster preparedness. At the age of 18 most Israelis go into the army. In 5th grade every student is taught 2 days of readiness and emergency preparedness. In high school the highest two classes serve as volunteers in times of emergencies and assist in response to disasters and emergencies.¹⁸²

Citizen preparedness and education is approached from an empowerment perspective – that citizens can be part of “the cause” in fighting terrorism and a prepared citizenry defeats terrorism. It is also considered a citizen’s responsibility to be prepared.

Thinking Differently 101

Looking for details about dealing with terrorism? Try Israel. Its government updates read like a police blotter: “On Sunday, April 20, 2003, Fa’ruz Ahmed Mahmud Makhil was arrested in the Balata refugee camp, near Nablus. [Makhil], a wanted female Palestinian, intended to carry out a suicide bombing inside Israel. [Makhil] was the fifth terrorist arrested in the past two weeks, three of whom intended to carry out suicide bombings.”

Israel demonstrates how a country’s populace can simultaneously adjust to the dangers of terrorism and bolster security on the home front. Elementary school children there learn about chemical and biological weapons and how to use a gas mask. The Israeli government runs TV spots advising people how to keep an eye out for explosives in public places. “Public awareness of bombs has been an important aspect of coping with terrorism here,” says Ariel Merari, director of the political

¹⁸¹ Col. (ret.) Boaz Tadmor, M.D., *Webinar* (New York: Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, 2006) herein referred to as Webinar, www.cds.osr.columbia.edu/public_health/Mike/courses/player.html (accessed August 11, 2006).

¹⁸² Ibid.

violence research unit at Tel Aviv University. “Indeed, in many cases, bombs have been found because of people’s awareness.”

Yet, because the terrorism threat is different in the U.S., the government may not want to go as far as to include Gas Masks 101 in the curriculum of second-graders.¹⁸³

Israel actively engages the public in the war on terrorism. This approach also keeps the public from falling victim to hopelessness and the sense that the individual can do nothing about the threat of terrorism. The HFC website reiterates that terrorism is a part of the culture in Israel. On one page, in the right hand corner, there is a color photograph of a silhouette of a man and woman standing together at sunset, a happy couple gazing at each other...wearing gasmasks. This same page describes the IPK (individual protective kit) which is distributed to each citizen and replenished by the HFC at expiration. Immigrants and newborns are also issued IPKs. The kit contains syringes, masks, and other essential items and may not be opened unless there are explicit instructions from the HFC to do so, as “these items may well save your life at the moment of truth.”¹⁸⁴

The HFC’s fifty-two page pamphlet entitled “In the Event of a Genuine Alert, Information on Civil Defense for the Family” (dated January 2003) has a similar tone, treating terrorism as an accepted part of everyday life. The cover has a photograph of an idyllic happy family of four (Mom, Dad, two young children) and the content of the preparedness guide covers everything from missile attacks to syringe injection instructions and proper establishment of safe rooms (including APS: Apartment Protected Space and FPS: Floor Protected Space) and ventilating systems. Running throughout the pamphlet are cheery photographs; color illustrations show a family with small children all donning masks and hoods in a safe room equipped with children’s toys and dolls and coloring books, as though it’s a typical evening at home.

¹⁸³ Siobhan Gorman, “Fear Factor,” *The National Journal* 35, no. 19 (2003), www.nexis.com (accessed August 15, 2006).

¹⁸⁴ Home Front Command website, www.1.idf.il/oref/site/EN/main.asp.

In January of 2002, *Redbook* published an article describing the life of a mother, father, and three small children living in Jerusalem.

I don't think of my home as a war zone. I was born in the U.S., but I now call Jerusalem, where I've lived for the past seven years, my home. If the Israel of news accounts seems an embattled country, visitors here are invariably struck by the persistence of normalcy – open businesses, bustling streets, children in schools, parks full of people.

Yet beneath our adherence to routine lies a not-so-thinly-veiled anxiety, the result of terrorist attacks so frequent they themselves have come to seem almost routine. I can't say that I walk around feeling uptight all the time, but when I'm in a public space – especially downtown Jerusalem—I am intensely aware of every passerby. Suicide bombers often perform their deadly missions in disguise, dressed as Orthodox Jews or Israeli soldiers. Any man or woman carrying a lot of packages is suspect. When I leave a public place, something in my body relaxes. Only then do I realize how tense I have been, how wary of the crowd.

Certain security precautions are standard procedure here, and it's striking how quickly one becomes accustomed to them. Having the trunk of your car inspected has become as routine as putting on your shoes. Your bags are not checked for shoplifting when you leave a mall, but for explosives when you enter. My 5-year-old daughter Noa's kindergarten is protected by an armed guard, as are cafes, pizzerias, and movie theaters. And each of the three times I gave birth during the past five years, I left the hospital loaded with the usual infant-formula samples, new bottles, and a gas mask for the baby (a reminder that chemical attacks are still possible even 11 years after the Persian Gulf War, when Iraqis were rumored to have equipped their Scud missiles with chemical warheads).

Staying safe – or at least feeling safe – has become a matter of rearranging our routines...¹⁸⁵

This woman's own words reveal a culture of preparedness and resiliency in the face of terrorism.

Israel's messages and expectation of the public and their role is clear-cut. In looking at preparedness for disease outbreak and medical preparedness:

¹⁸⁵ Wendy Senor Singer, "What It's Like to Live in Danger," *Redbook* 198, no. 1 (January 2002): 85.

Specific items which Israeli citizens take individual responsibility for include: understanding the threat and the potential impact; cooperating and collaborating with authorities; situational awareness, suspicion and notifying authorities; individual reporting of illness or cases; self isolation; determining what kind of protection is required based on the threat; first aid and initial treatment; individual follow up with medical authorities and individual reporting to health authorities.¹⁸⁶

Messages of reality work in Israel because of the context. The empowerment of citizens – in controlling their destiny despite the great unknown of terrorism and when it might strike – provides a resiliency at the community and individual level. This resiliency serves to defeat terrorism.

In contrast, most Americans seem to feel that terrorism will happen in the U.S., but not to them¹⁸⁷ and believe there is little they can do about it. Others simply don't want to think about it.¹⁸⁸ The key for the U.S. is “getting people to listen to unsettling messages that they would prefer to ignore”¹⁸⁹ and moving citizens to take action in preparedness efforts to create a resilient community.

Terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, and Israel defeats terrorism by meeting it head on. “Perhaps there's a lesson to be learned. Because terrorism is psychological warfare, one of the best responses may be to gradually become less afraid of it – that is, to prepare for it not just with duct tape but with psychology.”¹⁹⁰ The HFC website echoes this strategy in defeating terrorism.

Terrorism does not present an existential threat to Israel, but it is becoming a strategic threat, succeeding in spreading fear among the public and thus affecting political positions and processes and, of course, the

¹⁸⁶ Boaz Tamor, *Webinar*.

¹⁸⁷ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 3.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁸⁹ Siobhan Gorman, “Fear Factor,” citing Susan Neely, former Communications Director, Department of Homeland Security.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

future of the state and its residents. We must continue our daily routine and not help our attackers in their goal of disrupting our lives.¹⁹¹

This same sentiment is echoed by a journalist who covered the Scud missile attacks on Tel Aviv in Jerusalem in recounting her experience early one morning after a Scud missile hit a nearby area as families were preparing for the day ahead. Everyone was poised with gas masks and atropine needles waiting for the “all clear” or the “inject yourself now” announcement on TV or radio. After the “all clear” announcement was made, children were put on busses to head to school and life returned to normal. She even describes the scene of children with “boxes casually slung over every little shoulder...decorated with stickers, glitter, drawings. Gasmask boxes.”¹⁹²

That is what I learned in Israel on that morning all those years ago. I couldn't stand to see those children being put on school busses after the missile landed. I thought, Netanyahu said “all clear” to indicate that the bomb wasn't a chemical or biological weapon. He didn't say no more were on the way. What are these people thinking? I ran up to one mother and asked, “Aren't you afraid? What if there's another attack?” She gazed at me with a great deal of pity. “You're American. You don't understand how terror works. It is about changing the way you live, react, think, don't think. That's what they love to see, these people. If they make you crazy and stupid with fear they win. I am more afraid of losing my child to that.”¹⁹³

In a woman's own words, she describes how Israelis refuse to allow terrorism to rule their lives.

Preparedness in Israel has a strong basis in psychology. Hirsch Goodman, a senior fellow at the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies and a columnist for *Jerusalem Report* described Israel's preparedness in a 2003 interview. “Every man, woman, child has a gas mask and the correct type of injections. They're in the schools, their shelters.” In describing Israel's preparedness efforts, “the level of preparedness, both

¹⁹¹ Home Front Command website, www.1.idf.il/oref/site/EN/main.asp accessed throughout August and September 2006.

¹⁹² Lisa Suhay, “Ducking for Cover – From Ourselves,” *Christian Science Monitor* 24 (February 2003): 9.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

psychologically and everything, is very, very high.”¹⁹⁴ He cites both equipment and psychology as the keys to preparedness for terrorism.

The citizens of Israel are considered an essential part of the effort in defeating terrorism. “Public participation has been one of the cornerstones of Israeli defensive measures against terrorism in the domestic arena.”¹⁹⁵ This effort resembles more of a partnership with government.

Much of Israel’s success in thwarting terrorist bombings can be attributed to public awareness. The majority of explosive devices placed in public sites such as bus stations, supermarkets, and shopping centers have been discovered by civilians who were able to alert the police before the bombs went off. Public alertness has been encouraged by the police advertisements on television and other media, but the main reason for this high-level awareness has undoubtedly been the Israeli public’s identification with the struggle against terrorism.¹⁹⁶

In the U.S., however, this spirit of partnership has not been fostered.

Addressing the barriers to improving public preparedness is important. It is increasingly understood that citizen participation in disaster planning and response is an essential factor in determining actual readiness for major catastrophic events. In fact, optimal preparedness is best understood as a partnership between government strategies and individual behaviors. The failure of “both partners” were (sic) painfully evident in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.¹⁹⁷

B. TRUSTED MESSENGERS, FAITH IN GOVERNMENT, AND REGULAR AND CONSISTENT MESSAGES

A critical factor in citizen preparedness centers on the credibility of the entity providing the information or instructions. Several studies from the New York Academy

¹⁹⁴ NPR News Special Coverage, Interview: “Hirsch Goodman on Israel’s preparedness in the event Iraq attacks the country,” March 22, 2003, 1, www.nexis.com (accessed August 15, 2006).

¹⁹⁵ Ariel Merari, “Israel’s Preparedness for High Consequence Terrorism,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-30, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-02 (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2000), 6.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁹⁷ Irwin Redlener, David A. Berman, “National Preparedness Planning: The Historical Context and Current State of the U.S. Public’s Readiness, 1940-2005,” *Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (2006): 96.

of Medicine, New York University, and ABC polls, all discussed more thoroughly in Chapter VI, *infra*, show that Americans have little faith in government as a messenger. The combination of these findings is very important to address in a preparedness and education campaign. People will not do what government expects and needs them to do before, during, and after an emergency unless there is faith in government.

In a post-Katrina world, intense effort to restore citizens' faith in government is needed and is critical to emergency response efforts. Messengers of disaster preparedness and education are very important. The government needs to be seen as a trusted resource, with viable emergency plans and strong leadership. Likewise, government needs to team with trusted messengers in every community including clergy, neighborhood leaders, and respected non-profits.

The Israeli government and Home Force Command have great credibility.

One key to Israel's success in living with the constant threat of terrorism is the government's credibility on the issue. When the Israeli government announces that, say, it apprehended a terrorist outside a Tel Aviv café at 3 p.m. last Sunday, the Israeli public doesn't question the truth of the statement, any more than Americans do when their local police department announces that it thinks it has solved a murder.

Government terrorism warnings and announcements have to be credible, or the public won't take them seriously. Israel's HFC has enough credibility to get away with having as its motto, "You Can Count On Us!"...Leno and Letterman would have a field day ridiculing the department if it tried to adopt such a motto.¹⁹⁸

The HFC website currently has another motto on the masthead, "You are in Good Hands" and refers to its mission as "a command which stands for saving lives." Further, the website describes the HFC as a "national leader in the field of civil defense in different states of emergency, represents a central element in the strength of our country and its citizens, a worthy recipient of the full trust of the population." Unfortunately, faith in government continues to be a major factor in trying to get Americans to take personal preparedness issues and the threat of terrorism seriously.

¹⁹⁸ Siobhan Gorman, "Fear Factor."

The U.S. should consider moving citizen preparedness efforts to a centralized, trusted source for information. FEMA and DHS have differing preparedness websites that must be reconciled. CDC has its own approach to terrorism and pandemic flu preparedness efforts which should blend seamlessly with its federal partners. Consistency of message across the country is needed from government and its partners in preparedness. For example, the American Red Cross called for five things one needs to do to be prepared,¹⁹⁹ *Ready.gov* has three and California's OES program has ten.

Americans tend to distrust and question government institutions. Federalism is also a factor in developing a centralized message and effort. A serious policy debate should take place as to whether one federal agency should "own" the issue of preparedness (from education through messaging) and unify the federal voice under one program. This regularity, unity, and consistency of message has been a key ingredient in the Israeli success. See also Chapter VI, *infra*, "*Stovepipes and Silos*."

C. EDUCATION (INCLUDING A HISTORY OF REASONS TO PREPARE) AND MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE AT AGE 17

Israelis prepare because there is a history of reasons to prepare. The U.S., as diverse and large as it is, also has a substantial history of reasons to prepare for terrorism and natural disasters – from the 9/11 attacks to devastating earthquakes, floods, massive wildfires, and deadly hurricanes – yet citizens remain unprepared. Part of the educational effort must stress the history of reasons to prepare.

Discussion of terrorism at a young age is an essential component of the Israeli strategy. In the U.S., many believe that talk of terrorism will "scare the children." Educational efforts need to be sensitive to this aspect of education, but ignoring terrorism, its reality and its impact, undermines efforts to create a resilient population. Israelis speak openly about terrorism, children are known to draw faces on their gas masks, and they are armed with information and education that allows them to cope with the issue and provides them the tools to survive an attack. This resiliency, imbued at a

¹⁹⁹ The American Red Cross has since changed to three to be consistent with the *Ready* campaign.

young age, is the underpinning of Israel's culture of preparedness. Elementary school education involving terrorism must be approached with extreme sensitivity and caution.

Education in the high school years, with a more intense curriculum, provides a cadre of young adults who are prepared for any event. This continuity of education is essential. Israel's next step in establishing and sustaining a culture of preparedness is required military service at age seventeen for all males and females. Required military service at age seventeen is unlikely in the U.S., but a requirement to participate in Citizen Corps or on CERT Teams (Community Emergency Response Teams) might be a viable option during the late high school years.

D. PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN TO NORMALCY, RESILIENCY IS KEY

Israel has developed a psychologically prepared citizenry. Equipment and psychological preparation (as part of educational efforts) have been cited as essential to a culture of preparedness. Psychological preparedness is a key component of resiliency. The Israeli people acknowledge the seriousness of, and live with, the reality of terrorism on a daily basis. Embracing the fear of terrorism, taking action to prepare and survive, all serve to take the "terror" out of terrorism. Part of developing a psychologically prepared country is addressing the psychology of terrorism -- the terrorists want fear and panic and to diminish citizens' faith in government to protect them. The Israeli approach is: "don't let them be successful."

The U.S. needs to prepare the population for another large terrorist attack. This should be part of the education of children and young adults. In addition, education and awareness campaigns need to stress resiliency and prepare citizens for terrorism. As in Israel, these messages need to be regularized and be normal and routine, not alarmist and frightening.

Major urban areas need to be prepared to return to normalcy immediately following an attack. This is another resiliency strategy of the Israeli government. This type of planning should be required in the U.S. for efforts that are funded by DHS. In Israel, bombings scenes are cleaned up immediately, casualties moved, areas cleaned and

boarded, and everyday life returns to normal as soon as possible. In the U.S., this area would remain a crime scene for some time. Israeli strategies should be considered with deference to the needs of U.S. law enforcement and investigation efforts. However, other planning efforts to restore a sense of normalcy to a city and its citizens should be emphasized and developed as an essential part of planning.

E. CITIZEN RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTNERSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT

A significant component of the Israeli culture of preparedness is citizens' willingness to embrace their civic duty to prepare; it is the duty of every individual to be prepared and to take responsibility for their families and their community. Preparedness is also viewed as a partnership between the citizens and government. The Israeli government relies on awareness and education programs to make citizens a part of the effort in defeating terrorism, as another set of "eye and ears" looking for suspicious activity. This is particularly effective in Israel and having citizens as part of the effort serves also to defeat the hopeless feeling that terrorism cannot be stopped.

The U.S. has had some success in efforts that capitalize on "civic duty" as a means to promote preparedness. Similar efforts include transit safety campaigns which stress "If you see something, say something." Using Israel as a model, this concept of partnership with government and being part of the effort should be fully embraced in preparedness programs throughout our country.

F. LESSONS LEARNED FROM ISRAEL: SOME POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

There are a variety of policies and strategies at work in Israel that may or may not be advisable for the U.S. to adopt. Others may be tailored to provide a more robust and effective preparedness effort in the U.S. and used to promote and foster a culture of preparedness. Resiliency is the cornerstone and overarching theme of Israel's efforts. Resiliency – in the form of an equipped, educated, and psychologically prepared community – is the only way to confront and defeat terrorism.

Despite the recognized differences between Israel and the U.S., there are several key lessons to be learned from Israel which could be applied in developing effective policies and strategies to create a culture of preparedness and should be considered by policy makers:

- Develop educational curriculum that is age appropriate and mandate its incorporation (through federal legislation and funding) at approximately the fifth grade level. This grade level appears to be effective as evidenced by the ten-year-old British girl who had studied tsunamis in geography class. She recognized the warning signs of an impending tsunami while vacationing in Thailand in December of 2004 and was able to warn guests and hotel staff to evacuate the property. Her actions saved hundreds of lives.²⁰⁰
- Develop educational curriculum for the eleventh and twelfth grade levels which teaches a more comprehensive program of preparedness, first aid, and CPR; provide opportunities for actual participation in emergency efforts. This should also be federally mandated and funded and should be age appropriate. Mandated education provides a new generation of prepared citizens.
- Truly effective campaigns for citizen preparedness need to be established. Current messaging is not penetrating into the American psyche and most Americans remain woefully unprepared.
- Psychological preparation must be addressed to defeat terrorism. The U.S. population is not psychologically prepared for terrorism and the country has not prepared itself for nor planned for an immediate return to normalcy.
- Programs should move toward the concept of resiliency to address terrorism.
- Programs should address terrorism at all age levels, which removes the fear of terrorism and provides a sense of empowerment to citizens.
- Programs should stress the partnership aspect of preparedness and engage the public in the effort, which also provides a sense of empowerment. These efforts should also stress civic duty as well as preparedness as key to assisting first responders.
- Programs should be based on the use of trusted messengers enlisted to help create the culture of preparedness.
- Programs need consistency and regularity of message. The U.S. has many mixed messages on preparedness.

²⁰⁰ News Wire Services, "Bill hails tsunami heroine, 10," *Daily News*, November 4, 2005.

Israel effectively communicates and motivates citizens to take action to prepare for terrorism. Many of these policies and strategies have collectively created a culture of preparedness in Israel and several policies can be adapted for the U.S. Most importantly, Israel has shown that the key to defeating terrorism is resiliency. Resiliency includes making significant efforts to prepare in the form of equipment and supplies and psychological preparedness.

To create a culture of preparedness in the U.S., education is the key and starting with children and young adults is essential to any such effort. Successful recycling, seat belt usage, and anti-littering campaigns all focused on changing behavior among children and young adults. It will take a significant investment, sustained and ongoing efforts, and substantial policy redirection in the U.S. to achieve a culture of preparedness which may require an acceptable adaptation of the successful Israeli approach.

Reaching a vast and culturally diverse U.S. population will require a multi-faceted approach. A one-size-fits-all approach will not be effective but Israel's lessons of consistency and regularity of message, as well as standardized curriculum in the elementary and high school levels, provide an excellent model. Preparing for an immediate return to normalcy and developing a psychologically resilient community are also important concepts to replicate.

VI. WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO REACH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC? THE IMPACT OF CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, MARKETING, AND MESSAGING ON PREPAREDNESS AND EDUCATION EFFORTS

A. EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGNS TAKE TIME, RESOURCES AND THOUGHT

An effective effort to create “profound and enduring change” and a culture of preparedness will require tapping into a vast array of successful campaigns that have effectively changed human behavior. Experts in the fields of sociology, psychology, marketing, as well as public health experts well-versed in successful behavior-change campaigns (known as “social marketing”) should be brought together to fuse their knowledge and experience in addressing the challenge of citizen preparedness.

An effective campaign has a simple message, is easily understood, and gives succinct actions a citizen can take to become prepared. Messages should come from trusted messengers in the community. Children have proven to be excellent agents of change and often are the catalysts for an entire family adopting new habits (recycling, anti-littering, seat belt usage). Children in urban areas with large multi-cultural components are often the “ambassadors” to the family, bringing home important information and translating for non-English speaking parents and grandparents. The way in which messages are delivered, how they impact the individual, and whether those messages will motivate a citizen to action are all part of the puzzle that concepts from the fields of sociology, psychology, and marketing may help solve, particularly in the development of messages and targeted audiences.

Cultural differences may prove to be an important distinction in messaging. The Townsend Report recognizes that many factors must be looked at in creating the new culture of preparedness.

DHS and other Federal agencies should identify both the individual skills and capabilities that would help citizens in a disaster as well as the types of messages from trusted leaders that would encourage citizens to be better prepared. Public awareness messaging must shift to include more

substantive information, as opposed to just telling our citizens that they need to “do something.” For example, the “Stop, Drop and Roll” campaign used so successfully in fire safety as part of the “Learn Not to Burn” ⁽⁴²⁾ program provided citizens with specific steps to take. Other successful campaigns include the National Highway Traffic Administration’s “Buckle Up America” campaign ⁽⁴³⁾...As with so many of these successful campaigns, the Nation’s children can help lead the way ⁽⁴⁴⁾.²⁰¹

(42) The “Learn Not to Burn” curriculum, first released in 1979, teaches twenty-two fire safety behaviors and is organized in three learning levels. The curriculum is intended for use by teachers in planning classroom activities and can be re-used from year to year. “Learn Not to Burn” incorporates fire safety behaviors into regular school subjects, so children absorb life-saving information while developing skills in reading, math, art, history, and science. National Fire Protection Association, “Learn Not to Burn,” <http://www.nfpa.org>.

(43) A 2004 study by the national Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported a record 80 percent of Americans wear their safety belts while driving or riding in their vehicles. Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta said the 80 percent safety belt usage will save 15,200 lives and \$50 billion in economic costs associated with traffic related crashes, injuries, and deaths every year. Donna Glassbrenner, “Safety Belt Use in 2004—Overall Results, Traffic Safety Facts,” prepared for the National Center for Statistics and Analysis (September 2004). See also U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Safety belt use jumps to record 80%,” news release, September 12, 2004.

(44) Additional advertising campaigns that were successful in helping to change citizen behavior include efforts to stop the use of drugs through the “Just Say No” message created by First Lady Nancy Reagan and the “Drug Abuse Resistance Education” (D.A.R.E.); prevent drunk driving originating with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD); help quit smoking through the Surgeon General’s campaign to educate people on health risks and the American Cancer Society’s “Great American Smoke Out”; and stop littering through the “Keep America Beautiful” message promoted by First Lady Claudia “Lady Bird” Johnson.

Dennis Mileti (cited *supra*), a sociologist and former director of the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder has written extensively on the subject of human behavior and disasters.

²⁰¹ Townsend Report, 80.

From a theoretical viewpoint, public hazards communication and education works best when the public materials and approaches used bring about *uncertainty* in the minds of the people, causing them to wonder about their environment, and to question their safety in it. Good public education gives people something to mull over and to discuss with friends, family and colleagues. It sparks interest enough that people generate questions, and then seek more information to answer their questions, and its specialists are there with additional and clear information when the questions are asked (cf. Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1992). Despite all that, the desired changes in the public may take some time to materialize.²⁰²

Mileti looks at effective hazard campaigns, such as seat belt campaigns, anti-littering, and anti-smoking efforts. He recognizes that:

[All of them] began by showing the risks or problems associated with particular behaviors. They all have three things going for them: (1) they raised questions (created uncertainty) in the minds of their audiences, (2) they offered fairly simple answers, and (3) they had authorities available over time that were able to provide additional information when people sought it and were able to reinforce the message.

Generous funding by one or more interest groups helped with the latter. An effective public education campaign posits a problem and then says how to solve it – over and over again.²⁰³

Mileti's writings confirm that we must understand human behavior and human dynamics to structure an effective campaign. We must take into account that a program must be ongoing and sustained over time and that different age groups, education levels, gender, and ethnicity all impact a program. Messages need to be constant, consistent and clear, and must come from various and multiple sources. Also important is using simple language, great graphics, and multiple languages, and seizing on the windows of opportunity provided by media attention to disasters in other parts of the country or the world to push people to take action to prepare for disasters.²⁰⁴

²⁰² Dennis Mileti, *Public Hazards Communication and Education: The State of the Art* (Boulder, Colorado: Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, undated), 2.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

Constant and consistent messaging is key. In a recent interview with Dr. Mileti, he put it another way: “It needs to be everywhere, every time you turn around, ever present ...like Coca-Cola.”²⁰⁵ Making the task of preparedness seem easy is also an important factor.

Simplicity of the message and simplifying the steps to action are important. A study conducted in the 1960s by social psychologist Howard Leventhal is set forth in Malcolm Gladwell’s best-selling book *The Tipping Point* as evidence that advice that is simple, practical, and personal becomes memorable and serves to change human behavior into action. The example used was a study conducted of students, teaching them the need for tetanus shots. One group was given “high-fear” pamphlets, with gory pictures and strong language on the ravages of tetanus, while the others received toned down “low-fear” pamphlets containing the same core medical information. The group survey showed that the “high fear” group would take action and get the tetanus shots. However, on follow up, only 3% actually took action. The study was repeated, involving a new set of students. After this second presentation, students received directions and a map to the on-campus health clinic with the hours of the clinic operations. The number of students taking action rose to 28%, regardless of whether they were in the “high-fear” or “low-fear” group. The simplicity of the map and providing clinic hours, making the information practical and personal and therefore memorable (by changing the way the information was presented) caused a significant difference in the action taken by the second group versus the first.²⁰⁶

This example underscores the need to present preparedness information in a new way. The ARC has been placing preparedness messages throughout the United States for many years and has in recent years increased messaging in partnership with DHS. The poll numbers show that preparedness messages are not resonating with the American

²⁰⁵ Telephone interview with Dr. Dennis Mileti, March 10, 2007.

²⁰⁶ Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point*, How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 97-98.

public. A dramatic new approach is needed which takes into account the expertise of sociologists, psychologists, marketing experts, and others, to find the key to what motivates citizens to act.

San Francisco's preparedness website, www.72hours.org, indicates that simplicity is working. This effort was designed as a "Disaster for Dummies," stressing simplicity.²⁰⁷ Advertising campaigns need to get past the "clutter" problem of too many messages being sent to any one human in a day. As Gladwell points out: "The New York-based firm Media Dynamics estimates that the average American is now exposed to 254 different commercial messages in a day, up nearly 25 percent since the mid-1970s."²⁰⁸ Similarly, in discussing direct marketing, Gladwell states: "reaching the consumer with the message is not the hard part of direct marketing. What is difficult is getting consumers to stop, read the advertisement, remember it, and then act on it."²⁰⁹

The CEG *Symposium Report* findings, cited *supra*, where first responders and emergency planners were brought together, are instructive in the area of an effective campaign. "The disaster preparedness and response community says that the information is available but is aware that it may not be visible, accessible or easily understood."²¹⁰ Given this situation, they recommended that

The overall unifying message to all Americans be rooted in the concepts of personal responsibility and self-reliance. This message can promote the empowering idea that Americans can take steps to save lives and those of their families and employees through the preparedness actions they take in advance."²¹¹

²⁰⁷ This new website won the International Webby Award for Best Government Website 2006. In a recent poll by CEG in looking at the "Public Readiness Index" respondents in San Francisco were asked if they were familiar with websites: Ready.gov (2%), 72 hours.org (26%). See Council for Excellence in Government, Schulman, Ronca and Bucuvalas, Inc., "Public Readiness Index in San Francisco," August 30, 2006, not published.

²⁰⁸ Malcolm Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 98.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 93.

²¹⁰ Council for Excellence in Government, et al., *Symposium Report*, 12.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

Secretary Chertoff made similar statements in referring to citizen preparedness as a civic duty and the importance of a prepared citizenry:

For those who say, ‘Well, I can take care of myself no matter what, I don’t have to prepare,’ there is an altruistic element – that to the extent that they are a burden on government services, that takes away from what’s available to help those who can’t help themselves...That is a matter of civic virtue.²¹²

The type of messaging that works to get people to act was explored in the CEG *Symposium Report*. “The public wants bite-sized, action-based specifics with rationale as to why they should do these things.”²¹³ Similarly, the July 2005 NYU poll, cited *supra*, found that simplicity of message in disaster education is very important:

The fact that between 1/5 and 1/6 of Americans had no response at all when asked an open-ended question about the first thing they would do in a crisis suggests serious challenges translating abstract emergency plans into plain instructions that ordinary Americans can both understand and internalize.”²¹⁴

The CEG *Symposium Report* looked at “striking the right balance between information and simplicity.”²¹⁵ It recommended messaging that focuses on the benefits of being prepared and the consequences of not being prepared:

While working to define the message, it is important for stakeholders to also come up with an approach for how they will position information to elicit public buy-in and engage in preparedness activities. One effective approach is two-pronged, with messages that both: (1) promote self-empowerment and self efficacy in order to motivate individuals to take responsibility for their own health and safety and (2) provide rationale for specific preparedness and response activities (why it matters) to validate and gain public support and adherence to them.

The consumer safety industry...offers one good model to follow. In motivating Americans to take precautions against various risks, consumer

²¹² Lara Jakes Jordan, AP Interview: “Chertoff Says Disaster Preparedness Depends on Public Altruism,” *Associated Press*, 31 October 2005.

²¹³ Council for Excellence in Government, et al., *Symposium Report*, 14.

²¹⁴ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 6.

²¹⁵ Council for Excellence in Government, et al., *Symposium Report*, 21

safety advocates increase awareness of a particular risk (e.g., death by car accident, home fire) and craft messages showing the public that they can mitigate the risk by their own actions (e.g. wearing a seat belt, installing smoke detectors). Explain to the public the benefits and consequences of their action or inaction through compelling examples and messages.²¹⁶

Messages also need to be communicated by the right messengers.

Some people distrust two of the disaster preparedness and response community's most used voices – the federal government and the police. In many communities, people are more likely to pay attention to trusted community leaders...It is important to reach people where they work, live, play, pray, and through trusted, local sources/messengers.²¹⁷

Messengers are a critical component to preparedness and response. People are more likely to listen to trusted leaders in an emerging event. In major urban areas, during a disease outbreak or other situation, some minority communities may need trusted physicians to instruct their community to adopt a Western medicine approach (Asian American community) or to trust government to fully disclose side effects from vaccinations (reluctance of African American community to trust government in reaction to Tuskegee experiments, as set forth in a recent study).²¹⁸ Trusted messengers speaking to the right audiences are essential in moving the population to take action to prepare.

The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is a voluntary accreditation process for states and jurisdictions that has developed benchmarking and consistent standards for emergency management at the state and local level. In October of 2005, EMAP convened a working group of emergency managers from around the country to review standards for public preparedness programs.²¹⁹ The working group developed “The Commandments” for an outreach, education, and awareness campaign. The commandments consisted of: develop an integrated strategic plan for public

²¹⁶ Council for Excellence in Government, et al., *Symposium Report*, 20.

²¹⁷ Council for Excellence in Government, et al., *Symposium Report*, 14.

²¹⁸ Roz D. Lasker, *Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public* (New York: Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health, New York Academy of Medicine, 14 September 2004). See pages 51 through 58 for survey methodology.

²¹⁹ Author was a member of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program Disaster Public Education, Information and Outreach Working Group and Advisory Group.

education based on HIRA (Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis); establish citizen preparedness as a budget and policy priority; identify the audience and the type of media to reach the most persons; identify the roles of different players; develop clear, concise messages that are culturally competent; evaluate the sustainability of the plan; evaluate the network of stakeholders for the program; build community buy-in; address the special needs and underserved community; and develop plans with benchmarks and milestones for evaluation and accountability.²²⁰

The group also recognized the need to implement concepts from sociology, psychology, and marketing in developing effective campaigns to reach targeted audiences and identified this as an area for further development by the emergency management community.²²¹ In addressing the issues of citizen preparedness, the return to normalcy, resiliency, and psychological preparedness for terrorism were not separately discussed as the group was following an all-hazards approach to preparedness.

B. STOVEPIPES AND SILOS: A CONSTANT CHALLENGE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Subject Matter Silos and Stovepipes

An entire body of knowledge and research exists in the fields of psychology and sociology and identifying factors which lead to behavioral change. Every useful body of knowledge needs to be fused together to identify the reasons people do not prepare for disaster and identify the motivators that move people to action, as well as how to overcome barriers to action. In particular, psychological preparedness for terrorism must be addressed in order to create a resilient population. The ways in which to approach the American public on this issue must be thoughtfully and carefully considered and significant effort and research is needed in this area.

²²⁰ Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Disaster Public Education, Information and Outreach Working Group Meeting, October 24-25, 2005, "The Commandments," unpublished.

²²¹ Emergency Management Accreditation Program, Disaster Public Education, Information and Outreach, Working Group Report, October 2005, Draft #1, unpublished.

A document created by Citizen Corps' contractor presents "Methodological Considerations and Key Findings in Preparedness Research" and states that "the events of 9/11 changed the research climate substantially enough to make prior studies less relevant to the current research climate."²²² Prior to 9/11, many years of study have been conducted by sociologists in the field of human behavior in disasters and on preparedness (mostly in earthquake country) that have applicability to current efforts to create a culture of preparedness and should not be overlooked or dismissed.²²³

Unfortunately, there appear to be the familiar stovepipes and silos emerging around the issue of citizen preparedness (generally by subject matter expertise), a pattern which has plagued overall nationwide homeland security planning. This presents a serious challenge to the creation of a culture of preparedness which will need a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary approach for an effective effort. All available resources and expertise, publications, and products should be used and their findings applied to citizen preparedness. Messaging, sociology, psychology, marketing principles, and public health expertise in behavior change and social marketing will all need to be incorporated to develop an effective and sustained preparedness effort. Much work has been accomplished in these fields, and recent studies on preparedness reveal that the public may be hearing the message of preparedness, but not taking action. We need to find that critical link that turns knowledge into action – using all available resources to address this vexing and challenging issue.

2. Why are the *Ready* Campaign and Citizen Corps in Different Directorates and Separate Programs? A Need for Consistency of Messages from the Federal Government

A number of restructurings have taken place under DHS. In the most recent post-Katrina restructuring, Citizen Corps was moved to FEMA as part of a new National Preparedness Directorate. FEMA is now its own agency within DHS, led by its own

²²² ORC Macro, "Methodological Considerations," 3.

²²³ Telephone interview with Dr. Kathleen Tierney, PhD., Director of the National Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder on March 9, 2007.

Administrator. The *Ready* campaign, in a prior restructuring, was placed in the Preparedness Directorate which no longer exists. *Ready* did not transfer from the Preparedness Directorate to the new FEMA, but was placed under the Office of Public Affairs, a separate entity within DHS. This means that the two entities responsible for citizen preparedness efforts are housed in separate agencies, have different funding streams, budgets, and reporting structures. In the reorganization, each program went back to its “legacy” department where it was housed prior to the creation of the Preparedness Directorate. Although representatives of *Ready* and Citizen Corps both state they work together closely, what little resources go into citizen preparedness are not being marshaled and unified into a working whole.

In addition, a variety of federal agencies outside of DHS and FEMA have responsibility for disaster planning and engage in efforts to prepare citizens for bioterrorism, pandemic flu, and other events, such as the Center for Disease Control and the Department of Health and Human Services. The federal family must speak with one voice in creating a culture of preparedness. Israel, discussed *supra*, has one central entity which deals with citizen preparedness. A trusted messenger and consistency of message is an underpinning of their successful programs.

As an example of the need for federal entities to work together on messaging, the inherent tension between the government wanting to reassure the public that plans are in place and that FEMA is on the mend may serve to undermine citizen preparedness efforts. In the *2008 Budget-in-Brief*, FEMA announced that response times to disasters in the past year have averaged twenty-five hours. These messages may serve to undermine citizen preparedness efforts if the public believes help will arrive within a day. While one part of the federal government is trying to inspire citizens to take responsibility to be on their own for a minimum of seventy-two hours in a disaster, other messages are contradicting the need for such efforts.

C. SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS TO CHANGE HUMAN BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL MARKETING AND CAUSE MARKETING

There are some useful examples of efforts to change human behavior that are instructive in the promotion of personal preparedness. Among those generally cited are the seatbelt campaign, efforts to increase the installation of smoke alarms in households, and campaigns to stop littering or encourage recycling. Awareness campaigns such as those leading to the dramatic changes in breast cancer awareness may be instructive as well. Seat belt usage represents a successful “social marketing” campaign that also had a significant law enforcement component, as well as other factors which raised compliance. Breast cancer awareness, known as an example of “cause marketing,” was successful in its broad marketing appeal, and the simplicity and regularity of messaging.

1. Social Marketing

Social Marketing is well known in the public health arena and is defined in several ways.

Social Marketing is the application of commercial marketing technologies to the analysis, planning, execution, and evaluation of programs designed to influence the voluntary behaviors of target audiences in order to improve their personal welfare and that of their society. (Alan Andreasen, Georgetown University, 1995)

Social Marketing is the use of marketing principles and techniques to influence a target audience to voluntarily accept, reject, modify, or abandon a behavior for the benefit of individuals, groups, or society as a whole. (Philip Kotler, Ned Roberto, Nancy Lee, 2002)

Social marketing is “...A process for influencing human behavior on a large scale, using marketing principles for the purposes of societal benefit rather than commercial profit.” (W. Smith, Academy for Educational Development)²²⁴

Social Marketing has three components that are “essential” to any definition.

²²⁴ Turning Point, *Social Marketing and Public Health, Lessons from the Field, A Guide to Social Marketing* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, Social Marketing National Excellence Collaborative, May 2003), 1, www.turningpointprogram.org (accessed on April 10, 2007).

First is the role of marketing techniques – which necessitate putting the primary audience or target audience (aka customer) at the center of every decision. Second is that the focus of the endeavor is on voluntary behavior change. Third, but not least, is that behavior change is for the benefit of an individual, group or population.²²⁵

Social Marketing traditionally relies upon the “4 P’s” of marketing strategy in crafting an effective effort.²²⁶ These are Placement, Price, Product, and Promotion.²²⁷ The concept of exchange is important in social marketing. “A distinguishing feature of the social marketing approach, exchange is the concept that people adopt/reject or maintain a new behavior in return for benefits that they believe outweigh the costs of that behavior.”²²⁸

- **Place or Placement** refers to reaching places where the targeted audience exists and accessing the “distribution channels used to make the product available.”²²⁹
- **Price** refers to hindrances or the barriers to action, the use of incentives or disincentives and minimizing the cost, whether financial, emotional, psychological or time costs.²³⁰ This can also be seen as “the actual cost or something the consumer must give up/do in order to obtain the product.”²³¹ This is also considered part of the “exchange.” In order to achieve change one must “minimize the ‘price’ the target audience believes it must pay in the exchange.”²³²

²²⁵ Turning Point, *Social Marketing and Public Health, Lessons from the Field, A Guide to Social Marketing*, 1.

²²⁶ Others may add a fifth “P”: one group adds “Positioning” (University of California, Davis, Center for Advanced Studies in Nutrition and Social Marketing website, “Introduction to Social Marketing,” <http://socialmarketing-nutrition.ucdavis.edu> (accessed March 1, 2007); another adds “Policy” (Turning Point, Social Marketing and Public Health).

²²⁷ Alan R. Andreasen, *Marketing for Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995), 15.

²²⁸ Turning Point, *Social Marketing and Public Health*, 8.

²²⁹ University of California, Davis, Center for Advanced Studies in Nutrition and Social Marketing website, “Introduction to Social Marketing,” <http://socialmarketing-nutrition.ucdavis.edu> (accessed March 1, 2007).

²³⁰ Turning Point, *Social Marketing and Public Health*, 8.

²³¹ Center for Disease Control website, Communication at CDC, Practice Areas, Social Marketing, www.cdc.gov/communication/practice/socialmarketing.htm (accessed March 2, 2007).

²³² Social Marketing Institute website, *Social Marketing*, www.social-marketing.org (accessed March 2, 2007).

- **Product** is the what is being sold – the desired behavior or the “package of benefits associated with the desired action.”²³³ Also known as “what the consumer is asked to ‘buy’ (often a behavior).”²³⁴ Benefits can often be framed as the “positive results, feelings, attributes, etc. that the audience will obtain from the desired behavior change....Benefits are what you offer the audience in exchange for the new behavior. It’s ‘what’s in it for them.’”²³⁵
- **Promotion** refers to the communication avenues, messaging, and methods of reaching the audience.

There are some key social marketing concepts regarding moving people to action: “action is undertaken whenever target audiences believe that the benefit they receive will be greater than the costs they incur...programs to influence action will be more effective if they are based on an understanding of the target audience’s own perceptions of the proposed exchange.”²³⁶

Another key factor in social marketing is the identification of audiences and sub-audiences (segmenting the population) and reaching the population through aggressive targeting.

To ‘sell’ healthy behavior, social marketing starts with audience research that leads to the segmentation of the target audience into groups with common risk behaviors, motivations, and information channel preferences. Key audience segments can then be reached with a mix of intervention strategies informed by the “4 P’s” of marketing.”²³⁷

This is consistent with the theory herein espoused that a “one-size-fits-all” campaign will not succeed in the major urban areas of the country.

Social marketers are acutely aware that one single program cannot be meaningful to all people. Audience segmentation means dividing targeted populations into subgroups that share similar qualities or characteristics. Several factors can be used as bases for segmentation including

²³³ Social Marketing Institute website, *Social Marketing*, www.social-marketing.org (accessed March 2, 2007).

²³⁴ Center for Disease Control website, *Social Marketing*.

²³⁵ Turning Point, *Social Marketing and Public Health*, 8.

²³⁶ Social Marketing Institute website, *Social Marketing*.

²³⁷ Center for Disease Control website, *Social Marketing*.

geographics, demographics, physical or mental history, attitudes and behaviors (Weinreich, 1999). Social marketers most often divide populations into segments based on psychographics (e.g., values, lifestyles), current behavior, intentions, and readiness to change.²³⁸

The process of understanding your audience “is fundamental to social marketing (Parsons & McCormack Brown, 2004).”²³⁹ In a recent discussion with Richard Earle, creator of the famous “Crying Indian” anti-littering campaign, and author of *The Art of Cause Marketing*, he stated the key to success “is to understand the psychology of your targeted audience.”²⁴⁰ This understanding is essential: “The most fundamental principle underlying marketing is to apply a *customer orientation* to understand what target audiences currently know, believe and do...Marketers know that the marketplace is a rich collage of diverse populations, each having a distinct set of wants and needs.”²⁴¹ This effort is also known as looking at “KAPB” or the knowledge, attitudes, practices, and beliefs of a targeted audience.²⁴² A campaign must also remain flexible and respond to feedback and have constant reevaluation.²⁴³

**a. Center for Disease Control, Public Health and Social Marketing:
A History of Experience**

Public health has used social marketing to help change human behavior since the 1970s.²⁴⁴ The CDC website lists a variety of social marketing campaigns it engages in on a regular basis.²⁴⁵ CDC partners with Turning Point and the Social Marketing National Excellence Collaborative in developing effective ways to apply

²³⁸ Rosemary Thackeray, PhD, MPH, Kelli McCormack Brown, PhD, CHES, FASHA, FAAHE, “Social Marketing’s Unique Contributions to Health Promotion Practice,” *Health Promotion Practice* 6, No. 4 (October 2005): 365-368, 366.

²³⁹ Ibid., 366.

²⁴⁰ Phone interview with Richard Earle, March 15, 2007.

²⁴¹ Phillip Kotler, Ned Roberto, Nancy Lee, *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 2d Ed. (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2002), 7, emphasis in original.

²⁴² Alan Andreasen, *Marketing for Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment*, 109.

²⁴³ Turning Point, *Social Marketing and Public Health*, 9.

²⁴⁴ Thackeray, et al., “Social Marketing’s Unique Contributions to Health Promotion Practice,” 365.

²⁴⁵ Center for Disease Control website, *Social Marketing*.

social marketing research and practice to public health issues.²⁴⁶ They have developed significant research in the area and a compendium of successful voluntary behavior change campaigns from across the country from HIV Risk Reduction, Preventing Illness Associated with Chitterlings, Breast Cancer Screening, Promotion of Low-Fat Milk Consumption, Low-Fat Eating for American Now (Project LEAN), to Air Quality Public Education and Incentive Programs, and Breast Feeding Promotion.²⁴⁷

A publication produced by Turning Point, *The Basics of Social Marketing*, discusses a number of messages delivered by social marketing: Fasten your seatbelt; Eat more fruit; Pull over to talk on your cell phone; Don't litter; Get a mammogram.²⁴⁸ This guide states:

Social change is a messy process and not the purposeful action of an architect. It is the synergy of efforts of multiple change agents. Many practitioners believe that permanent, large-scale behavior change is best achieved through changing community norms – a process that can require time and patience.

Public health professionals understand that people don't change behaviors easily. In fact, people are more likely to adapt to a new idea quickly if it exhibits these characteristics: It has a relative advantage over what exists; It's compatible with social norms; It's not too complex; It can be "tried out"; You can see someone either doing or using it.²⁴⁹

Making it easy, simple, and seeing others engaging in the process of disaster preparedness will all work to motivate behavior change. The "synergy of multiple change agents" will need to be employed to create a cultural shift in the country for citizen preparedness. This is consistent with earlier discussion of Mileti, the CEG Symposium, and the efforts of EMAP; there needs to be a constant, consistent message coming from many, many sources.

²⁴⁶ Turning Point, *Social Marketing and Public Health*, Introduction.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Turning Point, *The Basics of Social Marketing, How to Use Marketing to Change Behavior*, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, Social Marketing National Excellence Collaborative, n.d.), 3, www.turningpointprogram.org (accessed on April 10, 2007).

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

The experience of public health experts in successfully influencing human behavior should be an area of further study in addressing the issue of citizen preparedness. Citizen preparedness can easily cross into the public health arena as a prophylactic or prevention measure, as we are asking the American public to take self-protective action, to think about things they would prefer to ignore (just as they do with disease, weight and health issues) and to “inoculate” or “vaccinate” themselves and their families from the impact of disaster. The vast experience of a large public agency (CDC) in social marketing and successfully changing human behavior should be embraced and modeled. Unfortunately, this significant experience does not seem to be a significant part of the conversation and again we see the stovepipes and silos emerge in addressing the issue of citizen preparedness. The attention to pandemic flu may break down this barrier. Years of research and experience from public health professionals should be fused with current efforts by DHS to create a culture of preparedness. Indeed, social marketing has been used to improve health (curbing tobacco use and fat intake, cancer screening, blood pressure awareness, alcohol abuse) and for injury prevention (drinking and driving, seatbelt use, domestic violence, fires, household poisons), and has expanded to other areas such as protecting the environment (recycling, water conservation) and community involvement (blood donation, organ donation, increasing voting).²⁵⁰

b. Seatbelt Campaigns

One of the most effective uses of social marketing can be seen in the dramatic change in the use of seatbelts by Americans over the past decade. In 1983, only 14% of U.S. motorists wore seat belts.²⁵¹ By 1994, 58% of Americans buckled up, and 71% wore seat belts in 2000. In September of 2005 the U.S. reached a new record: overall seat belt use was at 82%.²⁵² Where the “primary goal is to change behavior and get people to buckle up” a combination of factors were key to success: “Safety experts

²⁵⁰ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 15-16.

²⁵¹ Joseph B. White, “Eyes on the Road: Reluctance to Buckle Up Remains Overriding Problem in Auto Safety,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2003, D2.

²⁵² Ken Thomas, “Motorists Set Record For Using Seat Belts,” *Washington Post*, December 20, 2005, A19.

state the progress has been helped by such high-profile media campaigns as ‘Click It or Ticket,’ stepped up enforcement by police officers and the adoption of primary seat belt laws, which allow police to stop motorists who fail to wear their seat belts.”²⁵³ In addition, the federally required “nagging” from the car – a recurring chime and light – was an added factor.²⁵⁴ Several articles reference the tailored efforts in various communities. For example, successful efforts to influence the Hispanic population focused on protecting children as the motivating force.²⁵⁵ Educational efforts carried out with partners in colleges and in the community are credited for the increase in seatbelt usage among African Americans.²⁵⁶

In order to influence teenagers, fear and shock were used as motivators. “Convinced that friendly persuasion has reached its limit” the famous crash test dummies used in advertisements were replaced with real life crash scenes in an attempt to reach the one third of the population – young males – who had very low numbers for seat belt usage. According to Dr. Ricardo Martinez, the administrator of the highway agency, studies showed that people did not wear seat belts because “they believe they are in charge and nothing will happen to them.”²⁵⁷ However, as the President of the Air Bag Safety Campaign stated: “It’s a tremendous challenge because it involves changing basic behavior and deeply ingrained habits.”²⁵⁸

The placement and targeting of messages at every level were important factors in the success of the seat belt campaign, as was segmenting the population, targeting specific audiences and understanding each audience. The “price” “product” and “exchange” were all at work – a small effort for significant increase in safety, coupled

²⁵³ Ken Thomas, “Motorists Set Record For Using Seat Belts.”

²⁵⁴ Joseph B. White, “Eyes on the Road: Seat-Belt Nagging by Cars May Soon Be More Aggressive,” *Wall Street Journal*, October 8, 2002, D3.

²⁵⁵ Ana Beatriz Cholo, “Los Angeles; Seat-Belt Drive Targets Latinos; Safety: A U.S. Official Says Many Newcomers Do Not Use Seatbelts. The Campaign Stresses Buckling Up Children,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 22, 2001, B3.

²⁵⁶ Anonymous, “Findings Show Seat Belt Use Increasing Among Blacks,” *The Nation’s Health* 33, no. 4, (2003): 21.

²⁵⁷ Matthew L. Wald, “Shock to Replace Dummies in TV Ads on Seat Belt Use,” *New York Times*, January 27, 1999, A12.

²⁵⁸ Donald W. Nauss, “Seat Belts Often Take a Back Seat,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 4, 1997, 1.

with continual promotion of an excellent marketing campaign and message. In North Carolina, where the “Click it or Ticket” campaign was initiated, seatbelt usage went from 65% in 1993 to 80% in the first six months of the program and remains at 84%.²⁵⁹ In addition, “fatal and serious injuries were cut by 14%. And as an added bonus, in 1994 and 1995, North Carolina Auto Insurers asked for a total of \$33 million less...”²⁶⁰ Lower insurance premiums may also have been a factor in the success of the campaign.

Enforcement had a great deal of influence in changing human behavior with regard to seatbelt usage. Entire states were motivated to have citizens “buckle up” as federal highway funds were linked to demonstrated increases in seatbelt usage. In 1997, President Clinton threatened to cut off millions of federal dollars in highway trust funds to states that refused to toughen up safety belt use laws.²⁶¹ Adoption of seat belt laws was required by the federal government, and stricter laws were rewarded with extra highway money.²⁶² And of course, the nagging bell installed in the car which chimes until the seatbelt is engaged was an added factor leading to the increase in the use of seatbelts.

Seat belt usage, smoke alarms and anti-littering campaigns all had enforcement components (tickets for non-compliance, legal requirements to install smoke alarms upon sale of house, hefty fines for littering and enforcement). They are useful to study but may not prove as useful in citizen preparedness efforts, where we are seeking voluntary behavior change. In seeking voluntary behavior change, other campaigns which motivate Americans to action – such as donating blood, blood pressure testing and awareness, or targeting teens with awareness programs to prevent smoking – may have more relevant application. However, the seatbelt campaigns and others are worthy of further study, particularly in the education of children as change agents, as well as for their overall success as major public awareness campaigns designed to influence behavior

²⁵⁹ Social Marketing Institute website, *Success Stories*, Click It or Ticket www.social-marketing.org/success/cs-clickit.html (accessed on March 2, 2007).

²⁶⁰ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 80.

²⁶¹ Ken Zino, “Buckle Up or Else,” *Road & Track*, August 1997, 41.

²⁶² Matthew L. Wald, “U.S. Presses States for Strict Seat Belt Laws,” *New York Times*, March 5, 2004, A17.

in a sustained and meaningful manner. In addition, these campaigns are useful to study as they underscore the fact that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to influencing behavior and highlight the importance of segmenting the population, crafting appropriate messages, and targeting that segment effectively.

c. *Successful Voluntary Behavior Change Campaigns: Blood Donation, High Blood Pressure Campaign & Tobacco*

(1) Blood Donation. In 2001 the American Blood Centers conducted a survey to determine “nationwide attitudes toward blood donation.”²⁶³ This was done in a concerted effort to look at effective messages and programs to increase blood donation. The reasons for donating blood were mostly altruistic (four of the top six answers). The reasons given for donating blood: wanting to help others, 34%; responding to a blood drive, 25%; helping the community, 13%; hearing about a shortage, 7%; because “I might need it someday,” 4%; and helping a local child, 2%. Of the reasons for *not* giving blood, 44% centered around fear of disease. The remaining 52% cited: never thought about it (17%), too busy (15%), scared of process (10%), afraid of infection (4%), don’t know where/how to give (4%), and don’t know anyone in need (2%). The excuses for not giving blood echo many of the reasons citizens cite for lack of disaster preparedness: time and knowledge.²⁶⁴

The American Blood Centers studied messaging in their effort to increase the number of donations. They found the most compelling message to be that a family member, friend, or child was in need. Overall, “the most effective message in multiple regression analysis was ‘four million Americans would die every year without lifesaving blood transfusions.’”²⁶⁵ This campaign highlights the importance of messaging in moving people to action.

²⁶³ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 70.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

²⁶⁵ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 76.

(2) High Blood Pressure Campaign. The National High Blood Pressure Education Program (NHBPEP) was established in 1972. In the first year of the program,

Less than one fourth of the American population knew of the relationship between hypertension, stroke, and heart disease. Today, more than three fourths of the population is aware of this connection. As a result, virtually all Americans have had their blood pressure measured at least once, and three fourths of the population have it measured every 6 months.²⁶⁶

This campaign is considered “the longest running behavior-change program to use social marketing concepts, processes, and tools...”²⁶⁷

This effort is an excellent example of social marketing. There was a wide and varied target audience: women taking birth control pills, older persons, African Americans, people with diabetes, people with high cholesterol. The campaign used segmentation principles, targeting messages to each audience, and adapted messages and efforts to position the desired change as more appealing than current behavior.

The barriers to action reflect many of the excuses citizens give for not being prepared for disaster (time, money, cost, lack of priority, don’t want to think about it):

It’s hard for me to change my diet and to find the time to exercise; My blood pressure is difficult to control; My blood pressure varies so much it’s probably not accurate; Medications can have undesirable side effects; It’s too expensive to go to the doctor just to get my blood pressure checked; It may be the result of living a full and active life. Not everybody dies from it.²⁶⁸

The campaign sold its “product” (behavior change consisting of having blood pressure checked, losing weight, physical activity, low sodium foods, limited alcohol, and taking medication) and focused on “price” (making things easy, changing things over time, tracking blood pressure at home, requiring only a little

²⁶⁶ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 30.

²⁶⁷ Alan Andreasen, *Marketing for Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment*, 18.

²⁶⁸ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 32.

exercise). The “placement” was effective; people could check blood pressure in malls, health centers, and at home. “Promotion” consisted of using mass media and a myriad of other channels to deliver the message – websites, doctors, direct mail, internet, and toll free numbers were all employed.²⁶⁹

(3) Tobacco – Truth Campaign and Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program. There have been several very successful anti-smoking social marketing campaigns. Some have employed extremely powerful and memorable television commercials. Teen smoking is a good example of the need for audience segmentation. One is the “Truth” campaign in Florida; another is the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program (“Make Smoking History”). Both of these campaigns focused on reaching teens and teen smokers. The “Truth” campaign targeted teen smoking and conducted an extensive effort to segment the teenage population and find the right conduits for messaging. These campaigns also had the benefit of significant financial assistance from tobacco tax initiatives and tobacco lawsuit settlements. In Florida, the Truth campaign consisted of “a two year \$200 million youth anti-tobacco education and marketing effort.”²⁷⁰ In Florida, researchers found that, before even starting the campaigns, there was

100% awareness [among teens] that tobacco killed... and that smoking had everything to do with emotion and nothing to do with rational decision making...like piercing an ear or dying hair, using tobacco was a tool of rebellion all about sending a signal to the world that the users made decisions for themselves.²⁷¹

Teachers, counselors, parents, the media, and communities had done their job of educating teens about the ill effects of smoking, but it had not changed smoking behavior.

The last two campaigns highlight the need to understand the segmented audience – to analyze their knowledge, attitudes, practices, and beliefs – and then apply social marketing principles. The Massachusetts campaign appealed to the

²⁶⁹ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 31.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 48.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 50.

vanity of teenage girls, showing the role of smoking in producing wrinkles and other signs of premature aging; another focused on adolescent boys, with actress Uma Thurman telling young males “the five things all guys should know” with the closing line: “nix the smoking.”²⁷² The campaigns had to be “sufficiently intrusive to be talked about in the study hall the next day.”²⁷³ This is reminiscent of Mileti’s concept that the message must be something people “mull over and discuss...[that] sparks interest enough that people ask questions.”²⁷⁴ This is the concept behind Malcolm Gladwell’s book *The Tipping Point*: identifying the key factors leading to the tipping point where a social contagion happens and a product or idea takes off which, Gladwell finds, depends largely upon the “stickiness” of the message.²⁷⁵

Social marketing is also a long process:

It took five years to see a decline. During the period of increased smoking among teens nationally (35 percent), the teen smoking incidence in Massachusetts fell from 31.4 percent in 1993 to 24.4 percent in 1999. So, statistically speaking, they have bucked the trend. The youth numbers are part of an approximately 35 percent remarkable statewide reduction. This reduction represented a net loss of more than \$1.3 billion for the tobacco industry.²⁷⁶

Well-known social marketing efforts took many years, even decades, to resonate with the American public and change behavior. Social marketing has been successful in many areas of influencing human behavior. Famous social marketing efforts have also included powerful taglines and memorable images, such as Smokey the Bear and “Only YOU can prevent Forest Fires,” the Crying Indian and the campaign to stop littering with “Keep America Beautiful” as its message, or the

²⁷² Richard Earle, *The Art of Cause Marketing: How to Use Advertising to Change Personal Behavior and Public Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 203.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 208.

²⁷⁴ Dennis Mileti, *Public Hazards Communication and Education: The State of the Art*, (Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, n.d.), 2.

²⁷⁵ Malcolm Gladwell, *Tipping Point*, 19, 92-95, 96-98, 233-34.

²⁷⁶ Richard Earle, *The Art of Cause Marketing*, 213-214.

memorable tagline “A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Waste” for the United Negro College Fund, inspiring black youth to look toward higher education and to raise awareness of, and funding for, the effort.

2. Cause Marketing

A major effort to motivate Americans to prepare for disasters, creating a culture of preparedness, may require using another increasingly effective tool: “cause marketing.” Major retailers reach consumers every day. They have proven to be effective messengers and educators for various causes and have successfully served as conduits for raising awareness among their consumer base. Cause marketing is not just linking a cause with a major retailer for fundraising purposes; it also involves leveraging celebrity and visibility for awareness of, or education about, a pressing social issue, need, or problem.

According to the Cause Marketing Forum website, social marketing is: “(A) strategic positioning and marketing tool that links a company or brand to a relevant social cause or issue, for mutual benefit. (From *Brand Spirit, How Cause Related Marketing Builds Brands* by Hamish Pringle and Marjorie Thompson, 1999.)” and/or “a commercial activity by which businesses and charity or causes form a partnership with each other to market an image, product or service for mutual benefit. (Business in the Community, the leading British corporate social responsibility organization...).²⁷⁷ Cause marketing is not social marketing, nor is it corporate philanthropy.²⁷⁸

Avon and Breast Cancer awareness have one of the most successful cause-marketing partnerships. The match was natural in that Avon specializes in service to the female population. The vast network of Avon’s salesforce and the company’s constant contact with women was the perfect means to distribute information and raise awareness. Fundraising through product sales and the Avon Walk for Breast Cancer and other efforts also played a major factor in the success of Avon’s partnership.

²⁷⁷ Cause Marketing Forum website, Definitions, www.causemarketingforum.com (accessed March 2, 2007).

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

Linking major retailers and corporations with the need to raise awareness of an issue and influence human behavior is emerging as a very strong tool for a variety of causes and is not just about fundraising.

The business objective of a cause-branding campaign can be anything from increasing sales, forging new business relationships, and improving customer loyalty to something as broad as enhancing overall reputation. The philanthropic objective could be raising awareness of a critical need, inspiring consumers and partners to take action, or raising money.²⁷⁹

ConAgra foods, another leader in the field of cause marketing, has embraced the issue of child hunger.²⁸⁰ The Feeding Children Better program “encourages employees to raise money and serve meals, donates products...and leads a national public-service advertising campaign to raise public awareness of child hunger.”²⁸¹

The visibility of a cause, seeing messages over and over again, and getting people to think about taking action are all key components in efforts to change human behavior.

Today’s consumers wear their values on their sleeves – literally. From yellow “Livestrong,” to blue “Democrat”...wristbands are all the rage. Couple this with the popularity of cause-related ribbons stuck on vehicles across America, and you have a societal trend. Americans today are putting their passion for various causes on display – on wrists, cars, and clothing. We want others to see us as ethical, caring, good citizens. But this trend goes more than skin deep. Americans want to align themselves with brands, employers and even investments that stand for something we can feel good about.”²⁸²

The little pink ribbon has certainly been one of the most effective symbols of a cause.

²⁷⁹ Carol L. Cone, Mark A. Fledman, Alison T. DaSilva, “Causes and Effects,” *Harvard Business Review*, July 2003, 95- 101, 97.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 95.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Sherlyn Manson, “Cause Marketing: Good Deeds as Good Business,” MarketingProfs.com, March 14, 2006, www.marketingprofs.com (accessed March 2, 2007).

a. Breast Cancer and Cause Marketing

This successful campaign has been an ongoing and ever growing effort conducted over the past two decades. Breast cancer awareness efforts have involved many retailers and corporations (although Avon's visibility and early support have always given it tremendous stature in this cause). Awareness has experienced a slow and steady evolution, built up over many years.

Successful persuasion campaigns appeal to a person's willingness to change: explain what they need to do and how to do it and then get them to do it. Much of the success of the breast cancer awareness campaign has been attributed to making information widely available, creating high visibility on an ongoing and constant basis. Messages and information are in simple language and substantial efforts have made mammograms accessible and affordable. In addition, successful campaigns are targeted based on cultural²⁸³ and socio-economic factors.²⁸⁴ Targeting women where they shop, play,²⁸⁵ work,²⁸⁶ and pray has been highly effective.²⁸⁷

Segmentation of the population was important in the delivery of the message. The true success of the awareness campaign was the joining of a massive cause marketing effort with a large-scale social marketing effort by public health throughout the United States. An excellent example of this is the "Florida Cares for Women" program. This particular campaign enhanced the "exchange," offering "peace of mind" as the benefit, and marketed free or low cost mammograms to women fifty years of age and over as a "special gift" – enhancing the campaign's message by reminding women that "your gift is waiting." The campaign lowered the "price" of the product and enhanced

²⁸³ Jim Forkan, "Cable Net Stays Focused on Breast Cancer," *Television Week*, April 12, 2004, 16.

²⁸⁴ Gail Stegler, "A Program of Interventions Designed to Increase Mammography Rates in Women Ages 50 Years and Older for an Underserved Racial Minority," *Journal of Health and Human Services Administration* 26, no. 3/4 (2003/2004): 336.

²⁸⁵ Norma Ramage, "Hairdressers Serve as Breast Friends," *Marketing*, October 24, 2005, 3.

²⁸⁶ Jennifer Dacey Allen, "Promoting Breast and Cervical Cancer Screening at the Workplace: Results From the Woman to Woman Study," *American Journal of Public Health* 97, no. 4 (2001): 584. See also Norbert Goldfield, "Marketing Strategy Key to Success of CIGNA Breast Cancer Program," *Business and Health* 4, no. 3 (1987): 62.

²⁸⁷ Lauren Chambliss, "Battling Breast Cancer at Work," *Working Woman*, October 1995, 74.

“placement” of the service in the community with free transportation and extended hours.²⁸⁸ These types of social marketing efforts by public health departments were taking place across the country as the high visibility cause marketing effort fueled awareness and education among the targeted population. As an added benefit, cause-related marketing increased fundraising as well.

Unlike seat belt campaigns, there is no enforcement aspect to the breast cancer awareness campaign, requiring women to get mammograms and look to early screening. Clever partnerships with large corporate entities, combined with substantial and sustained marketing over many years, have established the pink ribbon as a symbol, a reminder, and a call to action. Many lessons of this successful campaign can be applied to a powerful, national, sustained effort in creating a culture of preparedness in America.

What was simply another “awareness month” for a cause or issue has grown into “Pink October”:

The Pink Parade starts again in October, the 20th annual Breast Cancer Awareness Month. In Times Square, 3M is building the World’s Largest Pink Ribbon using Post-it notes with a ribbon imprint. There’s Chapstick in pink packages, Avon’s breast cancer celebrity nailwear campaign, Kitchen Aid’s “Cook for the Cure” effort not to mention pink and white M&M’s, pink ribbon silk scarves, socks, stuffed bears and so on.²⁸⁹

Avon used the sale of celebrity “little black dresses” (Sharon Stone, Kim Cattrall, Brooke Shields, Liz Tyler) to launch a new fragrance “Little Black Dress” while raising money in Pink October.²⁹⁰ In 2004, Target stores donated 100% of their proceeds to breast cancer from the Times Square Store. Even Georgia Pacific bath tissue

²⁸⁸ Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*, 86-88.

²⁸⁹ Karen Springen, “A Ribbon’s Far Reach,” *Newsweek*, October 4, 2004, 12.

²⁹⁰ Christine Bittar, “Celebrities’ Little Black Dresses Get Auctioned Off for Big Pink Cause,” *Brandweek*, October 29, 2001, 26.

markets with the pink ribbon.²⁹¹ “More and more, U.S. businesses see tying their corporate identities to good causes as a powerful marketing tool, and breast cancer has become the queen of all good causes.”²⁹²

“It sounds like the prescription for a marketing disaster: Link your product to a disfiguring and potentially fatal disease that evokes fear in women...yet for leading cosmetics and fashion companies, the issue of breast cancer is proving to be a powerful selling tool.”²⁹³ In the mid-1990s, Avon’s campaign was one of the most visible cause-marketing efforts ever undertaken by a Fortune 500 Company.²⁹⁴

b. Cause Marketing and Citizen Preparedness

A partnership or marketing tie-in to a major industry that in turn “markets” citizen preparedness on a national scale may help create a tipping point in the American psyche. Talking about unpleasant things, such as disasters, is much like talking about cancer. With the help of a Fortune 500 company, and the right marketing and partnership, a far-reaching and sustained dialogue with the American people is possible. Partnerships might be formed with investment firms (we care about your financial security and your personal security), the insurance industry (protecting your home, protecting your family), or with companies that target women (taking care of the family).

Cause marketing is extremely powerful. Citizen preparedness can certainly be seen as a cause or an issue. Businesses or industries partner with causes or issues to raise their image and make consumers feel good about that company or industry. With regard to charitable causes, three-quarters of consumers say they will switch brands to a company involved in a charitable cause if price and quality are equal.²⁹⁵ A study of this area may prove helpful in designing a preparedness campaign that partners with a

²⁹¹ Huck Stogel, “GP Rolls out Pink Carpet for Breast Cancer Effort,” *Brandweek*, March 7, 2005, 16.

²⁹² Susan Ornstein, “The Selling of Breast Cancer,” *Business 2.0* 4, no. 1 (February 2003): 88.

²⁹³ Suein L. Hwang, “Linking Products to Breast Cancer Fight Helps Firms Bond With Their Customers,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 1993, B1.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Brian D. Till, Linda I. Nowak, “Toward Effective Use of Cause-related Marketing Alliances,” *The Journal of Product and Brand Management* 9, no. 7 (2000): 472.

responsible company or celebrity and, through intense and sustained marketing, constantly reminds citizens to take action to prepare and reinforces that it is easy, simple, and affordable.

Cause marketing, however, requires long-term commitment.

Cause marketing was once a company's promotion with a charitable organization in which it donated a portion of its profits to the organization's cause. However, cause marketing has taken on new importance. The promotion becomes a major, long-term commitment to an issue and an alliance that links a company with that issue in the consumer's mind. Avon's Breast Cancer Awareness Crusade and Coors Brewing Company's literacy campaign involve a great deal of work and investment. To some, cause-related promotions are tacky and can harm a company's image. If a company tries to promote sales of its products by promising to donate a portion of the proceeds to the Red Cross or AIDS research, it risks looking like it is taking advantage of somebody else's problem. Integrated 5-year programs like Avon and Coors campaigns have a measure of built in immunity to charges of opportunism.²⁹⁶

Recent successes in cause marketing and raising awareness for issues can be found in the "color coded causes." LiveStrong engaged Nike to sell the yellow Lance Armstrong wristbands; over 47.5 million bracelets were sold in 2004.²⁹⁷ The American Heart Association has the "Go Red" campaign. "What started with red ribbons in support of fighting AIDS has quickly spread: pink ribbons for breast cancer, a yellow bracelet for LiveStrong, a red dress for heart disease, a royal blue bracelet for prostate cancer. The color parade just gets stronger."²⁹⁸

The new (Red) campaign, initiated by Bobby Shriver and U-2 lead singer Bono, has linked major retailers and their products to fundraising for and increasing awareness of fighting AIDS in Africa (supporting the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria) . Retailers include giants such as GAP, American Express, Motorola, Converse, Apple, and Armani.²⁹⁹ The (Red) campaign has benefited directly

²⁹⁶ Nancy Arnott, "Marketing with a Passion," *Sales and Marketing Management* 146, no. 1 (January 1994): 64.

²⁹⁷ Nancy Coltun Webster, "LiveStrong Color Coded Causes," *Advertising Age*, June 13, 2005, 31.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ See the (Red) website, www.joinred.com (accessed March 2007).

from proceeds from sales of (Red) products at these retailers. Gap has engaged in a massive media campaign to brand the (Red) campaign and join itself to the awareness and education efforts. Celebrities and politicians are part of the major marketing effort, raising awareness of AIDS in Africa, and have been featured in ads, magazines, and television shows from *Vanity Fair* to *Oprah*.

Raising awareness and providing visibility to a cause or issue through these types of efforts has direct applicability to citizen education, preparedness messaging, and awareness efforts. The synergy of social marketing and cause marketing could provide powerful new tools to reach the American public, engage the population, and help propel the country toward the creation of a culture of preparedness.

**D. TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY AND MORTALITY SALIENCE:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REACHING A PUBLIC THAT JUST DOESN'T
WANT TO THINK ABOUT DISASTERS**

Images of disaster and the suffering of fellow Americans waiting for help and assistance did little to inspire Americans to take personal responsibility for the preparedness of themselves and their families. Americans cite lack of time, lack of money, and lack of organization (among others) as reasons they have not prepared themselves or their families for disaster.³⁰⁰ Many believe that terrorists will strike again in the United States, but not in their town or city. Others prefer to believe that disaster will happen, but not to them: “Ironically, Americans are convinced that catastrophe is inevitable. The vast majority expect a major event to occur somewhere in the United States within the next five years. But many believe catastrophe will strike anywhere but in their own communities, and are therefore less motivated to prepare.”³⁰¹

The surveys conducted by Professor Light at NYU (discussed *supra*) reveal that the number of people who cited “I just don’t want to think about it” as the reason not to prepare actually *increased* after Katrina. In the July 2005 NYU survey, 23% cited the reason they are not prepared is that they “did not want to think about September 11th.” In

³⁰⁰ Light, Paul C., *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 4.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

the second survey, conducted in October of 2005 – just five weeks after Katrina – 27% cited that they “did not want to think about Katrina and Rita” as a reason for not getting prepared.³⁰²

A recent article discussing the failure of Americans to heed the preparedness message found that:

...a critical issue might be the degree to which citizens sense that an attack will actually affect them or their community. We found that while more than three-quarters (78 percent) of respondents were concerned that there will be more terror attacks in the United States, less than a third (31 percent) believed an attack would happen within a year. Likewise in New York City, which was actually attacked by international terrorists twice within the last thirteen years, more than three-quarters (76 percent) of New Yorkers were concerned that there will be more terror attacks, but less than a quarter (23 percent) believed an attack would happen within a year. Thus we see a population with a belief in future acts of terror, but a failure to see the threat as immediate.³⁰³

Although Americans say they comprehend the threat of disaster and believe terrorists will strike again, they have not taken the most basic and fundamental steps to be prepared to be self sufficient for a minimum of seventy-two hours, despite witnessing the inability of government agencies (local, state, and federal) to reach those most in need after Katrina.

In two seminal textbooks on social marketing, overcoming a human’s natural tendency to ignore health messages or to deal with unpleasant topics is not thoroughly addressed from the psychological standpoint of mortality salience.³⁰⁴ Fear is addressed as an emotional appeal and using fear as a motivator should be approached with caution.

There are a number of circumstances under which an emotional appeal may serve to move a target audience member to the Contemplation Stage

³⁰² Paul C. Light, *The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness*, 3.

³⁰³ Irwin Redlener, David A. Berman, “National Preparedness Planning: The Historical Context and Current State of the U.S. Public’s Readiness, 1940-2005,” *Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (2006): 98.

³⁰⁴ See Alan Andreasen, *Marketing Social Change, Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment*, and also Philip Kotler, et al., *Social Marketing: Improving the Quality of Life*.

(Monahan, 1995).³⁰⁵ Fear appeals have long been suggested as a way to get customers' attention and interest (Janis, 1967; Averill, 1987; Peter and Olson, 1993). The difficulty here is that fear can have two competing effects (Hale and Dillard, 1995). On the one hand, when attended to, fear appeals can be motivating in encouraging people to think about taking precautionary actions (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Kunreuther Sanderson, and Vetschera, 1985). On the other hand, fear can serve as a powerful force preventing attention from taking place....if fear is used, it should be coupled with some mechanism for its reduction..."³⁰⁶

The concept of "mortality salience" provides some interesting insight into the reasons Americans don't want to think about disasters and terrorism and choose not to act on, or simply ignore, public information campaigns designed to educate the public about the importance of preparedness and survival post-disaster. Why is it we cannot seem to sell preparedness as a means of safety and survival? New avenues for reaching the public in applying concepts of psychology may prove useful in re-orienting how we target and message certain segments of the population.

Mortality salience looks at the phenomena that humans prefer to not think about death and mortality; we naturally prefer to think about other things or are reluctant to think about things that are upsetting. Humans have a tendency to avoid things we don't want to deal with.

Humans are gifted with the ability to contemplate their own demise, and this weird blessing infuses every moment of life with the inevitability of death. That said, we're remarkably good at making our date with death seem so far away we doubt we'll have to keep it. If an event pierces our defenses and makes our mortality vivid, we quickly return to living as we usually live, as if the odds against death are stacked in our favor.

...Most people aren't so calm in the face of "mortality salience" – modern science-speak for the moments when we realize death awaits us. According to studies, pointed reminders of death are more likely to trigger unsavory behaviors, including a puritanical conformism that drives us to defend our worldview and to punish others who threaten it – if only in our

³⁰⁵ The Contemplation Stage refers to Prochaska and DiClemente's Stages of Change Model, discussed more fully infra.

³⁰⁶ Alan Andreasen, *Marketing Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment*, 209-210.

minds. Curiously, an awareness of death also drives us to seek out ways to bolster our self esteem. Researchers say that even little ways of feeling better about ourselves (like flattery or shopping) are strangely effective in lulling us back into forgetting our ultimate fate.³⁰⁷

This effort to bolster our self esteem as a response to mortality salience may prove a fruitful beginning in reshaping preparedness messaging.

A recent study explored the role of self esteem in consumer responses to mortality salience. One part of the study focused on food choice, the other on charitable donations and making socially conscious decisions.

Individuals display a wide variety of behavioral responses to reminders of the possibility of their own death. In the laboratory, making mortality salient has increased intentions to engage in physical fitness activities (Arndt, Schimel, and Goldenberg 2003), preference for luxury goods (Mandel and Heine 1999) and materialism (Arndt, et al. 2004), interest in sex (Goldenberg et al. 2000), and aggressive driving behavior (Ben-Ari, Florian, and Mikulincer 1999). Public events can also make mortality salient and influence behaviors. After September 11, 2001, for example, people reported increases in overeating and going off diets, drinking, smoking, time spent with family and friends, shopping, and church attendance (e.g., Barnes and Petersen 2001).

Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, and Pyszczynski 1997) provides a framework for understanding such behaviors. Events that remind individuals of death engender existential anxiety, leading to the use of two main coping strategies to alleviate this anxiety, defense of one's cultural worldview and attempts to bolster and enhance self esteem (Pyszczynski et al 2004). We focus on the strategy of bolstering/enhancing self-esteem as a buffer against existential anxiety. Terror Management Theory argues that, when mortality is made salient, individuals increase their efforts to live up to the standards upon which their self esteem is based...When mortality is salient, individuals will focus attempts to bolster or increase areas of self-esteem that are central to them and in which they can live up to standards.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Laine Bergenson, "Good Life, Good Death: The Only Way to Learn from the Reaper is to Accept He's There," *Utune Magazine*, September/October 2005, [www.utune.com/issues/2005_131/cover\)story/11760-1.html](http://www.utune.com/issues/2005_131/cover)story/11760-1.html) (accessed December 26, 2006).

³⁰⁸ Rosellina Ferraro, Baba Shiv, James R. Bettman, "Let Us Eat and Drink, for Tomorrow We Shall Die: Effects of Mortality Salience and Self-Esteem on Self-Regulation in Consumer Choice," *Journal of Consumer Research* 32 (June 2005): 65.

In the above mentioned study (Ferraro, et al.) the behavioral domain of virtuous behaviors, such as donating money to charity or engaging in socially conscious behavior, were studied as a source of self esteem. The experiment found that “among individuals high on virtue as a source of self-esteem, the decision to give to charity, the amount contributed to the charity, and intentions to engage in socially conscious consumer behaviors were higher when mortality salience was high than when it was low.”³⁰⁹

Zeroing in on self esteem as a coping mechanism for existential anxiety about death may be instructive in moving Americans toward preparedness. Perhaps preparedness messages should begin to focus on an individual’s action in becoming prepared as an altruistic act or charitable act (promoting self esteem) – looking at preparedness as protecting one’s family, civic duty and responsibility, pride in doing something good, assisting the community, or as assisting first responders in being prepared and alleviating pressure on first responders in the first 72 hours post disaster. Under this theory, the individual must find this domain of participating in strengthening “family” and the “community” an important source of self esteem. DHS senior officials have stressed civic duty as a reason to prepare in various statements and speeches.

Preparedness messages that are based on fear and death alone are unlikely to move individuals to action and should be used with caution. In fact, fear messages may cause maladaptive behavior and push people further into denial and avoidance. However, messages that make mortality salient and are linked with efforts capitalizing on known coping mechanisms such as bolstering self esteem may prove a useful endeavor for further study in moving Americans to action in preparing for disaster.

Another study looked at the impact of mortality salience on consumer behavior and looked at impression motivation “which refers to the desire to be socially acceptable and this motive may link to the striving for self-esteem.”³¹⁰ Impression motivation may be an important key in persuading Americans to become prepared.

³⁰⁹ Rosellina Ferraro, Baba Shiv, James R. Bettman, “Let Us Eat and Drink, for Tomorrow We Shall Die: Effects of Mortality Salience and Self-Esteem on Self-Regulation in Consumer Choice,” 73.

³¹⁰ Durairaj Maheswaran, Nidhi Agrawal, “Motivational and Cultural Variations in Mortality Salience Effects: Contemplations on Terror Management Theory and Consumer Behavior,” *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 14, no. 3 (2004): 214.

According to Terror Management Theory, coping with death leads individuals to attempt to validate their self worth. In general, self-worth comes from seeing oneself as a valued part of social reality. Thus, the need to enhance self-worth is likely to motivate individuals to satisfy social goals and manage impressions.³¹¹

Therefore, adjusting preparedness messaging to accommodate the feeling of self worth and enhancing social goals where mortality is salient may be a promising endeavor because “...when mortality is salient, people are more willing to act in concert with the opinion of others...impression-motivated individuals are more sensitive to the opinion of others and their subsequent attitudes reflect a bias toward social goals.”³¹²

As shown in so many surveys, current preparedness efforts are simply not working. Mortality salience should be further studied in the context of citizen preparedness, recognizing that humans do not want to think about disasters and death. Additional study is needed, looking at fear-based messages and whether such messages might work within the right context of mortality salience and Terror Management Theory. This study may lead to a redirection of preparedness campaigns to capitalize on the anxiety coping mechanism of self esteem – with preparedness marketed as a virtue and something that is of high social value that translates into the individual taking action to become prepared. To this author, the excuses for not preparing, such as lack of time or money, or “wish I was more organized,” all sound as though they are part of a continuum of a human’s natural tendency to “not want to think about” 9/11, Katrina, death, disaster, or terrorism. The importance of using psychology to help solve the vexing issue of why people do not prepare for disaster cannot be over stated, yet it appears, over the past five years, to have been left out of serious efforts to solve this complex problem.

³¹¹ Durairaj Maheswaran, Nidhi Agrawal, “Motivational and Cultural Variations in Mortality Salience Effects: Contemplations on Terror Management Theory and Consumer Behavior,” 214.

³¹² Ibid.

E. A NEW MODEL: “CITIZEN CORPS PERSONAL BEHAVIOR CHANGE MODEL FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS,” A HOPEFUL START IN DRAMATIC CHANGE

Citizen Corps recently released an elaborate new model, the “Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness” (called PDP) for addressing citizen preparedness aimed at using social science theory to change behavior. It is based on two theoretical models. First is Prochaska’s Stages of Change/Transtheoretical Model which looks at stages of changes and when persons are most accepting of messages and change. There are five stages: Precontemplation, where the individual is not intending to change or even thinking about change; Contemplation, where the individual is not prepared to take action immediately but within the next six months; Preparation, where the individual is actively considering taking action in the immediate future; Action, where the individual has actually taken action; and Maintenance where an individual has taken action, maintained a change in behavior, and is working to sustain the change.³¹³

The other theoretical model is the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), “chosen because it addresses how individuals process threat as well as their ability to take protective action.” As set forth in the Citizen Corp report:

The PDP Model applies the EPPM’s description of factors that influence two types of responses to threats (i.e., danger control or fear control processes).

1. A person’s perception of a threat is composed of two components:

- 1) threat severity (e.g., How severe will the effects of a disaster be?) and
- 2) threat susceptibility (e.g., How likely is it that the disaster will happen to me?)

³¹³ ORC Macro, et al, “Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness,” 4. See also J.O. Prochaska,, C.C. DiClemente, “Stages and processes of self-change of smoking: Toward an integrative model of change,” *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 51 (1983):390-395; J.O. Prochaska, W. F. Velicer, “The Transtheoretical Model of Health Behavior Change,” *American Journal of Health Promotion* 12 (1997): 38-48; and Alan Andreasen, *Marketing Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Development, and the Environment*, preface xv-xvi and Chapter 6.

2. A person's assessment of the value of a recommended protective action is also composed of two components:

1) self-efficacy (e.g., Am I able to protect myself from a disaster?)
and

2) response efficacy (e.g., Will the recommended preparedness actions help me in the event of disaster?)³¹⁴

In this model, persons take one of two actions when threatened: danger control or fear control.

1. *Danger control* focuses on a solution to the threat (e.g., preparedness or protection). For danger control to be selected, a person needs to believe that an effective response is available (response efficacy) and that he or she is capable of using this response to reduce the risk (self-efficacy).
2. *Fear control* is not solution-oriented and can be represented by denial, rationalization and escapism.³¹⁵

The new model defines groups by one of three "Threat/Efficacy Profiles." The first is the "Low Perceived Threat Profile," where the person is "unaware or dismissive of the threat because of perceived low susceptibility, urgency and/or severity."³¹⁶ This person is deemed "unreceptive to preparedness messages."³¹⁷ The next is a "Low Perceived Efficacy Profile," where the person understands susceptibility to and the severity of the threat, but perceives barriers to preparedness and is therefore unprepared.³¹⁸ The third group is prepared, understands the threat and has become prepared.³¹⁹ Each of these profiles is examined to determine the type of outreach, messaging, and social marketing that is most effective in promoting preparedness. The new model also looks at the Stages of Change Model to identify where individuals are in

³¹⁴ ORC Macro, et al, "Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness," 3, italics in original.

³¹⁵ Ibid., italics in original.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 3 and 6.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 3.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 3 and 8.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 3 and 10.

the process of change and how to move an individual in a current stage through the remaining Stages of Change to the Action Stage and Maintenance of Change Stage.³²⁰

This new effort in using social science theory is admirable and is a start in the right direction for creating a culture of preparedness. The report also recognizes that the current one-size-fits-all approach is not viable. In acknowledging the continuing abysmal numbers in citizen preparedness, and an actual decline in preparedness in 2005 from 2003, the report states:

To achieve higher levels of personal disaster preparedness throughout the country, government officials, emergency responders, nonprofit organizations, educators, and community leaders must gain a better understanding of the motivating factors and barriers to personal preparedness. A greater range of personal factors that might correlate with these motivators and barriers must also be examined, including basic demographic variables, such as age, education, and income, but also factors that cut across levels of socioeconomic status and geographic location. By understanding these issues, the preparedness community will be able to design targeted social marketing and outreach programs to increase awareness of the need for individual preparedness and to motivate behavior change.³²¹

Whether this model is the most effective way to create a culture of preparedness remains to be seen, and the report makes clear that further research and extensive testing of the model is needed.

F. IS GOVERNMENT THE BEST MESSENGER? FAITH IN GOVERNMENT – A FACTOR TO CONSIDER

A study produced by the New York Academy of Medicine in September of 2004 demonstrated that Americans lack faith in government to give them correct information during an emergency.³²² The study focused on two scenarios: one was a smallpox outbreak, the other a dirty bomb. The purpose of the survey was to determine if all of the planning engaged in by government for these types of events would actually go according

³²⁰ ORC Macro, et al, “Citizen Corps Personal Behavior Change Model for Disaster Preparedness,” 4.

³²¹ Ibid., 2.

³²² Roz D. Lasker, *Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public* (New York: New York Academy of Medicine, September 14, 2004).

to plans when put to the test. In other words, would people follow instructions and would members of the public do what was expected of them in an emergency?

In focusing on the dirty bomb scenario, only three-fifths (59%) of the American people would cooperate fully with instructions to stay inside their office building and shelter in place after an explosion.³²³ There were several reasons for the other 41% not cooperating, but the study found that more members of the public would follow instructions if the American people's lack of trust in official institutions was addressed and there was a higher confidence in their community's preparedness plans.³²⁴ The study found that emergency planners could improve public response in emergencies by strengthening people's confidence in the community preparedness plans and enhancing people's trust in official instructions and actions.³²⁵

The July 2005 NYU survey report did not give high marks for confidence in local government to deal with a bombing in a grocery store or shopping mall (only 30% believe local government is very prepared) or an outbreak of disease (19% believe local government is very prepared).³²⁶

The answers suggest an important disconnect between knowing about a plan and believing in the institution that produces it....Having watched closely as Hurricane Katrina unfolded, it is not clear how Americans will react to messages from their local institutions in the wake of future disasters. Much as one might hope they will heed the evacuation orders more quickly, confidence in government and its leaders was badly shaken by the widely-televised images of evacuees who followed orders only to be stranded at the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center.³²⁷

The October 2005 ABC news poll (discussed *supra*) found that overall, 52% of Americans express confidence in government's ability to respond effectively to a nuclear or radiological attack. However, that number was down significantly from a prior poll in August of 2005, where 78% of Americans expressed faith in the government's

³²³ Roz D. Lasker, *Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public*, 31.

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 36.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 37.

³²⁶ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 6.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

capabilities. The October poll also cited that fewer than three in ten citizens know what to do in the event of an attack of this type, half would not know where to get information, and three-quarters believe there would be panic.³²⁸

These findings, in combination, must be addressed in a preparedness and education campaign. People will not do what government expects and needs them to do in an emergency unless there is faith in local government. Likewise, an educated citizenry that knows what to do in an emergency is essential in creating a culture of preparedness.

In a post-Katrina world, a concerted effort to restore citizens' faith in government is needed and is critical for effective emergency preparedness and response efforts. Messengers of disaster preparedness and education are very important. Local government needs to be seen as a trusted resource, with viable emergency plans and strong leadership. Local government needs to team with trusted messengers in every community from clergy and neighborhood leaders to respected non-profit agencies. These messengers must be identified and employed in the effort to improve citizen preparedness.

Creating a culture of preparedness will require using a wide variety of conduits to reach the American people – employing many agents of change. The continued lack of faith in government reveals that perhaps government is not the best messenger (or “front person”) for preparedness messages, awareness efforts, and education. This is an area for further study.

G. FINDING, DEFINING, AND BRIDGING THE PREPAREDNESS DIVIDE

The images of stranded fellow Americans in New Orleans made it obvious that there is a preparedness divide³²⁹ in any major American city. The question becomes how to bridge that divide. Given that every city has citizens with limited funds, limited education, and limited access to information and the internet, how do we prepare our

³²⁸ ABC News Poll: “Confidence in Anti-Terror Response Drops.”

³²⁹ The phrase “preparedness divide” was identified by Dr. Paul Light in the report of his survey findings from October of 2005. See Paul C. Light, *The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness*.

vulnerable populations for disaster? Is disaster preparedness a top priority for a mother with a limited income trying to clothe and feed her children? Can we realistically expect it to be? How do we plan, as a city and community, for this reality?

The July 2005 NYU poll clearly demonstrated a preparedness divide exists. According to the study “socioeconomic status has a profound impact” on preparedness, with significant differences in preparedness between rich and poor and educated and less educated citizens.³³⁰ Most importantly, the study found that:

Less educated, lower income Americans are more likely to report problems getting resources to be prepared. Fifty-seven percent of those with a high school degree or less say they strongly or somewhat agree that they are not sure where to turn for help, compared with 39 percent of those with a college degree or more. In turn, 64 and 62 percent respectively of those with a high school degree or less say they wish they had more time and money to focus on preparing.³³¹

The study showed that high percentages of less educated, lower income Americans did not know what to do in the event of an emergency and the same group has little confidence in all but the fire department to assist people in need.³³²

The report states that this situation “presents a serious policy challenge as government, business, and charitable organizations look for ways to convince all Americans to prepare for the inevitable.”³³³ This situation presents significant policy and strategy challenges in preparing any major urban area for disaster and must be addressed as an integral part of creating a culture of preparedness.

³³⁰ Paul C. Light, *Preparing for the Unthinkable*, 8.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Ibid., 2.

H. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE IDEAL PROGRAM -- BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER

As seen in the surveys exhibiting the wholesale lack of preparedness among Americans, the impact of 9/11 and Katrina was “nearly nonexistent”³³⁴ in inspiring citizens to prepare. The creation of a culture of preparedness will largely rest on the ability to create a preparedness program that is well funded, sustainable and well crafted. More importantly, the creation of a culture of preparedness will require a complete overhaul of current efforts that are having minimal, if any, impact.

Israel provides interesting options for preparedness efforts, particularly in the area of education at the grammar and high school levels. Israel’s approach also provides a starting point for a thorough discussion of preparedness for responding to terrorism and the concept of resiliency based on partnership with government, an immediate return to normalcy, and the psychological preparedness of the citizenry.

Important concepts from social marketing should be applied to new efforts. The success of various social marketing campaigns, coupled with the power of cause marketing, should be adapted for a nationwide effort to create a culture of preparedness. Celebrity power should not be overlooked. The (Red) campaign has benefited from the involvement of Bono and many celebrities to raise awareness for AIDS in Africa. Major retailers have been successful in using their messaging conduits to raise awareness for other issues such as breast cancer and child hunger. Trusted messengers, including celebrities such as Oprah, should be utilized. Oprah can place a book on the bestseller list, or turn a product into a “must have” item for Americans, simply by mentioning it on her show.³³⁵ Star athletes, musicians, and others can all be used to push the message of preparedness within their spheres of influence. At the local level, trusted community leaders must be enlisted as part of the messenger brigade.

³³⁴ Council for Excellence in Government and the American Red Cross, *The Aftershock of Katrina and Rita: Public Not Moved to Prepare*, 2.

³³⁵ Hardy Green, “Why Oprah Opens Readers’ Wallets: She offers the guidance and sense of community bookstores no longer provide,” Commentary, Business Week Online, October 10, 2005, www.businessweek.com (accessed March 1, 2007).

Diverse experts from around the country, representing various schools of thought, need to be brought together to solve the complex and vexing issue of why citizens will not take action to prepare. Concepts from psychology, sociology, and marketing should all be used, and subject matter silos and stovepipes, as well as those that exist within the federal government, should be fused into a workable whole.

A complete and thorough analysis of the barriers to preparedness, as well as the motivators to action, is the key to success. Programs must be based on a thorough assessment of the target audience and the segmentation of the audience for messaging. Gender, age, ethnicity, education level, and geographic location all impact messaging for a population. Consistency and regularity of message is essential, with adaptations of an overall message to meet each targeted audience's knowledge, attitudes, practices, and beliefs. The use of trusted messengers to reach the population, as well as compelling taglines, are equally important to an effective campaign. Significant research, testing, and modeling at the federal level is needed in this area, with results then shared with urban areas to address their populations.

All of this will take a substantial investment. Government, in the face of survey after survey showing the abhorrent lack of preparedness in the country, can no longer short-change citizen preparedness efforts.

**VII. GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO MAKE A RADICAL SHIFT.
VIEWING EVERY POINT OF PREPAREDNESS AS A FORWARD
DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS, URGENCY & IMPORTANCE MUST
BE STRESSED AND GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO RE-EVALUATE
ITS STRATEGY AT EVERY LEVEL**

The population in urban areas is complacent. Citizens are unwilling to take measures to protect themselves and their families from disaster by being prepared to survive on their own for a minimum of seventy-two hours, to learn basic survival and rescue skills, and to have family emergency plans in place.³³⁶ As shown in the many surveys cited herein, current efforts are ineffective and there are dwindling resources for citizen preparedness efforts. The *Ready* campaign is under-funded and understaffed. Citizen Corps is as well. Government at all levels is not viewing citizen preparedness with the urgency and importance of an entity that sees a prepared citizenry and prepared communities as an invaluable asset in a time of disaster.

First responders generally are not supportive of citizen preparedness programs if programs detract financially from other high-priority issues such as equipment, training and personnel. Preparedness programs are treated as a low-priority issue among the competing needs of homeland security programs across the country. In addition, UASI funding and other homeland security grant dollars cannot be used to purchase caches of food and water, so the responsibility for providing caches of these vital supplies falls to mayors of major cities, as well as governors, and their General Fund budgets, lest they rely on the federal government for assistance. Whether mayors and governors fully understand and agree that this is their responsibility is not clear.

In the Bay Area, for example, FEMA maintains a 100,000 square foot warehouse at Moffet Field which houses relief supplies. This warehouse is not dedicated to the Bay Area, and supplies move in and out of the center for distribution throughout the country on a regular basis. The Bay Area is likely to experience a major earthquake, with a debilitating impact on the region and the national economy. The Bay Area has been rated

³³⁶ Paul C. Light, *The Katrina Effect on American Preparedness*, Executive Summary.

in the Tier I category for UASI funding alongside New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston as the areas at highest risk for acts of terrorism.³³⁷ Despite these facts, there is no set level of preparedness and relief supplies stationed in the Bay Area by the federal government. The American Red Cross maintains some limited supplies at their facility in Dublin, California. Recently, ARC has augmented supplies for Northern California in a warehouse just over the state line in Nevada. In the Bay Area, San Francisco and the major cities of Oakland and San Jose store extremely limited emergency supplies (mostly geared toward sustaining first responders only) and very limited care and shelter supplies (such as cots and blankets), relying mostly on the ARC for assistance.³³⁸ Cities such as Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. also maintain only limited supplies.³³⁹

The post-Katrina Townsend Report called for the creation of a “Culture of Preparedness”³⁴⁰ – with citizens taking personal responsibility for their own preparedness -- which has yet to be fully described, vetted, and adequately funded. As Americans remain woefully unprepared for disaster, caches of supplies stored by local government in urban areas are limited. Mayors and governors must choose to take on the responsibility for providing food and water for their citizens after a disaster or get serious about citizen preparedness.

Devastating natural disasters will leave urban areas without help or assistance, with thousands of unprepared citizens looking for assistance. As an example, according to the CAPPS Report (Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety), a repeat of the 1906 Earthquake in San Francisco will lead to the destruction of over 80,000 housing units and

³³⁷ United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of Grants and Training, “Overview: FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program,” January 5, 2007, www.dhs.gov (accessed March 2007).

³³⁸ Some caches of first aid and other shelter supplies are currently being purchased in the Bay Area, but are of limited quantities.

³³⁹ Telephone interviews with Barbara Childs-Pair, Director of Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., and Ellis Stanley, Director, City of Los Angeles, Emergency Preparedness Department, November 2005.

³⁴⁰ Townsend Report, 79.

over 60,000 displaced persons within the city.³⁴¹ A quake of this magnitude will impact the entire Bay Area, which has a population of over seven million, two major ports, three major airports, and a large economy. According to the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), a major quake on the San Andreas fault or a rupture of the Hayward fault (debilitating the entire East Bay and severely impacting San Francisco) will render major roads impassable, disruptions of major utilities will occur, overpasses will collapse, hospitals will be severely impacted or collapse, bridges will be impacted, transportation will shut down, rail service will be disrupted, airports and runways will be out of service, and first responders and disaster service workers will be unable to reach their places of work due to the severe curtailment of travel.³⁴² Movement of supplies and rescue and relief workers will be an incredible challenge. San Francisco, as a peninsula, will be essentially cut off from assistance.

As was shown in the Gulf States, entire urban areas can be cut off from assistance for a significant period of time due to damage to the terrain. The lack of citizen preparedness will have devastating consequences in future disasters. Ninety percent of the nation's population lives in areas with a high risk for at least one major hazard or threat. The majority (58%) of the nation's population lives in metropolitan areas with one million or more residents.³⁴³ Given these numbers, the continued state of an unprepared citizenry, left unaddressed, will be a repeat of the Gulf States when a major disaster occurs.

Those first responders who are on site and available must prioritize and respond to the most acute needs of the population and the city as a whole. A population that needs water and food will lose patience within the first forty-eight hours of a disaster.

³⁴¹ San Francisco Department of Building Inspection, *Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPPS)*, *San Francisco's Earthquake Risk: Report on Potential Earthquake Impacts in San Francisco* (Draft), prepared by the Applied Technology Council, April 5, 2003.

³⁴² Association of Bay Area Governments, *Taming Natural Disasters, Multi-jurisdictional Local Government Hazard Mitigation Plan for the San Francisco Bay Area* (Oakland, CA: Association of Bay Area Governments, March 2005).

³⁴³ United States Department of Homeland Security, *Draft Target Capabilities List*, September 2006, 116.

The responsibility to care for citizens in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and before federal aid arrives will fall to the mayor and state governor. How does an urban area and state realistically prepare for this time period?

A. CHANGING THE MINDSET OF GOVERNMENT TO SEE EVERY POINT OF PREPAREDNESS AS A POINT OF FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS -- FINDING A *BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY*

The best selling book, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, reveals that new ideas, and looking at issues from another vantage point, often have the effect of dramatically changing an approach to solving issues, presenting ideas and opening up entire new markets.³⁴⁴ This book is instructive in two ways. First, it points to ways of altering the mindset of government to view citizen preparedness and every point of preparedness as the forward deployment of assets and an essential component in disaster preparation, response, and recovery efforts. Second, it suggests dramatic new ways to approach the American public in getting them to prepare. According to the concepts of a *Blue Ocean Strategy*, attracting new customers and non-customers (citizens) to become prepared is an essential step in creating a “tipping point” toward a culture of preparedness. The issue of government mindset is discussed in this chapter; the issue of preparedness campaigns and the need for dramatic new approaches has been discussed in Chapter VI.

Government can be inspired to change its view of citizen preparedness through the application of *Blue Ocean Strategy* concepts. These include: a value proposition; the creation of true community preparedness efforts (as a forward deployment of assets) through established delivery systems (for messaging and for distribution); a strategy canvas showing the current system and the value of a new approach; the identification of key organizational hurdles; and the need to drive the plan.

³⁴⁴ W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant*, (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 2005).

1. Value Proposition

Citizen preparedness is the key to the survival of a community in the event of a catastrophic disaster. It is incumbent upon federal, state, and local officials to focus on citizen preparedness as a valuable asset in the response, recovery, and resiliency of communities.

Is the right answer to have caches of supplies strategically placed by FEMA throughout the country near high threat/high risk cities? Is the expectation that the federal government will bring in adequate supplies within seventy-two hours a realistic assumption? Do mayors want to rely on this proposition after Katrina? What about the acute phase of the first seventy-two hours, when there is no promise of support? Should mayors be expected to spend millions of General Fund dollars to invest in food, water, and supplies, alongside the cost of warehousing and staffing seismically-sound and climate-controlled buildings, and be ready to move supplies through a chain of distribution with disaster service workers and first responders? Will the workers be there to distribute the supplies? Will roads be passable and equipment available to distribute supplies? How will priorities for supplies be handled? Is this a workable and cost effective strategy when there are immediate pressing demands for General Fund dollars at the local level for homelessness, health care, crime, and education?

Despite FEMA's efforts to increase the amount of supplies on hand in the post-Katrina era, the current system is doomed to fail again. It still relies on the ability to get supplies moved into a devastated area. This system is especially precarious when disasters strike without warning, such as major earthquakes and acts of terrorism, where the possibility to pre-stage and "lean forward" with supplies and relief teams does not exist.

Investing in a prepared citizenry, armed with supplies for a minimum of seventy-two hours, and with the education and training needed to survive the acute phase of disaster, is a far more effective strategy for building a resilient community. A prepared citizenry knows what to do and takes care of itself when disaster hits. First responders

and local officials are able to focus on response efforts and the restoration of lifelines and caring for those most in need. Fear and panic are held to a minimum when citizens are educated and prepared for disaster.

An effective community-based preparedness program will help alleviate the enormous pressure on first responders and local officials post-disaster. The investment of dollars in preparing individuals and communities, so that supplies are present in the community and within the neighborhoods of a city, will help lessen the need for locally warehoused supplies. A prepared citizenry will also lessen the demand – during the acute phase of response, rescue, and recovery – for a city to move and distribute supplies, and allow authorities to give priority to immediate response efforts (mass casualties, fire suppression, restoration of utilities and transportation) with the limited number of available workers and responders.

Storage of food and water is a costly venture. A recent study in San Francisco showed that the cost of purchasing Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) and water packs to care for 30,000 people for three days would well exceed \$12 million over a ten year period. This is exclusive of warehouse rental or real estate purchase costs, personnel, and other costs associated with this type of program.³⁴⁵

It is important to have some caches of supplies, but it is unrealistic to (1) expect to cover everyone who will be in need after a major event and (2) believe that immediately following a major event an effective distribution system will be in place. The creation of a culture of preparedness in every urban area is essential in order to allow a mix of cached supplies and prepared citizens to carry an urban area through the first seventy-two hours of a disaster. Caches of supplies are needed to address the issue of the preparedness divide. These supplies should be available to challenged communities, as there is no feasible way for government to store food and water for the entire population of an urban area.

³⁴⁵ City & County of San Francisco, *Food and Water Study*, December 2006, unpublished.

2. Building an Effective Community Based Program: Every Point of Preparedness Becomes a Forward Deployment of Assets, Using Existing Delivery Systems for Preparedness Efforts

The current DHS campaigns for individual preparedness represent a one-size-fits-all approach to preparedness which is not resonating with the general public in major American cities. Urban areas have the ability to mobilize around pressing social issues and to take action. Most urban areas have extensive community-based and community-focused programs, from public health issues to community policing to issues of homelessness and housing. School communities, religious communities, volunteer groups, and trade associations are all part of the fabric of the community. Culturally competent, community-based preparedness programs, based on mass mobilization strategies, are the most effective way to prepare an urban area. These types of programs capitalize on the already existing “delivery” systems from which citizens seek and obtain information, where they find trusted messengers they are willing to listen to – in the workplace, at school, in churches, and at community centers. Under a system where every neighborhood and community is prepared for disaster, every point of preparedness becomes a point for forward deployment of survival supplies, negating the enormous costs for massive warehousing and the unrealistic expectation that in a major disaster a distribution system will be easily created. Preparing communities, neighborhoods, and individuals to be educated, have supplies, and follow established plans all work toward the creation of a true culture of preparedness.

Urban dwellers value and respond to a system that creates empowerment and strengthens communities and neighborhoods. They will rise to the occasion if they understand that being prepared and taking financial responsibility for themselves and their family in a disaster would allow General Fund dollars to go to social programs, rather than to the exorbitant cost of warehousing food and water. Likewise, a desire to help first responders – alleviating pressure on those responders in a disaster – plays strongly to the values of the community. Empowerment is valued by urban area residents; creating preparedness programs which stress empowerment may resonate within many communities.

3. Strategy Canvas: A Better Approach

A Strategy Canvas comparing the current DHS model to a proposed community-based model is set forth below. The current system relies on minimal resources provided for citizen preparedness efforts, a traditional “hub and spoke” distribution of supplies post-disaster from warehouses outside the impacted area, and the assembly of relief teams from outside the impacted area for deployment after disaster strikes. The reach and effectiveness of the current DHS preparedness campaign is questionable. Supplies within communities and individual households (a true forward deployment) remain at extremely low levels. FEMA and ARC supplies, stored in large caches, may not be reliable in a disaster, thus leaving urban areas at risk during the seventy-two hours immediately following a disaster. Massive warehousing strategies (whether implemented by the federal or local government) are expensive – especially in costs for transportation, rental of facilities, and the procurement of the supplies themselves. As a result, under the current strategy, the seventy-two hour gap will most likely remain unfilled and enormous pressure will be placed on local authorities during the most acute response phase – where attention should be focused on the highest priorities for rescue, fire suppression, saving lives and property, and the restoration of lifelines .

An article in *The Washington Post* revealed that FEMA is still experiencing significant problems with logistics, and new programs for improved tracking, as well as logistics support, are substantially delayed. As the old adage states “Wars are won and lost on logistics.” According to Senate investigators, “After Katrina, FEMA could not meet Mississippi’s requests for food and water for 10 days.”³⁴⁶ The article shows that 279 truckloads of MREs and other food worth almost \$43 million were simply discarded for lack of proper climate controlled warehouse space. FEMA and DHS had increased supplies of food, water, and ice, “storing enough to feed 1 million people for a week” prior to the last hurricane season.³⁴⁷ As a result, according to this article, FEMA is now

³⁴⁶ Spencer S. Hsu, “FEMA Food Went to Waste: More than \$40 million worth of supplies tossed out, scavenged for re-use,” *The Washington Post*, April 13, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com (accessed April 13, 2007).

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

cutting overall inventory and will increase its reliance on the military for cold storage facilities. The agency will respond more quickly with supplies, with assistance from the military and private contractors.

The alternative community-based model, founded upon an aggressive community education and preparedness campaign, allows for the forward deployment of supplies within individual homes, communities, and neighborhoods. The aggressive campaigns break through the barriers to preparedness and find the motivators that push citizens to prepare – attracting traditional “non-customers” of the preparedness message (discussed *infra*). It also allows for trained volunteers within communities, acting as relief teams, to be immediately available within the impacted area. In this manner, the seventy-two hour gap is better handled and the pressure on local authorities and first responders during the acute phase of response is substantially relieved. This type of effort capitalizes on established and successful community-oriented efforts and provides a sense of empowerment for the community as a motivating force. Likewise, this model requires that federal, state, and local government are clear in answering the question of who “owns” the seventy-two hour gap. Mayors and governors either take dramatic action to prepare their residents for disaster, or rely on a system that makes no promise of support in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.




Figure 1. Strategy Canvas for Citizen Preparedness Programs

4. Organizational Hurdles

In looking to new strategies, organizational and other hurdles are often encountered. First is a cognitive hurdle – breaking down the status quo. Elected officials need to fully understand the importance of public preparedness. The big question is “who owns the issue” of preparing the community? Is it a local, state, or federal issue? All disasters are local – and it is the mayor who will be on television in the first seventy-two hours, being asked why food and water are not available for the citizenry. FEMA’s standard is seventy-two hours – but is it wise for a mayor to rely so heavily on outside assistance? Realistically, a mayor and governor should look to the citizenry itself as a

partner in preparedness – and to the communities, neighborhoods, and individual households as the repository of supplies. Without a prepared citizenry, chaos is certain in disaster. Local and state government must embrace the need for a strategic shift in how it views citizen preparedness – and why it is critically important.

Another hurdle is resources. An aggressive community planning and preparedness program is less costly than massive warehousing. A warehousing system is also doomed to failure if roads are impassable and there are limited workers and equipment. Also, post disaster, identifying the “needs” of various communities is easier if the communities themselves are prepared with supplies.

Motivation can be another hurdle to overcome. The Bay Area is at high risk for earthquakes and for acts of terrorism. Other urban areas face the same threat of terrorism and natural disasters. The failure to effectively prepare the community will further traumatize a community in crisis. The country can no longer fail to invest in, plan, and prepare for resilient communities.

Politics always plays a role. The big question remains: Who owns the seventy-two hour gap? Who owns the issue of citizen preparedness? Whether they like it or not, the answer is local government and its officials. All levels of government have a major part to play in citizen preparedness, but mayors and governors are best suited to delivering the preparedness message, to understanding the proper conduits to reach their constituencies, and to find the right messengers to motivate citizens to take action. Katrina should have been enough harsh reality for any civic leader – providing the “urgency and emotional impetus”³⁴⁸ needed to stimulate change in the political body to take citizen preparedness seriously. When executives have been asked “...what prompts them to seek out blue oceans and introduce change, they usually say that it takes a highly determined leader or a serious crisis.” A mayor or governor can choose to be highly motivated on this topic ahead of time, or face serious crisis in a disaster, risking a repeat of the experiences of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.

³⁴⁸ W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, 154.

The federal government does have a significant role to play in citizen preparedness. Most immediately, this role is one of providing substantial financial resources, structuring campaigns for an aggressive nationwide effort to create a culture of preparedness, engaging in the baseline research that is essential to messaging, and effectively targeting the population. These tools should be provided to urban areas to then craft, tailor, and adjust programs, based on sound and extensive research and development of effective messages for their populations. It is up to mayors and governors to implement programs in their jurisdictions (using the valuable tools provided by the federal government), to identify barriers to preparedness, and to find what motivates their particular population and targeted audiences to prepare – in addition to identifying and bridging the preparedness divide.

The federal government has created significant expectations in calling for the creation of a culture of preparedness. The *Target Capabilities List*, in setting forth performance measurements and metrics, is unrealistic in its scope for citizen preparedness unless the federal government makes a dramatic shift in providing financial resources and other support to local and state government. The federal government has a limited capacity in the FY 2008 budget to foster a culture of preparedness, having cut Citizen Corps and *Ready* funding; yet the *Target Capabilities List* places an enormous burden and expectation of performance on local and state government.³⁴⁹

5. Driving the Plan: The Key is Effective and Aggressive Community Preparedness Programs at the Local Level

Serious efforts to study and create new ways to reach the American public are essential to the creation of a culture of preparedness. According to *Blue Ocean Strategy* concepts, driving a successful plan and preparedness campaign will require reaching out to “new customers” and “non-customers”³⁵⁰ of the preparedness message – those who are

³⁴⁹ Funds may be used from other federal grant sources, but are not required to be spent on citizen preparedness. The language in UASI, SHSGP, and other programs is permissive and not mandatory. See also Citizen Corps, “2007 Funding and Community Preparedness,” March 29, 2007, www.citizencorps.gov (accessed April 30, 2007).

³⁵⁰ W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, 28, 88, 102-04.

not listening to the message and those who choose to ignore the message – and finding out why they do not listen to or ignore the message. The simplicity of the message or use of “a compelling tagline”³⁵¹ is essential to reaching the population. New efforts are needed in analyzing what types of campaigns and messages truly motivate people to prepare. “Challenging an industry’s conventional wisdom about which buyer group to target can lead to the discovery of a new blue ocean.”³⁵² Current efforts are largely ineffective. Engaging every level of the community – from young to old, large to small businesses and merchants, large ethnic populations, community based organizations, and religious organizations and large congregations is an absolute necessity.

UASI and other homeland security funding must be tied to an urban area’s demonstrated efforts at achieving a comprehensive citizen preparedness program, with metrics for measuring success. The current *TCL* creates an ideal state of readiness for the American people. Yet, it sets an impossible goal and an unreachable bar given the overall lack of funding and attention by the federal government for this most important issue. The *TCL* should be revised to more realistically reflect the current status of citizen preparedness in the country and provide realistic goals. The federal government needs to provide far more resources for achieving the end state in the current *TCL*.

Local and state governments need incentives. In the seatbelt campaign, only upon the threat of loss of highway funds for states not meeting the 85% usage rate did Governors take the law seriously and implement aggressive campaigns and enforcement efforts. Mayors and governors must understand that they “own” the seventy-two hour gap. They can choose to fill the gap with cached supplies or embrace the importance of citizen preparedness programs (viewing prepared households as a forward deployment of assets and trained volunteers as a force multiplier) and embrace both as essential components of the survival of a city in a disaster.

A pilot program, in partnership with DHS in each of the highest risk cities, should be initiated with a steady stream of funding over a five-year period with a long-term

³⁵¹ W. Chan Kim, Renee Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, 37.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 61.

vision for sustained efforts. Overall federal efforts must focus on researching and working with experts in public health with social marketing expertise, marketing experts, sociologists and psychologists, and others to create an effective and aggressive national effort. Focus groups in each of the urban areas should be established to develop specific and compelling messages that resonate with the various communities housed within the urban area, ensuring cultural competency. The messages created, whether based on fear, a sense of civic duty, altruism, empowerment, responsibility for family, or other aspects, should all be evaluated for their motivational and persuasive value and success in moving citizens to action. Similarly, the community outreach efforts (partnerships with congregations, schools, community-based organizations, neighborhoods, businesses, apartment complex owners, and non-profit agencies) should be evaluated for their effectiveness. Preparedness and the resulting forward deployment of supplies within the community should be measured.

The federal government, in partnership with state and local partners, must build on the successes of Citizen Corps, *Ready*, and other efforts across the country, in individual cities or states, to prepare citizens for disaster. A new approach must be taken to meet the urgent need to prepare urban areas for disaster. No longer can the federal government rely on under-funded Citizen Corps programs and the under-staffed *Ready* campaign as its citizen preparedness efforts. There must be a wholesale change in government's approach to the issue of citizen preparedness. It must begin to see citizen preparedness (including trained and educated volunteers) as a serious, full-scale plan for the forward deployment of supplies and assets in a disaster, based on a partnership of all levels of government working together with the citizens and the communities they serve.

VIII. CONCLUSION

A culture of preparedness can be created in America. It will require dramatic changes in government at all levels, coupled with a profound shift in the American people embracing the importance of preparedness. Despite the urgency of improving preparedness numbers, this shift will entail a long, steady process, as has been the case in any major cultural shift in America.

In order to create a culture of preparedness, several substantial issues must be addressed and resolved, and several large steps will need to be taken, as indicated below.

“Ownership” of citizen preparedness must be established. A clear vision of who “owns” the responsibility for citizen preparedness must be resolved. Is it the responsibility of the federal government to run a national program, or is it the responsibility of governors, county-level officials, or mayors to ensure citizens are prepared to be on their own for seventy-two hours? Mayors, governors, and county administrators have not acted as a unified and collective voice to demand a well funded, comprehensive, nationwide effort to create a culture of preparedness. It is unclear whether mayors and governors see citizen preparedness as their obligation or responsibility, or fully understand the impact of an unprepared citizenry.

Formal policy must be adopted by national organizations to prioritize citizen preparedness. It is unclear whether mayors and governors accept citizen preparedness as their responsibility given the absence of formal policy statements on the importance of, and need for, a robust nationwide citizen preparedness effort from the National Governors’ Association, the United States Conference of Mayors, or the National Association of Counties. These organizations, as well as America’s mayors, governors, and county administrators, need to adopt formal policies endorsing a culture of preparedness and embracing citizen preparedness as a top priority.

Government at all levels must recognize the vital importance of citizen preparedness, viewing each point of preparedness as a forward deployment of assets. Government at all levels must prioritize, both in budgets and written policy, the

importance of citizen preparedness, viewing prepared citizens and communities as a forward deployment of assets and trained citizens as force multipliers. This requires a radical shift from viewing citizen preparedness efforts as “feel good” actions to embracing the importance of citizen preparedness as a vital component in the survivability and resiliency of a city after a major event. Local government will be charged with the care and feeding of its citizens during the acute phase of a disaster if its citizenry remains unprepared, untrained, and without basic essentials. Such a burden will place enormous stress on first responders and disaster workers whose attention should be focused on caring for those most in need and the restoration of lifelines.

The traditional first responder community must embrace citizen preparedness as a vital part of the “first response.” Unfortunately, the traditional first responder community has treated citizen preparedness as a “second-tier” need. Training, equipment, and exercises have all been given a much higher priority in competing for and distributing federal grant funds for homeland security. Until the first responder community embraces citizen preparedness as part of the “first response,” as a forward deployment of assets with trained citizens as force multipliers in a disaster, a major hurdle will remain in the prioritization of grant dollars.

Funding for citizen preparedness programs must be revised and augmented. Citizen preparedness competes for funding with many pressing needs in the world of homeland security – improving prevention efforts, securing our borders and coastlines, aviation security, transit security, information sharing, improving communications interoperability, improving CBRNE detection and response, training and exercises for first responders, infrastructure protection, and mass casualty and mass prophylaxis planning and response, to name a few. Citizen preparedness can no longer fall among the lowest priorities for funding. Current grant programs provide small baseline funding for citizen preparedness efforts. Although the larger grant programs (UASI, SHSGP and others) allow for the use of funds for citizen preparedness efforts, it is permissive and not mandatory to provide funding from these grant dollars to citizen preparedness efforts.

Substantial investment in future efforts will be needed to create a “profound and enduring” transformation of citizen preparedness and establish a culture of preparedness in America.

The federal government must use its vast resources to fuse the experience and knowledge base currently existing within the various federal agencies and other levels of government, the private sector, public sector, and academia, and move toward a comprehensive approach to address the issue of why Americans don’t prepare, determine how to motivate people to prepare, and identify and overcome barriers to preparedness. No local or state government is going to solve this complicated issue on its own. As was evidenced in the research, changing human behavior is a complex undertaking. Despite admirable efforts, Americans remain woefully unprepared. Dramatic changes are needed in the messaging and approach to citizen preparedness, to identify barriers to preparedness and motivators which inspire the adoption of the preparedness message and lead to action on the part of the American people. Substantial new research, along with the significant existing bodies of knowledge (from sociology, psychology, marketing and public health expertise in social marketing, as well as other subject matter expertise), must be fused into one unified effort to create a nationwide effort. This collective expertise and research must be used to create a model program to inspire a cultural shift in which the American people embrace the message of preparedness and act on it.

Children have proven to be effective agents of change. Many agents of change must be employed to penetrate the American psyche and move people to action. Many different messengers and adaptations of messages for targeted audiences must be used to reach the American population, as a one-size-fits-all approach will not be successful.

All levels of government must work together on this issue, and a major federal investment in (1) synthesizing and building upon current and past preparedness efforts; (2) fusing the silos and stovepipes of marketing and behavioral sciences, among others, as well as all federal partners; and (3) bringing top experts in various relevant fields (from think tanks to academics to practitioners) into one cohesive whole to develop effective means to reach the population with the preparedness message and provide useful, hands-on guidance for local and state government in developing tailored efforts in

their communities. Given the vast resources of the federal government, it should act as the “convener” in bringing the necessary experts together and funding intensive study of what works in persuading Americans to prepare. Using this research, the federal government (working side-by-side with local and state government) should pilot programs in a few urban areas, tailored to each urban area (within guidelines), over the next five years. There should be guaranteed funding to constantly test, adjust, and validate the programs. If results are successful, the program should then be rolled out nationwide.

It should be noted that federal efforts have been admirable in the creation of Citizen Corps and its programs and the development of the *Ready* campaign. These important programs remain understaffed and under-funded. The necessary level of funding and access to resources for this type of undertaking is required at the federal level to create a “profound and enduring” change in the nation as called for in the Townsend Report.

Psychological preparedness for terrorism and creating a resilient population must be addressed. The country, as a whole, has taken an “all hazards” approach to citizen preparedness. One of the main purposes of terrorism is to instill mass fear and create uncertainty in the population about its government’s ability to protect its people. In order to defeat terrorism, a population must be resilient in response to terrorism and be psychologically prepared to handle terrorist events, returning immediately to a sense of normalcy. Psychological preparedness for terrorism and creating a resilient population are largely absent from citizen preparedness efforts, yet they are essential in creating a culture of preparedness. Israel has a culture of preparedness and several lessons can be adopted from this culture to help infuse Americans with the responsibility and duty to prepare. Israel provides a model for psychological preparedness for terrorism, which the United States must begin to address as a part of citizen preparedness efforts. A psychologically prepared, resilient community should be the end state of citizen preparedness efforts and a culture of preparedness.

Consistent messaging, a definition of preparedness, and measurement tools must be established. There is wide disparity in the definition of “preparedness” and

what it means to be prepared. “Preparedness” and “culture of preparedness” must be defined and efforts for preparedness must be measured for progress and accountability. As part of the suggested fusion of efforts, a definition of preparedness is an essential first step. Measurement tools, based on accepted definitions, are necessary to establish a comprehensive baseline and track progress and areas for improvements. In order to create a culture of preparedness there must be a common understood goal, consistent message, and a defined end state for preparedness programs and efforts.

In order to create a culture of preparedness much needs to be done. There are two major hurdles: government and the American people. The federal government must prioritize citizen preparedness through a substantial increase in resources and development of a large-scale national effort. Federal, state and local governments must be clear on who “owns” the seventy-two hour gap. State and local government must embrace the importance of citizen preparedness, view every point of preparedness as a forward deployment of assets to alleviate the seventy-two hour gap, and view trained citizens as immediately available “force multipliers” in relief and rescue efforts. In turn, the American people must embrace their role and responsibility to be prepared for disaster. The nationwide effort, based on a dramatic new approach, using myriad expertise and research efforts brought together to address the complex issue of why citizens do not prepare, must start to take hold and move citizens to action. As the government at all levels changes its perception of the importance of citizen preparedness, and as Americans begin to respond to a dramatic and effective new message of preparedness, this synergy may lead to the cultural shift and tipping point needed to create a culture of preparedness.

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